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Communication of Politics 
and Politics of Communication in Indonesia:  
A Study on Media Performance, Responsibility and Accountability 
 
Abstract 
Political communication scholars have long explored the communication of 
politics, what could be called “the first face of the coin.” It is interesting, however, to 
observe that in Indonesian history, the second face of political communication, i.e., the 
politics of communication, has been the predominant force driving the country’s politics. 
Against this background, the present research attempts to address the theoretical shortage in 
the development of the political communication field in Indonesia by providing a 
comprehensive Model of the Political Communication Field embracing the two faces of 
political communication. The breeding ground for this model was found in a simpler model 
that is still capable of representing the larger map of the political communication field in its 
essence. The Media Performance Model describes a continuous interplay among four power 
entities, also called factors, i.e. Government, Market, Civil Society and the Media. The 
result of the internal interplay within each factor will inevitably impact the external 
interplay among these four factors. Therefore, the outcomes (at a given period in time) are 
visualized in what the media do, referred to by the so-called “media performance.” In turn, 
the impact of the external interplay is further brought into the internal media environment 
as input for the internal interplay of each factor in the media organization, and so forth.  
The present research illustrates the necessity to connect media performance to the 
concepts of Media Responsibility and Accountability. Media Responsibility (assigned, 
contracted, self-designed and denied responsibility) will show the directions the media are 
taking in meeting the public’s expectations, while Media Accountability (political, market, 
public, and professional accountability) will show the directions citizens can take to 
actively compel the media to meet their expectations, so as to render politics of 
communication beneficial to all elements in society.  
Equipped with a comprehensive map of political communication, the present research 
examines concrete operationalizations of Media Performance, Responsibility and 
Accountability taking place during the past twenty years of political communication in 
Indonesia in general (Chapter 1), in the television sector (Chapter 2), in the local 
newspapers and radio stations (Chapter 3) and in the negotiations between the public and 
the community media (Chapter 4). The performance of the media was examined during the 
three subsequent eras that have colored Indonesia during the past twenty years – the 
Soeharto Era (better known as the New Order Era), the May 1998 Revolution, and the 
Reform Era (after the downfall of Soeharto on May 21, 1998). 
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1. Background and Theoretical Framework 
 
If Indonesian democracy 
–restored in 1998 after the fall of Soeharto— 
were a website, visitors would only read this line on it: 
This site is still under construction! 
(Basorie, 2001). 
 
This dissertation is located at the heart a ”website of democracies under 
construction” (please imagine that you encounter such a website that gives no hint 
of why it occurred and when it would be accomplished). As a researcher, I 
deliberately chose to revisit the political communication aspects of that large and 
endless project, for at least three reasons. First, I assume that the failure so far to 
build democracy in Indonesia has something to do with political communication. 
Second, only very few people or parties have paid attention to political 
communication in Indonesia. To put it in other words, I assume that the 
governmental practices, political interactions and processes among interest groups, 
as well as interactions in the newsrooms, have never been analyzed appropriately in 
terms of political communication science, or worse, are not yet a matter of public 
concern. Third, Indonesians in general, and government officials and politicians in 
particular, have kept confusing the notion of simple analyses on communication-
related aspects of political practices with analyses on political communication as an 
academic exercises. Certainly, these reasons taken together have exacerbated the 
problem.  
 
2. Political Communication as a Field of Study  
Regarding the first assumption, we should begin with stating that political 
communication must include two aspects. First, the communication of politics. This 
could be traced back to Laswell’s suggestion that an act of communication can be 
analyzed in terms of “who says what in which channel to whom with what effect” 
(Laswell, 1948, p. 37). Second, the politics of communication. To the best of my 
knowledge, even though numerous activists and scholars have been working in this 
area, this was not explicitly seen as a serious future concern in the field of political 
communication until recently.  Chaffee (2001) gave it importance by surmising that 
Laswell might phrase it [to make a new aphorism in line with Laswell’s previous 
aphorism] as follows: Who gets to say what to whom? (p. 243) 
The history of political communication has given the first aspect strong 
support. As a matter of fact, this field dates back to the very earliest research on 
mass communication (Chaffee & Hochheimer, 1985). According to Ryfe (2001,  p. 
408), it is in the theoretical and methodological commitments of this early research 
that the field’s place in history was established. These commitments, in turn, were 
shaped primarily by three disciplines: social psychology, mass communication 
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research, and political science. Of the three, perhaps social psychology exercised the 
most profound influence. It was from this discipline that the field inherited its 
interest in attitudes, opinions, and beliefs. Social psychology emerged as a field of 
study in the early 1900s, but by the 1920s its basic perspective was employed by a 
host of communication scholars (Delia, 1987, p. 39). The “four great men” of early 
communication research (according to Berelson, 1959) were all trained in the social 
psychology tradition. Not surprisingly, the earliest studies of political 
communication – from Laswell’s (1927) analysis of political propaganda to Hadley 
Cantril & Gordon Allport’s (1935) study of persuasion, and Walter Lippman’s 
theory of public opinion (1922) – were heavily influenced by social psychology. 
And since social psychology’s substantive interest in individual attitudes was 
combined with a deep methodological concern for precise measurement and 
experimentation, survey and experimental studies have become the two most 
common instruments of data collection in political communication. 
The twentieth-century political scientists began to see politics in terms of 
group competition for scarce resources. The notion was first introduced by Arthur 
Bentley (1908/1967). Through careful observation of Chicago politics, Bentley 
concluded that the essence of politics was the action of groups. Bentley defined 
groups by their interests. Thus Bentley conceived of politics as a process of 
interaction among interest groups; and this view became pervasive in postwar 
political science (Ryfe, 2001: 409), especially in the pluralist model advanced by 
political scientists such as David Truman (1951/1962) and Robert Dahl (1956). In 
addition to these developments, another important parameter of political 
communication research was the “proposition that communication in election 
campaigns constitutes the field’s paradigm case” (Swanson & Nimmo, 1990, p. 8; 
see also Denton & Woodward, 1998; Stuckey, 1996).    
Finally, the political communication field has inherited from mass 
communication research a language of “effects” and “influences.” When analysts of 
political communication investigate the role of mass media in politics, they typically 
ask research questions that seek to measure the “effects” of mass media (for a 
summary of theories in this vein, see McQuail, 1994). This orientation is in perfect 
keeping with the behaviorist mood of the field and with its interest in examining 
influences on, and changes in, attitudes, beliefs, and opinions (Ryfe, 2001, p. 410). 
The important and long-standing theories of political communication – from two-
step flow to agenda setting to framing and priming – have their roots in the 
language of effects.  
Certainly, there were other scholars using approaches derived from a variety 
of critical and cultural theories which have challenged the statement that the focus 
of political communication is communication in election campaigns (cf. Fiske, 
1996; Gitlin, 1980; Hartley, 1992; Miller, 1998). Likewise, much of the 
contemporary literature responds to the trends by examining the “effect” and 
“influences” and seeks to extend these theories (cf. Hart & Shaw, 2001). 
In short, Ryfe believes that early social psychology, political science, and 
mass communication research provided a series of terms that continue to mark the 
boundaries of the field: opinions, attitudes and beliefs, politics as a process, and 
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media effects. These terms conjure research agendas that seek to measure the effect 
of mass media on attitudes, beliefs and opinions expressed within the political 
process. But Ryfe acknowledges that they are more flexible than absolute 
boundaries. 
 
3. Indonesian History and Contexts for Political Communication 
One consequence of the “core” conception of political communication and 
its lines of research is the ignorance of, or the delay in paying serious attention to, 
the second aspect of political communication, i.e. the politics of communication, 
which is exactly the problem haunting a country like Indonesia. Since the Dutch 
colonial period, conflict and suppression have been the constants in the relationship 
between the authorities and the media. According to media educator and writer 
Atmakusumah Astraatmadja (1998), from the time the first newspaper in Indonesia 
was published in the mid-18th century to the present, “there has not been one period 
of considerable length without government pressure and suppression of the press” 
(quoted in Basorie, 2001). 
Perhaps the period between 1950 and 1957 was an exception. At the time, 
postwar independent Indonesia had governments (led by a prime minister) that 
lasted only two years or so, or merely months. Yet, most members of the press were 
then unapologetical partisans, mouthpieces of the political parties. Of course, at the 
same time, there were also a handful of non-party newspapers. Indonesia Raya 
(Greater Indonesia), in particular, was fond of exposing the corruption and misdeeds 
of whichever government was in power. 
By 1957, the Republic’s first president, Soekarno, found himself trying to 
quell several separatist rebellions, notably in West Sumatra and North Sulawesi. 
Thus, he declared martial law. Within that year alone, the government carried out as 
many as 125 acts of suppression against the press, including interrogations of 
journalists, warnings, detentions and closures of newspapers (Smith, 1983). 
Indonesia Raya, meanwhile, was finally banned in 1958.  
Two years later, Soekarno presented newspaper and magazine publishers 
with a nineteen-point statement of support for his program, which he asked them to 
sign; the alternative was the cessation of their publications. The statement amounted 
to a loyalty pledge. Point 1, for example, compelled the signatory to obey all 
guidelines issued by the government concerning publications. Point 8 required the 
publication to be a supporter and defender of “guided democracy” (Surjomihardjo, 
1980).  
In October 1965, the so-called “coup by the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI)” took place, and it opened the way for the military to come marching into the 
Presidential Palace. In the next year, Soekarno ceded power to General Soeharto. 
One of the Soekarno’s last acts as president was to sign into law the Republic’s first 
Press Act.  
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According to Article 8 of the 1966 Act, the print media were not required to 
secure a license before operating. In practice, however, newspapers and magazines 
had to seek a permit called the “printing license” (Surat Izin Terbit or SIT) from the 
Department of Information. It might be associated with another article in that law 
calling for the issuance of licenses, since Indonesia was supposedly in a state of 
transition. Those articles contradicted one another.  
Following the Dutch colonial Period, with its long-standing politics of 
communication, came the three subsequent eras of Indonesian history, namely:  
• The Soeharto Era (better known as the New Order Era);  
• The May 1998 Revolution;  
• The Reform Era (after the downfall of Soeharto on May 21, 1998).  
How the politics of communication worked in those three eras could best be 
examined through the performance of the media during each period. This 
examination is necessary since not only the media performance reflects what 
happens in the newsroom, in the forms of interests, demands, and pressures among 
the owners, management staff, editors, and journalists, but also the assessment of 
those interests, demands, and pressures coming from external individuals and 
institutions (what happens in society) helps to understand the mechanisms behind 
media performance and thus the politics of communication.   
 
4.  Media Performance, Pressures and Interplay 
According to Denis McQuail (1992a, p. 81), media performance is “what the 
media do,” that is often shaped by others, especially by powerful institutions and 
irreplaceable “sources.” A strong awareness of, and sensitivity to, external pressures 
and demands, is reported in many accounts of the media at work. They could date 
back to Cantor (1971), Tunstall (1971), Elliot (1972; 1977), Sigal (1973), Johnstone 
et al. (1976), Burns (1977), Engwall (1978), Schlesinger (1978), Tuchman (1978), 
Gans (1979), Weaver & Wilhoit (1986), and Carrol (1987). This literature 
emphasizes the extent to which people working in media organizations develop 
defenses against various pressures in order to protect their autonomy. 
McQuail (1992a, p. 82) tries to further describe the field of social forces in 
which media typically have to operate, under conditions of considerable pressure 
and constraint. Eight stakeholders surrounding a media organization comprise 
owners, advertisers, sources, audience, investors, government, social/political 
institutions, and pressure groups. 
The influences of these elements on the media organization range from  
distant and general (such as requirements of international regulation or the traditions 
of past performance) to immediate and particular (such as pressures of competition 
from rivals or those from local political and business interests; cf. Dimmick & Coit, 
1982). But in general, McQuail tries to place the agencies with most immediate 
power and leverage, i.e. owners, advertisers, sources, and audience, closer to the 
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media organization than other elements in his model, namely investors, social 
institutions, suppliers, government and its branches, or pressure groups.  Certainly, 
the disposition of forces displayed will vary according to industry type. For 
instance, the public broadcasting, which is supposed to be a highly regulated 
industry, may find government much closer than other elements in that model. 
TVRI (Television of the Republic of Indonesia), as the state-owned television 
station since its establishment in 1962 and as the public broadcasting station since 
2002, has proven to be closer to the government than the first five commercial 
stations. While the latter have always been closer to owners and advertisers than to 
investors, social institutions, government and its branches, or pressure groups. 
In a situation like this, any media organization should fulfill two duties 
simultaneously: on the one hand, developing work routines which simplify the tasks 
and decision-making (Engwall, 1978; Tuchman, 1978) and, on the other hand, 
referring to a set of occupational or operating norms, which often connect with 
wider norms of conduct for public life. There are some potential conflicts arising 
between these two duties. But not only do external relations of the media give rise 
to conflicts with normative dimensions; also such conflicts occur within 
organizations because of mixed and, in some cases, barely compatible goals 
(McQuail, 1992a, p. 83). Varying tasks or functions in a media organization are 
very likely to cause the existence of variations in the normative outlook. For 
instance, the marketing staff at a commercial TV station may not have similar 
standards to those of the editors in the newsroom. The editors may think that a news 
item is very important and relevant for the public, while the marketing staff may 
consider the same news item to be less important or relevant, because they expect it 
to receive lower ratings.  These phenomena have also been widely reported (e.g. 
Burns, 1977; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1986; Meyer, 1987). However, the most 
economical account of internal conflicts regarding the goals of a media organization 
is probably to be found in Engwall (1978), who made a three-fold division of work 
cultures:  
1. Management; 
2. Editorial, creative or writing people; 
3. Technical, design and production staff. 
Each of the three groups is likely to have different goals, different normative 
priorities and different kinds of relationship with the various “agencies” in the media 
environment as a whole.  
Realizing that a number of factors, goals and processes, both in the internal 
and external environments of media organizations, could put the media performance 
under certain pressures, and at the same time could provide media practitioners with 
chances to deal with or to overcome those pressures, it will be of significant benefit to 
design a (relatively simple) model to describe those complex issues. This dissertation 
will – among other goals – aim at developing such a model. The model should be a 
comprehensive overview of the political communication field. Or in short, the model 
should cover the two faces of political communication, i.e. the communication of 
politics and the politics of communication. 
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In developing that model, we need to take into consideration an assumption, 
suggested by Golding & Murdock (1991) and Cottle (2003), that within any 
institution there is a constant interplay between structure and agency, which 
constrains as well as facilitates, imposes limits on as well as offers opportunities to 
each other. In reviewing the relevant literature on “structure” and “agency,” a 
researcher might face different definitions and approaches; for some, the term 
“structure” may primarily be seen as including resources and regulations (Giddens, 
1984). The term “agency” in general refers to social actions carried out by social 
actors, either as individuals or as a group. It can also refer to social actions of human 
agents in a broader sense, not only of individuals, but also implying organized groups, 
organizations, and the state (Burns, 1986).  The results of interplay within each factor 
will inevitably have an impact upon the interplay or power relations among four 
elements, as described below, and vice versa. 
A review of the aforementioned literature highlights at least four power 
entities, also called (f)actors, that should be included in the planned model, i.e. 
Government, Market, Civil Society and the Media themselves. The results of the 
internal interplay within each (f)actor will inevitably be brought into the external 
interplay among these four (f)actors. Therefore, the final results (at a certain time or 
period) are seen in what the media do, called “the media performance” by McQuail 
(1992a), so that the model is named “the Media Performance Model”. In turn, the 
impact of the external interplay is further brought into the internal media environment 
as input for the internal interplay of each factor in the media organization, and so 
forth. We expect that the “new” model will complement the efforts that have long 
been made by scholars, as exemplified in the works by McQuail, 1992; Hidayat & 
Sendjaja, 2002; and Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2004.  
 
5. Relations among Media Performance, Media (Social) Responsibility 
and  Accountability 
 The Media Performance Model (which will be developed and implemented 
in the first chapter) is based on the principle that media is both a commercial entity 
and a public trustee.  On the one hand, the Media (in that model) occupy an equal 
position, so that they can act and react equally to other (f)actors in the model. On 
the other hand, other (f)actors, especially public or Civil Society elements, must be 
assured of an equal position as well, so that they can act and react equally to the 
media as well. These conditions may be seen as directions for Media Responsibility 
and Accountability.   
Regarding the so-called “social responsibility of the press,” we go back as 
far as 1947 when the Hutchins Commission in the United States stated: 
 “An overall social responsibility for the quality of press 
service to the citizen can not be escaped; the community can not 
wholly delegate to any other agency the ultimate responsibility for 
a function in which its own existence as a free society may be at 
stake” (p. 126). 
 Introduction 
8 
 
According to Jo Bardoel and Leen d’Haenens (2004), in the 1940s the 
Hutchins Commission’s Statement was a quite daring vision, since the traditional 
combination of the freedom of press and freedom of market had always been the 
firm basis for non-interference in the press sector. Nevertheless, the commission’s 
conclusions were to strike a chord of sympathy in the United States and Europe in 
the decades to come, since they formed a counterbalance against the commerce and 
partisanship that had been allowed to develop.  
What is implied in all expectations about the social responsibility of the 
media is the assumption that the Media should be freed from any pressure from the 
State, the Market and other potentially excessive powers. This clearly explains the 
context conditions for Media Performance and Media Responsibility, i.e. only if the 
Media are freed from any pressure that can damage the Media Performance 
(especially the journalistic performance), can they meet what society expects from 
them as a “public trustee.” Otherwise, under any kind of pressure, the Media will be 
forced to meet the expectations of the oppressor, and will largely neglect the public 
interests.   
The following table describes some elaborations of the concepts of Media 
Responsibility and Media Accountability in literature. In addition to showing how 
many kinds of Media Responsibility and Media Accountability might be included in 
each concept (both the more theoretical and more practical), the table also presents  
the relations between Media Responsibility and Media Accountability including the 
distinctions between them. 
 
 
Table 1  
Elaboration of Media Responsibility and Accountability1 
 
No Scholars 
 
Notes 
1 Hodges 
(1986) 
He makes an important distinction between “responsibility” and 
“accountability.” 
 Responsibility refers to the question 
“What social needs should we expect 
media and journalists to respond to?” 
Thus it has to do with defining proper 
conduct. 
Accountability offers an answer to the 
question: “How might society call on media 
and journalists to account for their fulfillment 
of the responsibility given to them?” Thus it 
has to do with compelling proper conduct. 
2 McQuail 
(2000) 
He favors a practical description of the concept of media responsibility, and 
defines it as the “obligations and expectations” that society faces regarding 
the media. He distinguishes between four types of responsibility: 
 1. Assigned responsibilities are obligations established by law, which the media must 
meet. In democratic societies, this regulation, in pursuance of the tradition of 
freedom of expression, is kept to a minimum. 
 2. Contracted responsibilities arise from self-regulated agreements between the press 
or broadcasters on the one hand, and society or politicians on the other hand, 
regarding the desired conduct of the media (for example showing violent images 
on television). 
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No Scholars 
 
Notes 
 3. Self-assigned responsibilities indicate voluntary professional commitments to 
maintaining ethical standards and public goals. 
 4. Denied responsibilities refer to the effort to refute accusations of irresponsibility 
that are thought to be undeserved or inapplicable. 
3 Pritchard  
(2000) 
He defines media accountability as “the process by which media 
organizations may be expected or obliged to render an account of their 
activities to their constituents”. He thus stresses that media accountability is 
a “process” that basically consists of “naming, blaming and claiming.”  
4 McQuail 
(2000) 
He defines four accountability frames: law and regulation, the market, 
public, and professional responsibility. 
5 Bardoel 
(2000, 
2001) 
Along McQuail’s lines, he slightly “remolds” that typology into four media 
accountability mechanisms:  
 
 1. Political accountability, which refers to formal regulations stipulating how 
broadcasting companies and newspapers shall be structured and how they shall 
function. 
 2. Market accountability or the system of supply and demand, in which the free 
choices of the public are given free reign and considerations of efficiency also 
play a role 
 3. Public accountability, which is linked to the media’s assignment of maintaining 
more direct relationships with citizens, in addition to their relationship with the 
market and the state. 
 4. Professional accountability, which is linked to ethical codes and performance 
standards used within the media that should help counterbalancing every 
excessive dependence upon politics and the market. 
6 McQuail 
(2003) 
Indicates that the term “social responsibility” not only has different 
meanings but also implies “differences of location of a given responsibility 
within the whole institutional complex.” Media Responsibility can thus be 
located on different levels; the media institution as a whole, the ownership, 
the organization and its management, the professional employee and the 
individual author or performer. 
7 McQuail 
(2003) 
He suggests two models of accountability: 
 The liability model of accountability 
mainly invoked in cases where the media 
are believed to be capable of causing real 
harm to individuals, certain categories of 
people or the society as a whole. 
The answerability model of accountability 
implies responsiveness to the views of all 
who have a legitimate interest in what is 
published, whether as individuals affected or 
on behalf of the society. It includes a 
willingness to explain, defend and justify 
actions (and general tendencies) of 
publication or omission. 
   
The elaborations in the above table allow one to see that the concept of 
Media Accountability is tightly related to the second face of the political 
communication field, i.e. the politics of communication, specifically in terms of the 
rights and duties of the citizens as active information gatherers and processors (see 
Mutz, 2001, p. 232-233) to compel the fulfillment of Media Responsibility. It is also 
in line with Bruck and Raboy’s suggestion (1989, p. 14) that what we need now is 
to work out and develop a new and all-encompassing strategy for democratic 
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communication, based on the whole range of communicational needs, i.e. the need 
to transmit as well as to receive; the need for access to meaningful information; and 
the need to redefine the framing process developed by other parties (senders). 
 
6.  Media Accountability Practices and Struggles 
At the present time, over fifty years after the introduction of the “social 
responsibility theory,” we witness a new increase in attention, including a new sense 
of urgency for social responsibility in the Media. According to Bardoel and 
d’Haenens (2004, p. 5), this is due to a number of factors: 
  “The first being the recent structural media changes that are 
often characterized by catchphrases such as competition, 
commercialization and globalization. Second, as a result of the 
first, public provisions on the media sector, such as public 
broadcasting and responsible journalism, find themselves in a state 
of uncertainty, or even crisis.” 
  In the Indonesian context, structural media changes have taken place 
primarily because of the successful revolutions against oppression from the 
government, dating back to the Dutch Colonial period. During the Dutch Colonial 
era, Indonesian media were famous for their persistent struggle against the Dutch 
Government in Indonesia, so that they were called “Pers Perjuangan” (the Press of 
the Struggle). Those efforts continued during the Japanese Occupation era around 
1942 to 1945, an era that was also colored by the return of the Dutch and the Allied 
forces led by the United States troops. Even the proclamation of the Indonesian 
independence was an astonishing success story that became public thanks to the 
journalists of RRI (at the time under the name of “Hoso Kyoku,” only allowed to 
voice the statements of the Japanese Colonial Government) who deceived the 
controller of RRI’s studio in Jakarta. This was accomplished by producing their 
programs on two channels: one channel, that was aired in the studio only, broadcast 
patriotic Japanese songs, while the other channel, airing to the whole country as 
well as to the entire world, repeatedly broadcast the proclamation of the Indonesian 
independence read by Soekarno and Hatta on behalf of the whole nation. 
After Indonesian independence, the government suppressions sometimes 
encroached on the spirit of adjusting to or welcoming globalization, for instance in 
the form of international advertising agencies or international TV programs (Open 
Sky Policy). This kind of policy certainly needed structural change. Other striking 
changes could be clearly seen during the May Revolution movement, pioneered by 
the students and activists since mid-1997, reaching its peak on May 21, 1928, when 
the revolution successfully ousted Soeharto from power. The consequences of all 
struggles and calls for the freedom of expression were supposed to produce some 
(significant) structural changes too (we refer the reader to the first chapter in which 
all of these structural changes are described in detail). 
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It was fair to assume that after the downfall of Soeharto there would be a 
clear popular rejection of the mass media system that was developed during the 
New Order Era. As a result, the media system, almost without reservation, took on a 
libertarian form. This has brought in programs such as bloody crime reporting, 
programs focusing on the supernatural and magic, celebrity gossip shows, imported 
as well as Indonesian versions of “telenovelas,” and other programs produced or 
bought – mostly from United States of America and Western countries – for rating 
considerations only. For the population, the news system was clearly superior to the 
previous one because it was more entertaining and intervention-free. The media 
were then concerned only in terms of how well they could sell their technical 
quality and entertainment commodities. Accordingly, Indonesia fell into what 
Bagdikian (1997, p. 248) calls “the Fallacy of the Two-Model Choice”: as if people 
could only choose between an authoritarian system and a libertarian system. Both 
systems would never provide media organizations and media practitioners with 
chances and (more importantly) the willingness to perform their social 
responsibility nor call for the Media  Social Accountability from the public’s 
viewpoint. 
Thus, some alternatives to the two models should be sought and offered to 
the Indonesian public. According to Bardoel & d’Haenens (2004, p. 10), the most 
prominent provision to foster the public interest in the media is public broadcasting. 
And political accountability should be a dominant factor in enhancing and 
maintaining the spirit and operational mechanism of public broadcasting. Political 
accountability should be, first and foremost, carried out in parallel with the concept 
of citizenship. 
According to Marc Raboy (1999, p. 9), the notion of citizenship has severe 
implications for broadcasting: 
  “Citizenship cannot be passive. Citizenship is political. 
When public service broadcasting is linked to the idea of 
citizenship, it must logically be de-coupled from the authoritarian 
power of the State. At the same time, it cannot be commodified. 
This is not a question of principle but of purpose.”  
In Indonesia, those stations that were supposed to be public broadcasting 
stations, i.e. TVRI (the Television of the Republic of Indonesia) and RRI (the Radio 
of the Republic of Indonesia) had had a long history as ideological state 
apparatuses. Therefore, on the one hand, it would be interesting to examine the 
structural changes which they underwent during the May Revolution movement as 
well as during the Reform Era following the fall of the New Order Regime. On the 
other hand, as we are reminded by Cees Hamelink (1994, p. 12), any empowerment 
(in this case, of both the media and the public) cannot be passively enjoyed, but has 
to be actively achieved and safeguarded: 
 “If people want fundamental rights to be recognized and 
enforced, they cannot escape from the responsibility to actively 
contribute to the defense of these rights. People cannot expect 
others (the state or the media) always to defend their rights and 
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liberties. The less alert people react to the violation of human 
rights, the more their own dignity comes under threat. If people do 
not actively engage in the battle for their empowerment, they 
should not be surprised to find themselves one day totally 
disempowered.”  
In line with Hamelink’s suggestion, academics and people working in public 
advocacy need to develop a strategy to actively struggle for both citizen’s rights and 
media liberties as well as struggle for the “new” broadcasting type, i.e. public 
broadcasting which, according to Bardoel & d’Haenens (2004), constitutes the most 
prominent provision to foster the public interest in the media. One of our strategies 
was therefore to conduct action research in representative areas across Indonesia. In 
action research, according to Nicholas Jankowski (2002, p. 371), researchers can 
assist practitioners by providing an empirically grounded analysis of the topics 
investigated, and practitioners can similarly assist researchers by arranging access to 
archival depositories, personnel and activities. Such alliances on community media 
can result in a mutually beneficial arrangement, contributing to theoretical insights 
as well as media practice. 
However, action research also has its limitations  – among others, it tends to 
be a kind of advocacy, usually conducted intentionally or unintentionally by media 
activists and academics. Such inclination to advocacy could easily represent the 
paternalistic tendency to determine what the public needs or wants. To overcome 
this limitation, Cohen & Uphoff (1980) suggest a paradigm called “working with 
the people.” The main concern in this paradigm is developing all stages of action 
research by listening to the local voices and never trying to (persistently or 
excessively) persuade the informants (participants) to formulate their assessments 
and activities according to a certain analysis model. Starting from the pre-
assessment, the need assessment workshop, the activities in the field and the 
evaluation, the locals always take the lead with the researchers providing active 
facilitation.  Again, it is not easy to carry out, and it is often difficult to determine if 
the researchers really leave everything up to the people. It may be fair to say that the 
researchers in an action research work must first help the people understand what 
their problems are and then work together to discover out the solutions.  
 
7.  Community Level and Community Media  
After suggesting an appropriate approach for action research in an effort to 
enhance Media Accountability, the next question is to determine which level this 
kind of effort should be aimed at. Going back to the concept of the social 
responsibility of the media, we can see remarkable similarities to the German 
concept of  “Oeffentlichkeit” (public sphere) that took shape in the 1960s, and 
became popular again in academic circles during the 1990s. One striking difference, 
however, according to Bardoel and d’Haenens (2004, p. 6), is that the main 
exponent of this theory, Jurgen Habermas (1993; 1996), placed more emphasis on 
the community’s so-called “communicative competence” in contrast to the more 
individualistic approach that appeared in the Anglo-America System. But we have 
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to notice that, when some renowned political communication scholars recently 
discussed the future of this field, they stated that the community has become a 
prominent arena for political communication research (among others McLeod, 
2001; Mutz, 2001; Iyengar, 2001; Chaffee, 2001). They paid serious attention to the 
concept of “social capital” and “civic participation” at the community level. 
McLeod sees civic participation as a function of both the individual’s characteristics 
and the community's resources, network connections, and norms as contextual 
influences. Hamelink (1990) also emphasizes that even under international law, the 
individual has duties towards the community. 
Hollander, Stappers & Jankowski (2002, p. 22-23) show why community 
communication is one of the forms of public communication that is located at the 
heart of the public sphere concept. Firstly, the emphasis of community 
communication is on the communicative exchange and social action within the 
context of geographical localities and/or communities of interest. Through that 
communicative exchange and social action, community communication is expected 
to bridge the gap between the policy coming from outside or being imposed on 
more than one community (such as State policy) on the one hand, and the collective 
(social) authentic experiences and needs, and multiple (i.e., cultural, ethnic, 
religious) identities that are relevant to a specific group or category of individuals 
on the other. 
Secondly, when it comes to institutional aspects, community media are 
generally seen as relatively small-scale institutions, concerned with programs 
oriented and produced locally, essentially publicly financed, and whose ownership 
and control are often shared by members in the community. All these ingredients 
together might help the community media to become relatively more independent 
from the dictatorship of both the State and the Market. 
Thirdly, community communication also may imply de facto 
decentralization. It means that there should be at least “shared governance” between 
the central government and the local government. What is more, in local areas, the 
community members are given their basic rights and liberties by the local 
government to develop, organize, and maintain the variety of communication forms 
that will fit the authentic collective (social) experiences and needs, as well as 
multiple (i.e., cultural, ethnic and religious) identities of their communities. For that 
purpose, decentralization provides the local governments with the authority to 
allocate radio frequencies in accordance with the needs of the communities. 
This is paritcularly relevant in the Indonesian context, through the 
implementation of the 1999 Regional Autonomy Law No. 22. All things considered, 
there is also an urgent need to find or design a specific model visualizing 
interactions of elements in social transition, specifically dedicated to 
comprehending the transition process itself, the decentralization policy and the 
structural changes in the media system taking place recently. Again, this model 
should always be related to the main characteristics of community media. For 
instance, an intriguing question was raised in the field, related to the objections 
from the owners of commercial TV and radio stations over the opportunities for 
community media to explore potential revenues from the market surrounding them. 
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Meanwhile, some advertising agencies and experts acknowledge that the 
community media are viable for specific local advertising expenditures. Why should 
we not leave it to the community members to make a decision about which kinds of 
advertising or potential local market could be explored by them and still be well-
suited to their authentic collective (social) experiences and needs? Royal Colle 
(2002) reminds us that any effort in community development should empower and 
provide the community members a chance to achieve long-term sustainability. 
Hence, he also emphasizes the significance of business plans that fit the culture of 
the community. Hence Colle (2001) stresses the centrality of research in setting up a 
viable enterprise. 
Moreover, the autonomy of citizens in deciding how to finance their 
community media and in their cultural development, that is the ability of people to 
respond according to their own intuitions, are crucial in establishing an adequate 
cultural system. As a matter of fact, few, if any, cultures have developed as 
completely isolated phenomena; an important characteristice of adaptive cultural 
growth is selective borrowing and exchange. However, according to Hamelink 
(1983, p. 22), in recent decades, a process has emerged that can best be described as 
“cultural synchronization,” which threatens, as never before, the delicate balance of 
adaptive cultural relations in many parts of the world. Hamelink (1983, p. 22) 
writes:  
“Cultural synchronization implies that the decisions 
regarding the cultural development in a given country are made in 
accordance with the interests and needs of a powerful central 
nation and imposed with subtle but devastating effectiveness 
without regard for the adaptive necessities of the dependent 
nation.” 
The principal agents of cultural synchronization today are the international 
communication firms, largely based in the United States of America as well as in 
other Western countries, which are most directly involved with the cultural 
component of the global expansion through the development of a global investment 
and marketing strategy. This also poses a threat to the idea of broadcasting as a 
public service. According to Raboy (1990, p. 15), the latter was at a low point, both 
in Canada and internationally, in view of an increasingly interconnected global 
system where conservative economic policies antithetical to a democratic public life 
are in command. 
Finally, the struggle for empowering people (starting from the community 
level) so that they can compel the fulfillment of Media Responsibility, also requires 
a certain form of institution or mechanism to be put in place. Canada, for instance, 
offers an interesting public accountability model in which citizens  – in all their 
geographic and ethnic diversity – are actively involved in the evaluation and 
possible steering of the concrete expression of public responsibility by the media. 
One example of public consultation is the so-called Public Hearings that the CRTC 
(Canadian Radio-Television Telecommunications Commission) regularly organizes.  
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Jo Bardoel & Leen d’Haenens (2004, p. 21) illustrate: 
 “These are fora on the ‘Public Accountability’ of both 
public and commercial broadcasters throughout the country, 
including in remote areas. These public consultations take place 
whenever a broadcasting license is up for renewal or when the 
CRTC wants to collect information about new policy directions or 
licensing decisions. These consultations, in the form of semi-
structured interviews, are broad; anyone can participate, including 
industry representatives, organized public interest groups or 
ordinary members of the public.”  
In addition to these public hearings by CRTC, Mac Raboy and David Taras 
(2004, p. 59-76) show that other institutions and mechanism also help “compel” the 
CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Cooperation) to be held accountable to the public in 
various ways, among others to the courts, interest groups, and through industry self-
regulation. Otherwise, the public interest often ends up being poorly served 
compared to the interests of the state, the government of the day, or the institution 
itself. This is what Raboy calls “administrative broadcasting,” or “paternalistic 
broadcasting” in the terminology of William (1976) and d’Haenens & Saeys (2001). 
In developing a local forum, which will work to ensure the constant and quality 
relationships between the community members and their media, according to Royal 
Colle (2002) it is important to build community liaison people into the 
organizational structure of the system or forum. These are persons who represent 
groups in the community – preexisting groups or groups organized by the liaison – 
and who seek information for the community.  
 
8. Recapitulation of the Research Line  
Political communication scholars are aware of the two faces of political 
communication, i.e. the communication of politics and the politics of 
communication.  So far a comprehensive model embracing those two faces does not 
exist. The literature on political communication tends to pay more attention to the 
communication of politics. Both faces, especially that of the politics of 
communication, could best be examined through the Media Performance Model, 
which could be seen as a simpler design of mediated political communication. We 
then connect the Media Performance Model to the concepts of Media Responsibility 
and Media Accountability. Media Responsibility will show the directions the media 
could take to meet the public’s expectations, while Media Accountability will show 
the directions the citizens could take to actively compell the media to meet their 
expectations, so that the politics of communication would be beneficial for all 
elements in the society.  
In Indonesia, it is assumed that the politics of communication matters more 
than the communication of politics. All things considered, this dissertation tries to 
examine the Indonesian case by firstly providing a comprehensive Model of 
Political Communication and its summary (the Media Performance Model) and 
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secondly by employing that model to investigate the political communication in 
Indonesia, scientifically and empirically, up to the community level, being the basic 
level of society, as described in the research questions below: 
 
a. Research Questions 
1. If the assumption about the lack of attention to the politics of 
communication (as the second face of political communication) holds true, 
what kind of model should be designed to explain political communication 
in the  Indonesian context and – if valid – to help explain political 
communication in other geographical contexts? 
2. What kind of Media Performance Model should be designed to represent the 
larger map of the political communication field into a specific context of 
mediated political communication? 
3. Is it appropriate to advance the concept of Media Social Responsibility and 
Media Social Accountability in order to show more clearly the directions of 
the interplay taking place in the Media Performance Model, especially to put 
emphasis on the citizens as active information gatherers and processors?  
4. What are the findings when Media Performance Model, Responsibility, and 
Accountability are employed together in an effort to examine the recent 
twenty years of political communication in Indonesia (for general aspects in 
Chapter 1, on the television sector in Chapter 2, on local newspapers and 
radio stations in Chapter 3, on negotiating a diversity of broadcasting, of 
ownership and content in Chapter 4)? 
5. What kind of Media Accountability, especially public accountability, should 
be promoted and developed in Indonesia? This question concerns the form, 
institutional aspect and mechanism in which the public could compel the 
fulfillment of the Media Responsibility; and the answers should be based on 
need assessments conducted by the public themselves on the field (while the 
action research takes place). 
 
b. Goals  
1. To develop a comprehensive model of the political communication field, 
that is able to explain most of the dynamics in the Indonesian context, and – 
if valid – to contribute to explain other contexts outside Indonesia. 
2. To develop a Media Performance Model that could still appropriately reduce 
the large map (model) of the political communication field, especially the 
mediated political communication, to its essence. 
3. To provide arguments and explanations to support the arguments submitted 
above by which Media Social Responsibility and Media Social 
Accountability could clearly show the directions of the interplay taking 
place in the Media Performance Model. 
4. To examine and discover which forms of Media Performance Model, 
Responsibility and Accountability have been employed during the recent 
twenty years of political communication in Indonesia; in general (in Chapter 
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1), in the television sector (in Chapter 2), in the local newspapers and radio 
stations (in Chapter 3) and in negotiating public and community media (in 
Chapter 4). 
5. To provide and develop tables, figures and (specific) models needed to 
support arguments and explanations in each chapter, for example the specific 
model for negotiating community media before the process of developing 
and guarding the broadcasting bill in Indonesia.    
6. To discover the forms, institutional aspects and mechanism for the public, 
especially in the community context, to exercise their rights and duties in 
compelling the Media to fulfill their Media Responsibility. 
 
c. Limitations of the study 
1. This dissertation includes four chapters (case studies); each of them can be 
seen as a separate study. Each has its own background, theoretical 
framework, concepts, research questions, findings, and some models to help 
in understanding the particular theoretical approach or paradigm more 
easily. 
2. This introduction aims at making the interconnectedness of all the chapters 
explicit. It provides a background and a theoretical framework, as well as 
some models and main concepts to be considered as unifying factors 
throughout the whole dissertation. 
3. Those unifying factors are: (a) the Model of the Political Communication 
Field which then is reduced to its essence in the Media Performance Model, 
and the two concepts of Media Responsibility and Accountability which 
demonstrate the directions of interplay in the Media Performance Model. 
4. Even though not all of these unifying models and concepts explicitly appear 
in each chapter, the four chapters are presented and arranged in such a way 
that the reader may easily go back and relate most parts of the four chapters 
to the models and concepts advanced in this introduction.     
 
d. Added Value 
1. Each chapter in this dissertation has undergone a reviewing process by 
editors of international journals or books. Most parts, in the form of 
shortened articles, have been presented in local, national and international 
seminars. Each chapter has thus contributed (to a certain extent) to popular 
and scholarly debate, to policy discussion, and to the general body of 
knowledge, empirically based and theoretically grounded. 
2. Finally, it is hoped that this dissertation might contribute to our collective 
effort to understand both the position and the potential of political 
communication with its two faces (communication of politics and politics of 
communication) in an era often characterized by a growing need for more 
democratic information and communication systems, relevant to, provided 
by, and intended for, active citizens, starting from their basic contexts: their 
communities.  
First Chapter 
 
Political Communication in Indonesia: 
Revisiting the Media Performance in Three Eras 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Data on political communication research in Indonesia in the past two decades 
have rarely been recorded.  This might be associated with some basic problems in 
the academic environment as well as in the development and practices of the 
political and communication systems in the country.  In the academic environment, 
both communication and political scholars in Indonesia have continually struggled 
to establish their own boundaries and methods, in order to gain more 
acknowledgement as scientific fields (for a full description, see Dahlan, 1990).  
They have also struggled to establish departments, generally in the faculties of 
social and political sciences.  For example, out of the forty-eight main state 
universities in Indonesia, only thirteen universities have an undergraduate 
communication program, compared to thirty-nine for management (PPSPMB, 
2003).  Besides, a special forum (division) for scholars from communication and/or 
politics, that would help accelerate development of political communication field 
(see Ryfe, 2001, p. 408), is not in place yet.  Neither the Association of Indonesian 
Communication Scholars (ISKI) nor the Association of Indonesian Political 
Scholars (AIPI) has a political communication division.   
Parallel to those situations, the Soeharto Regime (1966 to 1998, better known 
as the “New Order Regime”) put into place a systematic and comprehensive 
strategy to ensure that the political and communication systems functioned as a 
control instrument of power (see Haris, 2004; Gazali, 2002; Hidayat, et al., 2000).  
Under these circumstances, all research plans had to be submitted for approval to 
several Government offices.  The Government ensured that no research interests 
posed a threat to the political stability.   
From mid-1997 to May 1998, a chapter of Indonesian history was written that 
some analysts called, “a fascinating chapter in Indonesia’s media history” (Cohen, 
1998).  The mounting demonstrations by students and activists, simultaneous with 
the ailing economy (Indonesia was hardest hit by the Asian economic crisis) and the 
changing attitudes of certain media to the fight against Government control, finally 
forced Soeharto to step down on May 21, 1998.  Afterwards, Indonesia entered the 
so-called “Era Reformasi” (the Reform Era) characterized by a freer political and 
communication environment.  Certainly, it was expected that the new climate in this 
new era would stimulate enthusiasm among scholars to conduct political 
communication research. 
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This chapter examines what has been done in political communication 
research in Indonesia during and concerning three periods,  i.e.  the Soeharto Era 
(New Order Regime,  especially from 1984 to April 1998),    the May 1998 
Revolution when the peak of the so-called “Indonesian Revolution” took place, and 
the Reform Era (after May 21, 1998, until the present day). The authors use the 
historical narrative and develop the triangle of Media Performance Model (as 
exemplified in the works by McQuail 1992; Hidayat & Sendjaja, 2002; and Bardoel 
& d’Haenens, 2004) as an analysis tool for documenting and examining the 
functioning of the media in each period.  This triangle is built up by four power 
entities, i.e. the Government, Market, and Civil Society, and in the middle position 
the Media themselves (see Figure 1). We have to note that a strong awareness of, 
and sensitivity to, external pressures and demands has been reported in many 
accounts of the media at work (McQuail, 1992, p. 82). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the same time, within each (f)actor, according to Golding and Murdock, 
1991, p.19; see also Cottle, 2004, p.5), there is a constant interplay between 
structure and agency, which constrain as well as facilitate, impose limits on as well 
as offer opportunities to each other. The term “structure” may be seen as including 
resources and regulations (Giddens, 1984, p.17).  The term “agency,” in general, 
refers to social actions carried out by social actors, either as individuals or as a 
group.  It can also refer to social actions of human agents in a broader sense, not 
only individuals, but also including organized groups, organizations, and the state 
(Burns, 1986, p. 9).  The results of interplay within each (f)actor will inevitably 
have an impact upon the interplay or power relations among those four elements 
and vice versa. We will mark the resulting tendencies in each era (as put together in 
Figure 2) and relate them to strands of concrete research interests that have arisen 
within each period.  Using this model could also help to evaluate the contributions 
and limitations of past studies with respect to certain elements of the model, as well 
as helping to provide directions for future research.         
Figure 1: Media Performance Model
Market
Media
Government
Civil Society
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The data on political communication research were collected from the 
research collections of the faculties of social and political sciences, and the faculty 
of communication, at four main state-universities, i.e. the University of Indonesia in 
Jakarta, Padajajaran University in Bandung (West Java), Gajah Mada University in 
Yogyakarta (Central Java), and Airlangga University in Surabaya (East Java).  A 
panel of experts, consisting of seven senior researchers from those universities, was 
formed for the purpose of categorizing research that fits into the political comm.  
unication area.2 
 
2.   Indonesia under the Soeharto Regime 
The Soeharto Regime came to power in 1966 after ousting Soekarno, a left-
leaning nationalist President.  Soekarno's policies left the country with a negative 
growth rate, 600 percent inflation, no foreign reserves to speak of, and a national 
debt of over US$ 2 billion (see e.g., Vatikiotis, 1994).  The Soekarno Regime was 
also characterized by unstable administration with constant changes in cabinets.  In 
dealing with these problems, Soeharto’s economic advisors and technocrats sought 
to build and restructure political mechanisms that aimed primarily at achieving 
political stability, and were believed to improve economic life (Moertopo, 1974; 
Mas’oed, 1989).  This plan was then promoted to the international world, especially 
the anti-communist Western states, as a way of gaining support and attracting 
foreign investment.  
There is no doubt that until the economic crisis of 1997-98, the Soeharto 
Regime had succeeded in transforming the country from what has been 
characterized by Higgins as “the number one economic failure among the major 
underdeveloped countries” (Higgins, 1968, p.678), to an economy that was held up 
as a model of Third World development.  Over the span of the New Order’s first 
five five-year plans (from 1969 to 1994), the GDP expanded on average 6.8 percent 
annually; even in the aftermath of declining hydrocarbon prices in the early 1980s, 
annual average GDP growth accelerated from 6.1 percent (from 1980 to 1990) to 
7.6 percent (from 1990 to 1995), while the annual average population growth fell to 
1.8 percent (Booth, quoted in Emmerson, 1999, p.113).  Such achievements led the 
World Bank in 1993 to place Indonesia in the same category with South Korea, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Thailand, as high-performing 
economies responsible for the “East Asian miracle of rapid growth and declining 
inequality” (World Bank, 1993; pp. 1-3; see also Schlossstein, 1991). 
In practice, such a success heavily depended on a systematic and 
comprehensive strategy to ensure that the political and communication systems 
functioned as a control of power.  In the beginning of 1973, outside the ruling party, 
Golongan Karya (Functional Group or Golkar), all parties were forced to merge  
into two parties, namely the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic 
Party or PDI) and the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party or 
PPP).  Those parties and any mass organizations were required to adopt the 
Pancasila (Five Pillars) as their sole ideology.  The Government then developed an 
election format that served only to demonstrate the power of Golkar and its 
domination (Haris in Antlov & Cederroth, 2004).  The parliaments elected under the 
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New Order did not function as legislative bodies, conduits for popular aspirations or 
as a “checks and balances” mechanism for the executive branch.  On the contrary, 
as Haris (2004, p. 34) writes: “(…) By means of various policies and mechanisms, 
such as screening, political development, special examination and recalling, the 
Government was fully capable of controlling the House.” 
 
3.   The Shape of the Media Industry During the Soeharto Era   
The media industry during the Soeharto era had two faces.  Its first face was 
shaped markedly by the dynamics of Soeharto’s market economy.  Rapid economic 
growth during the Soeharto period brought into being a new middle class with 
relatively higher education and income levels.  This meant greater opportunity for 
the media to find large audiences with purchasing power.  The expansion of the 
economy also led to the growth of the advertising industry and of advertising 
expenditures.  Transnational advertising agencies arrived en masse during the 
1970s.3   This in turn created a greater opportunity for the Indonesian media 
industry to become profitable by selling access to audiences to producers in various 
industrial sectors. 
The commercialization of the media industry was also marked by the 
transformation of the Indonesian press from “political press” to “industrial press.”  
Previously, during Soekarno’s “Guided Democracy” period, the press was defined 
as a “tool of the Revolution,” responsible for energizing and mobilizing public 
opinion (see Hill, 1994, p. 14).  In addition, most of the press aligned their editorial 
policies with particular politicized segments of the population.  Under the Soeharto 
Regime, except for a few newspapers, most media aimed at achieving a broad 
readership across social, cultural and political distinctions, in order to have as large 
a circulation as possible and hence attract more advertisers.  The opportunity for 
such a transformation was made possible by the annulment of a regulation 
stipulating that all newspapers had to be affiliated with a political party or mass 
organization of their choice.   
Nonetheless, the media had always been defined by the Soeharto Regime as a 
“partner in development,” and while pursuing commercial success, the Indonesian 
press was declared “free but responsible,” in contrast to the presumed 
irresponsibility of the liberal Western press.  This was the second face of the media 
industry during the Soeharto era that affected almost all aspects of the functioning 
of the press.  The Government controlled -- preventively and correctively -- the 
ownership of media institutions, through the issuance of printing licenses (SIT), 
which later became licenses for publishing print media (SIUPP).  These licenses 
were issued primarily on the basis of political criteria.  Journalists were required to 
join the one and only journalists’ organization allowed at the time.  Chief editors 
had to attend courses on state ideology that were in fact part of an indoctrination 
process.   The Soeharto Regime, through the Ministry of Information, monitored 
closely the production of news texts, among others by means of the so-called 
“telephone culture”: one call from the Government official was enough to nip any 
potential revelation in the bud.  The Government also forbade press coverage of 
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opposition leaders.  It even went further by controlling paper supplies (see Hidayat 
et al., 2000, p.6; Gazali, 2002, p. 122). 
In the broadcasting sector, the appointment of individuals for certain positions 
in the Government-owned media, RRI (Radio of the Republic of Indonesia; 
established in1945) and TVRI (Television of the Republic of Indonesia; established 
in 1962) was fully in the hands of the Government.  Only after twenty-five years of 
TVRI monopoly, the first commercial TV station, RCTI (Rajawali Citra Televisi 
Indonesia), was allowed to operate in Indonesia.  It was then followed by SCTV 
(Surya Citra Televisi, 1990), TPI (Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia, 1990), ANteve 
(Cakrawala Andalas Televisi, 1993), and IVM (Indosiar Visual Mandiri, 1995).  All 
commercial TV stations were under the control of giant business enterprises owned 
by Soeharto’s family members and their cronies (for a full description, see 
d’Haenens et al., 2000, p. 197-232). The commercial radio landscape was slightly 
different from that of the television industry.  After 1970 local commercial radio 
stations operated in many large cities; the licenses for those radio stations were 
granted to those whose loyalties to the Ministry of Information branch, or to local 
Government, was unquestionable.  Both commercial TV and radio stations were not 
allowed to produce their own news programming and had to resort to packaging 
news items into something like features or soft news.  In addition, they had to relay 
the news from the state-owned stations.  Commercial radio stations had to relay RRI 
news up to eighteen times a day, or almost every hour, while commercial TV 
stations had to relay two TVRI news programs daily (see Gazali & Menayang, 
2002).    
There were two contradictory features worth noting about the shape of the 
media industry during the Soeharto era.  First, in line with the open market strategy, 
the “open sky policy” was announced by the regime in the 1990s, that allowed 
domestic companies to distribute foreign television direct broadcasts.  Government 
Regulation No.20, of June 1994, also included the mass media sector among 
previously off-limits sectors to be opened to foreign investment and majority 
ownership.  However, Harmoko, then Minister of Information, sharply criticized the 
regulation, asserting that it contradicted the 1966 Press Act, which explicitly 
prohibited any kind of foreign investment in the press industry.  Harmoko -- himself 
the owner of the second largest daily newspaper in the country, Pos Kota, and a 
significant shareholder in various print media -- declared that irrespective of the 
regulation he had the full support from the President in keeping foreign investment 
out of the press industry.  
Second, the pattern of vertical integration between private media and the ruling 
regime was a rare phenomenon in the world’s market economies.   In neighboring 
Southeast Asian countries, e.g., Singapore and Malaysia, the media were under 
state-controlled holding companies; but in the Indonesian case, it was the individual 
members of the ruling elite and their cronies who personally owned the media as 
part of their business empires. 4 
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4.   Press Freedom  
The power over licensing was clearly an effective instrument of power to 
control dissenting views and to promote Soeharto’s pragmatic and ideological 
interests in the media sector.  There was a long record of press crackdowns during 
the Soeharto era.  There were at least two cases of wholesale mass media banning.  
The first occurred in January 1974, when thirteen newspapers and news magazines 
were shut down following student demonstrations and riots in major cities.  
Encouraged by the scale of demonstrations and riots, the press gave heavy coverage 
and editorial support to the protests.  
The second series of multiple bans took place in 1978, when further anti-
Government student protests, which were sweeping through the main campuses 
since 1977, were again reported extensively.  The First Family was specifically 
targeted by the students; there were even calls for Soeharto to step down.  The 
Soeharto Regime finally responded in January 1978 by banning seven Jakarta 
dailies and seven student newspapers.  These bans preceded the disbanding of all 
student councils, the arrest of some 200 students, and the military occupation of 
several key campuses in Jakarta, Bandung, and Yogyakarta.  Unlike 1974 when the 
bans were permanent, in 1978 all of the banned commercial publications were back 
on the streets within weeks, except some of the student newspapers. 
In addition to the multiple bans, there were also sporadic bans of individual 
publications.  In April 1981, for instance, Jurnal Ekuin (a specialized magazine on 
economy, finance, and industry) was shut down after it reported an impending 
reduction in the Government’s floor price for oil exports.  On October 9, 1986, 
Sinar Harapan, an evening newspaper, had its publication permit withdrawn over 
commentaries on the Soeharto Regime’s economic policies.  In June 1994, in the 
midst of increasing public demand for more democracy and freer press, three major 
weekly magazines (Tempo, DeTik, and Editor) were closed down.  The reason 
seems to have been that the magazines had been pursuing, to the embarrassment of 
the Government, a conflict that had arisen between two of its ministers.  One, the 
minister for science and technology, B.J. Habibie, had close links with Germany 
and had been the prime mover in the purchase by Indonesia of thirty-nine warships, 
formerly belonging to the East German Navy.  The other, the finance minister, 
Marie Mohammad, had been critical of the purchase.  
In some situations, however, the limits on what could be published were ill 
defined, and were also a function of Soeharto’s “ideological maturation.”  For 
instance, in 1983, Ekspo, a news magazine, lost its publication permit for publishing 
a report on “Indonesia’s 100 millionaires,” a list that included an embarrassing 
number of Soeharto’s family members and cronies.  But by the 1990s, when the 
Soeharto Regime's attitude and behavior towards capitalism had become “more 
mature,” and when the authorities perceived that it was no longer politically 
embarrassing to become exceptionally rich, such listings had become common in 
the media. 
Yet, this was not the case when it came to the issue of SARA, which stands 
for “Ethnicity, Religion, Race, and Groups with differing affiliations and 
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backgrounds” (“Suku, Agama, Ras, dan Antar Golongan”).  Until the end of the 
New Order Era, the Government never allowed any media to explore or discuss 
openly any case related to SARA.  What exactly constituted the limitations was ill 
defined.  The main reason was that all elements of society were to uphold the 
nation’s principle of “Diversity in Unity” (“Bhinneka Tunggal Ika”).  For the media, 
it meant that all differences should be swept under the carpet; what should be 
promoted and brought into the media was “unity” only.  On the other hand, when 
the Government faced problems rooted in different political views, usually 
concerning certain radical Muslim groups and violent riots, the Government quickly 
labeled those problems as SARA conflicts, generally by announcing that the conflict 
was between the indigenous people and those of Chinese descent, or between 
Muslims and Christians. 5 
At the same time, a group of individuals in the inner circle of the Soeharto 
Regime, guided by their own perception of existing socio-ideological conditions, 
subjectively defined the limits of press freedom.  Accordingly, in addition to the 
dependence on Government-owned media and other Government sources, 
Indonesian journalists had to rely on their skill to report politically sensitive news 
that maximized sales and minimized the risk of closure.  According to one senior 
journalist, this meant, on the one hand, that editors had to develop “sensitivity to the 
Government’s approval and disapproval conveyed through an intricate and 
culturally conditioned network of subtle gestures and signals” (Makarim, 1978, 
p.279), while remaining sensitive to the market’s demand for critical reporting.  
Such a constraining media structure produced a type of journalism that was 
very cautious, exercising self-censorship, avoiding direct criticism, resorting to what 
has been described by the chief editor of the banned Indonesia Raya as, “very subtle 
allusions to avoid hurting anyone’s feelings, having to be like a snake, circling 
round and round without ever striking the target” (Lubis, as quoted in Hill, 1994, 
p.47).   Headlines never focused on negatives; criticisms were rarely written in the 
active voice, and the circumlocutory passive form of speech disguised disapproval 
(Hill, 1994, p.47).  A unique form for criticizing the Government, namely “criticism 
by praise,” was also common in the Indonesian press during the Soeharto period 
(Flournoy, 1992, p.2). 
On the part of media audiences, interpreting such news reports required a skill 
for reading between the lines (or for “reading between the lies,” as former editor of 
the banned Sinar Harapan, Aristides Katoppo, claimed).  Such skill seemed to have 
been widely learned by the media-consuming public in the country.  In many 
situations, such a skill was “improved” by political instinct, beliefs, suspicion of 
Government sources, and background information.  
 
5.  Research Interests During the Soeharto Era 
This section deals with research interests that surfaced after assessment of the 
data on political communication research carried out at four main universities in 
Indonesia, from January 1984 to April 1998, a month before Soeharto was forced to 
resign.  One might expect that any dictatorship might offer a challenging ground for 
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political communication research.  As a matter of fact, in Indonesia’s case, it could 
not be cultivated to the fullest extent due to the severe constraints imposed by 
Soeharto Regime.  Even if there were some grounds for research, their aims and 
scope would be primarily “administrative research” (see Smythe & Dinh, 1983, 
Dhakidae, 2003), or to the limit described in Chaffee’s words (2001), “(…) 
[research that] approached political communication practices with a critical eye, 
[but the] main goal was to understand and explain existing institutions, not to 
reform them” (p.239). Dahlan (1990) also subscribes to the aversion of 
communication scholars to conduct political communication research, except in the 
case of descriptive or normative research, such as “the Information Order of the 
New World” or “the Pancasila” (Five Pillars Ideology).  When scholars carried out 
research on the freedom of the press, they preferred to examine the foreign press 
rather than the Indonesian press as the object of the research.   
The “Suburi Incident,” that took place during the time preceding the 1972 
General Election, contributed to this aversion.  The incident refers to the 
Government reaction to a poll that  was about to be conducted by the Subury 
(Research) Company led by John DiGregorio in several provinces of Indonesia.  
Respondents were asked to rank political figures, including Soeharto.  This type of 
polling, especially due to its ranking technique, was considered highly sensitive 
politically, since it could destabilize the national and local security order.   Thus, the 
Government prevented the researchers from conducting the polling in the field.  The 
company was allegedly accused of carrying out espionage and its operating license 
was revoked (see Sopiann, 2002). 
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Table 2    
Political Communication Research in Indonesia 
 
No Category Research Interest 1984-April 1998* 
May 1998 
Revolution* 
After 
May 21, 1998* 
Media law & press freedom 7  10 
Structure of media industry and 
power relations related to it 2 1 5 
Citizens as active information 
gatherers & processors   2 
Diversity of media types, 
ownership & content   1 
1 Democratic Media System 
Access to, & freedom of, 
alternative media 1 1 1 
Media effects on political 
opinions, attitudes, beliefs & 
perceptions 
6  7 
Effects of the media agenda on 
the audience agenda 3  5 
Media roles 2  3 
2 
Media Roles, 
Media Uses  
& Effects 
Media  & content choices   2 
No Category Research Interest 1984-April 1998* 
May 1998 
Revolution* 
After 
May 21 
1998* 
(Comparative) Media portrayal 
of certain issues 5  7 3 Media Reality Construction Newsroom analysis 2 4 4 
Elections & campaigns 3  7 
Governmental institutions & 
processes 3 1 3 
Political conflicts with violence 
(including terrorism issues) 2  5 
Local politics & local 
autonomy 2  4 
Presidential political messages 2  4 
Political leadership 2  3 
Gender in politics 2  3 
Political socialization 2  2 
Political communication in 
development 2   
Political communication 
management   2 
Former forbidden (taboo) 
concepts in politics   1 
4 
Political 
Processes  
& Interaction 
among 
Interest 
Groups 
Money politics   1 
Religious issues/influences in 
political communication 4  8 
Ethnicity issues in political 
communication 2  4 
Political communication in 
arts/cartoons/ movies 1  2 
5 “Otherness” 
Political rumors  1  
Total 55 8 96 
Note:   *The research period refers to the time when the event or case examined took place. This means that 
research conducted in 2002 might investigate an issue under the Soeharto Era (and is therefore classified as part 
of the first period column). One should also  keep in mind that certain research plans were not feasible during 
the Soeharto Era and hence needed to be postponed to more prolific  times. 
Table 2 (Research on Political Communication in Indonesia) reflects the 
above-elaborated contexts.  The data collection (limited only) at the four main 
          Political Communication in Indonesia: Revisiting the Media Performance in Three Eras 
28 
 
 
 
universities shows the significant increase in quantity and variety of research 
interest after the Soeharto Era.  This is in line with Menayang’s data (2003), that 
during the final years of the Soeharto Regime and afterwards, there has been an 
increasing interest in application of critical approach to the research in 
communication questioning power and its distribution in society, as well as 
exploring audience resistance to the operations of media as ideological apparatus. 
The data collected for this chapter show that approximately twenty percent of 
research during the Reform Era could be categorized as critical studies in contrast to 
the Soeharto Era which was almost entirely dominated by “administrative research.”  
The studies on freedom of the democratic media system (category 1) during 
the Soeharto Era show two tendencies.  First was the tendency to blame the 
journalists, or the media in general, for most of the political communication ills 
during the Soeharto Era.  For instance, a study by Nasir (1996), that takes the 
closure of Tempo, deTik, and Editor in 1994 as its case, among others concludes 
that the Indonesian press tended more to “emphatetically” understand the state or 
power behaviors than to critically question them.  The Indonesian journalists were 
spoiled, desperate, and too worried that the law would never side with the press.  
Nasir states that one cause of this problem might have been the lack of solidarity 
within the media itself and the lack of clear support from the public.  These factors 
resulted in media personnel attempting to avoid isolation -- being the only ones 
questioning the state or those in power.   
The second trend was the tendency of research projects to put the limitations 
faced by the media in a larger context.  Researchers in the latter category were 
keenly aware, even before they planned their research, that the Government and 
business interests exerted a huge influence over the Indonesian press.  For example, 
a research project conducted by Taufik (2002), examined whether there was an 
overlapping of interests between the Soeharto Government and a media 
conglomerate, Bakrie Group which owned  several printed media (Sinar Pagi, 
Berita Buana, and Nusra dailies, as well as Go, a sport weekly).  Findings of this 
research reveal the existence of a systematic and comprehensive strategy launched 
by the Government during the Soeharto era.  A license for publishing print media 
(SIUPP) was granted to the Bakrie Group by the Government for two reasons.  
Firstly, the Government knew that the tycoons in this group would never pose any 
threat to the Government.  Secondly, the Government officials dealing with the 
issuance of this license saw the SIUPP as a commodity, or to be more specific as a 
“bribe” paid by businessmen to high-ranking Government officials.  On the other 
hand the owners of the Bakrie Group did not really care about that illegal bribery, 
since the “bribery tradition” being a long-standing practice in the business 
community in Indonesia, and because they thought the media business would still 
make money after counting the bribes as a business expense.  Regarding the 
performance of the media, the businessmen fully agreed to act as the Government 
wished.  And then they treated the media industry in the same way as other business 
commodities.    
Support for Government’s paradigm also spread to journalistic practices.  A 
study conducted by Soesilo and Wasburn (1994), noted that a leading national 
newspapers (i.e. Kompas Daily) was ideologically committed to the norms of a 
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“developmental press,” that supports the social and economic needs of their nation 
and gives priority to news and information about their Government.  Those 
researchers employed a framing analysis of the news coverage of the Gulf War in 
the New York Times and the Indonesian Kompas between 1990 and 1991 (in Table 
2, this research is put under the media portrayal, category 3).  This confirmed 
McCargo’s findings (1999) that much of the Indonesian press was engaged in the 
kind of essentially uncritical ‘development journalism’ favored by the authorities, 
serving primarily as an agent of stability.  It is exactly what President Soeharto 
expressed in his speech on National Press Day in 1989 (quoted by Mehra et al., 
1989, p. 131): 
As an integral part of our developing society, nation and state, the 
press has an important role to assist in managing this nation in all its 
complexity through the dissemination of news, opinions, ideas, 
grievances and hopes to the masses. (…)  It is in this respect that the 
press has a role to play in helping build and preserve our unity and 
cohesion as a nation.  
Almost all studies into media effects on political opinions, attitudes, beliefs 
and perceptions (category 2) employed (as usual) quantitative methods.  For 
example, the studies examining how media exposure influences student perceptions 
regarding human rights in Indonesia; and how exposés by local newspapers affect 
the attitudes of local Government officials on local autonomy regulations. There 
was a unique study in this category, attempting to examine the effect of TV-3 
(Malaysia) in terms of political socialization among Indonesians living in Medan 
who had access not only to TVRI Jakarta and TVRI Medan, but also to the spillover 
from RTM-1, RTM-2 and TV-3 from Malaysia (Djaja, 1990).  This research project 
showed that people living in Medan merely used the spillover from TV-3 Malaysia 
to enjoy the entertainment programs and some information unrelated to politics.  
The TV-3 programs neither increased the audience’s feeling of being involved in 
aspects of the political system in Malaysia nor in the political system in Indonesia.  
The audience did not consider that the Malaysian programs addressed the problems 
they had to face in their daily life any better than those of TVRI Jakarta or TVRI 
Medan. They did not feel encouraged either to carry out actions to support the 
efforts developed by the local Government or the community as a result of potential 
inspiration they might receive from the TV-3 programs.  
As of the 1990s, studies of religious issues or religious influences in political 
communication (category 5) seemed to emerge.  Most of the earlier studies 
examined the ways in which political figures, or political issues related to certain 
religions, were portrayed in different media.  Certain newspapers were most 
frequently used in this kind of comparison, i.e. Kompas (presumably representing 
the Catholic viewpoint), Republika (considered to be the Muslim voice), and Suara 
Pembaruan together with Sinar Harapan (seen as having Protestant principles in 
their news).  A study by Semma (1998) examined how Kompas, Suara Pembaruan 
and Republika dailies portrayed two events related to sectarian tension among 
Christians and Muslims in East Timor (September 1995) and Situbondo (October, 
1996).  It combined a content analysis with in-depth-interviews with the gatekeepers 
of those three newspapers.  This research found that in principle all three 
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newspapers sent the same message, i.e. that those conflicts were not supposed to 
take place!  However, in carrying this message, Kompas and Suara Pembaruan paid 
much more attention to the Situbondo Case, in a way that defended the position of 
the Christian background residents.  In contrast, Republika paid much more 
attention to the East Timor Case, in a way that defended the interests of the Muslim 
background residents. This finding might be related to which residents are 
considered the minority in each conflict area. 
The only dissertation in our data collection that dealt with media-related 
political process (category 4), during the Soeharto era, is entitled, “Roles of the 
Press in Indonesia’s General Election: a Political Communication Study on the 
Coverage of Ten Newspapers During the 1987 Election Campaign” (Suwardi, 
1993).  Suwardi has there been recognized as the first political communication 
expert in Indonesia, and his dissertation stands as the first academic writing with 
elaborative political communication definitions and analyses of the effects of media 
on campaigns.  Making use of the content analysis method in the form of symbol 
coding, he lists symbols and messages in those newspapers systematically and 
thereafter interprets them.  In his conclusion, he states that the newspapers during 
the 1987 Election Campaign were not capable of carrying substantial political 
messages.  They focused primarily on the political figures instead.  Three causal 
factors were identified.  First, the form of the campaign itself (street parades and 
open-air mass meetings) would not enable the delivery of substantial political 
messages; second, the incapability of the speakers; and third, the incapability of the 
reporters.  Accordingly, newspapers only carried slogans and on-the-spot reports, 
without substantial messages, thereby failing to play their role as a forum for 
political education.  Suwardi’s research also discovered that the editorial columns of 
all newspapers were relatively less controversial compared to opinion articles 
written by experts or observers.  Suwardi associates this finding with the self-
censorship developed by the editorial chief or editorial staff of each newspaper.   
Even though this research explores quite extensively the newspaper coverage 
during the 1987 election campaign, and also the tendency for newspapers to favor 
the ruling party (Golkar), it never strongly suggests possible reforms of the election 
campaign mechanism.  In addition, it does not clearly suggest that reform should be 
undertaken in Indonesia’s media industry structure, in order to provide a fairer and 
higher quality political education. 
Some analysts might have expected that political communication research in 
Indonesia would have evolved in a new direction, when a study was conducted  (by 
Lesmana, 1997) comparing the ways in which the news concerning the July 27 
Incident was published in a weekly magazine and in a cyber news magazine (this 
research is put under category 1, access to, & freedom of, alternative media).  The 
July 27 Incident refers to a bloody attack taking place in 1996 on attendees at a 
forum of expression at the PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) headquarter in 
Jakarta, allegedly carried out by members of the Armed Forces and vigilantes, under 
orders of the Soeharto Regime.  The action was a conspiracy by the regime and a 
faction of PDI that was loyal to Soeharto, led by Suryadi, against the majority of 
PDI, led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of the Indonesia’s first president.  
Megawati appeared to be a rising political star at that time.  Any rising political star, 
          Political Communication in Indonesia: Revisiting the Media Performance in Three Eras 
31 
 
 
 
moreover bringing a famous name like Soekarno, would certainly be regarded a 
serious threat by Soeharto.  This study indeed showed that the cyber news magazine 
(Tempo Interaktif) was much more transparent in its reports -- described by the 
researcher as a “mirror” of that event -- than the weekly (printed) magazine.  The 
latter, Gatra, still presented its news as “the neutral Government partner.”  
Therefore, its criticism of the regime pertaining that event was couched in very soft 
or implicit terms.  The editors reasoned that implicit criticism would ultimately be 
taken into consideration by the Government.  In addition, findings of this research 
showed that Tempo Interaktif, the cyber news magazine, tended to focus more on 
the political and social aspects of that bloody event, while Gatra chose to emphasize 
more on the legal aspects. For the news sources, Gatra simply interviewed sources 
from the armed forces.  This was certainly the safest choice for the editors and 
owners amidst that heated security situation.  Tempo Interaktif, on the other hand, 
relied more on sources from non-Government organizations.  Unfortunately, even 
though the cyber news magazine would never have to face the revocation of a 
license, a fate that the printed weekly could suffer, Tempo Interaktif was still not 
capable of presenting accurate data on the casualties of the July 27 Incident.  In 
other words, Tempo Interaktif did not go as far as it could have in making the most 
of its unique, and expected, role as cyber media.   
With the exception of this new hope for a freer press, which might have been 
made possible thanks to the Internet, an opportunity which unfortunately was not 
fully taken advantage of, in general we can conclude that during the Soeharto Era 
the results of interplay among elements in the Media Performance Model showed 
the dominance of the Government over other elements, i.e. Market, Civil Society, 
and Media.  Of course it is also fair to say that between the Government and the 
Market there was an overlapping of interests. On the one hand, the Government 
received guarantees that the media owners watch closely so that their media 
performance would only follow the Government line.  On the other hand, 
Soeharto’s cronies, or loyalists of the Government, who were granted licenses, had 
access to the media market and in general treated the media industry in the same 
way as other business commodities (see Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Civil 
Society
Market 
Media 
Government 
 Figure 2.  Media Performance model: Visualising Tendencies  
 in the Power Relations in Three Eras 
 B. May 1998 
Revolution 
C. The Reform Era 
Media 
Government 
Civil 
Society
Market
Media 
Government 
Civil 
Society 
Market
A. The Soeharto Era 
          Political Communication in Indonesia: Revisiting the Media Performance in Three Eras 
32 
 
 
 
6.   The May 1998 Revolution  
Without a comprehensive exploration, Indonesia’s May 1998 Revolution that 
successfully toppled Soeharto, may simply be attributed to the Internet as its 
significant driving motor (compared with the audio-tape during the Iranian 
Revolution and with the fax machine during the Chinese student movement around 
Tiananmen Square, see Hidayat, 2002, p. 157). On the other hand, some analysts 
postulate that the prima causa of Indonesia's May 1998 Revolution was the 
economic crisis, or to be more specific: the capital mobility (see Basri & Iswara, 
2000, p. 27-45). 
Of the data in our research collection at the four main universities, Ishadi’s 
dissertation (2002) could be included in the critical research category using 
historical narrative.  According to his research, the motives of establishing TV 
stations in Indonesia were heavily political. Accordingly, those stations would be 
seen and treated as ideological state apparatuses.  When the first commercial TV 
station, RCTI, was created in 1987, it brought with it a new function, namely to 
make a profit in line with the open-market economic policy developed by Soeharto.  
However, the Government control of the media was still very much in place.  These 
two functions might not have created problems for the TV station owner, but it 
placed the newsroom journalists in an uncomfortable position.  In the meantime, 
competition became tougher, with the creation of four additional commercial TV 
stations.  The need to achieve high ratings, and therefore a great deal of 
advertisement, in fact required the newsroom personnel to take seriously the 
preferences of their audience.  One of the outcomes was a conflict between what the 
audience wanted and what the TV journalists and editors were allowed to deliver.   
The audience expected more direct and transparent news, including subjects that 
were forbidden by the Government.  Under these circumstances, the interplay 
between the structure, represented by the interests of the media owners, and the 
actions of TV journalists and editors crystallized.  Of course the degree of those 
interplays differed from one TV newsrooms to the next.  According to Ishadi’s 
research, some of the journalists could be included in the so-called “critical 
supporters” category, while other could even be labeled as “spoilers” of the 
Soeharto Regime. 
In early May 1998, those interplay were colored (if not exacerbated) by the 
mounting economic crisis, political crisis, student and activist demonstrations, and 
conflicting opinions among the elite.  In addition, the pressures on the Government 
from international institutions, such as the IMF (International Monetary Fund), 
urging the Government to seriously tackle the economic crisis, had mounted to a 
climax.  At the same time, newsroom personnel were surprised that the ratings for 
TV news programs significantly increased; they could compete on an equal footing 
with popular entertainment programs.  Certainly the fear that the Government could 
at any time impose severe sanctions on the TV stations still haunted the media 
owners, as well as journalists and editors.  However, that anxiety was countered by 
the fear that any TV station that did not broadcast transparent and daring news 
would be left behind.  On top of that, any station wanted to avoid at any price to run 
the risk would be called a “coward” by students and activists, during their 
demonstrations across the country.  According to Ishadi, because of the above-
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mentioned interplay between structures and agencies in the television newsrooms, 
by mid-May 1998, almost all of the journalists and editors could have been included 
in the “spoiler” category.  He considers that the role of TV personnel as “spoilers” 
was a relatively dominant cause of the May 1998 Revolution.  While doing so, he 
acknowledges that there were other interplay between structures and agencies in 
Market, Civil Society, and Government itself that together contributed to the 
revolution process. 
Ishadi’s research was developed as a part of a larger research project on the 
“Press in the May Revolution,” conducted by a research team of the Graduate 
School of Communication, University of Indonesia, which was carefully designed 
to use the historical narrative.  Interestingly, the inquiries on what exactly happened 
in the TV newsrooms during May 1998 were not only assigned to Ishadi but also to 
another professional TV news manager, Sumita Tobing of SCTV (see “Interactions 
in the TV Newsrooms” in Hidayat et al., 2000, p. 241-249).  In 1994, Tobing was 
asked by the SCTV management to develop a TV newsroom, due to the fact that 
since 1990 SCTV only relayed news programs from RCTI.  She never gathered 
complete information about the business holdings of SCTV’s shareholders.  Later in 
the year, she was surprised to receive a phone call from a director of SCTV 
criticizing a newscast by SCTV.  The broadcast concerned a real estate company 
that did not pay any remuneration to a landowner when the company took over his 
land.  As a matter of fact, the owners of that real estate company were both the main 
shareholders of SCTV.  She was then pressured to fabricate another story to counter 
the previous news. 
Suddenly, on May 12, 1998, the movement pioneered by students and 
activists was accelerated by the bloody quelling of a student demonstration at 
Trisakti University in West Jakarta.  Four students were killed and many injured by 
unidentified troops and police.  This violent action provoked reactions across the 
country.  Starting the next day, mass riots including shop looting, car and shop 
burnings, as well as rapes took place in Jakarta and several other cities.  In Tobing’s 
exposition, until May 16, the Government still tried to control the TV news 
programs by briefing the journalists and editors at the SCTV newsrooms.  
According to the Government, the opposition figures could only be interviewed if 
they did not provoke people (there was no further explanation available at that time 
about what this criterion really meant).  On May 17, SCTV news producer Bosco 
invited an opposition figure, Sarwono Kusumaatmaja, to appear at noon on a live 
news program.   During his interview, Sarwono explicitly called for Soeharto to step 
down.  Tobing, who came to the office later that day, surprisingly found a letter on 
her desk stating that she was fired, signed by Gontha, the assistant director (also a 
share holder) who then directly put himself in charge of the SCTV newsroom!           
Tobing’s analysis was confirmed by research conducted by Almard (1999). 
According to his research, even on the day when Trisakti University students were 
killed, open arguments about what the journalists and editors could do and what not 
took place in the newsrooms of RCTI and SCTV; these arguments involved the 
owners, management staff, as well as newsroom personnel.  Also on May 13, or a 
day after the killing of the four students, the main policy in those newsrooms was 
merely to present the events, without any expression of support for the student and 
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activist movements.  It was from May 14 onward that the journalists and editors 
gradually began to openly show their support for the movement through their 
reporting.  On May 18, students and activists entered the Parliament compound and 
forced the legislators to ask Soeharto to step down.   
Thus, Tobing’s exposition and findings, as supported by Almard, did not 
confirm Ishadi’s theory that the TV newsroom personnel played a leading role in 
driving the May1998 Revolution to its culmination.  They were also supported by 
McCargo’s findings (1999), which state that evidence that the media led or initiated 
political transition is patchy.  McCargo further generalizes that the role of the media 
in political transitions tends to be a supporting one.  He also acknowledges that in 
many Southeast Asian cases, the picture of media as a political actor, and the 
conflict in which it is involved, is exceedingly ambiguous, and the issues at stake 
are both complex and subtle.  During the May 1998 Revolution, the state-owned TV 
station, TVRI, never reported the student demonstrations until they occupied the 
parliament building. Meanwhile students had temporarily occupied several local 
branches of RRI, in order to force the state-owned radio to air their demands 
(Abidin, 2000). This again confirms McCargo’s conclusion that the electronic 
media typically proves easier for the state to control and in many cases television 
appears to be the last media agency to support political transitions.  
In addition to the examination of the TV newsrooms, the research project, 
“Press in the May Revolution,” also investigated the processes taking place in local 
media, rumor, cyber media, as well as underground media.  Local media in 
Indonesia were mainly print media and radio stations, as all commercial TV stations 
were centered in Jakarta and the local branches of TVRI only produced relatively 
insignificant programs.  In May 1998, newsrooms of local media were characterized 
by the same open arguments between the owners and journalists as those heard in 
Jakarta.  What is interesting to note is the fact that during the Reform movement 
local radio and print media personnel generally referred to television news 
programming, particularly the newscasts on commercial stations, as a benchmark 
for evaluating both the subjects and the depth of the news coverage  (Gazali, 2002, 
p. 138).  So, this case represents an exception to McCargo’s findings, in that 
national commercial TV stations became an agent of change first, and then the local 
print media and radio stations followed their lead.   
At the macro level, the research project, “Press in the May Revolution,” 
concludes that the collapse of the Soeharto Regime appears to be the product of 
internal contradictions within the political, economic, and mass media structures.6 
On the one hand, Soeharto had to integrate the economy more deeply with the 
global capitalist system to strengthen the economy.  This was strategically 
significant for the regime’s survival, since economic prosperity had been its main 
source of legitimacy.  On the other hand, the economy's proliferating links to global 
capital markets had made the regime more vulnerable to external pressures and 
changes, among others to capital mobility due to “the changes in risk perceptions by 
the parties involved” (de Koning, as quoted in Hidayat, 2002, p. 171).  This research 
also found that under these circumstances the phenomenon of rumor indeed 
mattered.7  Rumor that the seventy-six-year-old President Soeharto was ill, for 
instance, sent the Jakarta Stock Exchange’s main index plunging 20% in mid-
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December 1997.  The rumors then spread from the financial markets into the street.  
A rumor that a coup was in progress resulted in a collapse of Indonesia’s currency, 
the Rupiah, and sent Jakarta’s rich and poor on a buying spree, emptying 
supermarket shelves of basic commodities, two times in as many weeks (see 
Christoper Torchia, Associated Press, January 9, 1998).  People also queued at 
banks and moneychangers in order to buy U.S. Dollars, saying they feared losing 
their Rupiah savings (Hidayat, 2002, p.172). 
While the formal or conventional media (print media, TV, and radio) in 
general waited until the stage when they could not help but report the news about 
the revolution, the “Press in the May Revolution” research project shows that along 
with the rumors, the news circulating through the Internet (see Winters, 2002) and 
the underground media, i.e. campus and student media, pro-democracy non-
Governmental organization (NGO) media, and the underground media, targeted at 
the general public (see Menayang et al., 2002) played significant roles much earlier 
in that revolution. 
Winters (2002, p. 118) concludes: 
This combination of an activist tradition among youth in 
Indonesia and high levels of Internet penetration among the same 
segment of Indonesian society provided a particularly potent 
political mixture for mounting a sustained and coordinated 
reformist movement in the late 1990s. Although fractured in many 
ways, the Indonesian student movement made excellent use of a 
wide range of information sources and technologies for analysis, 
networking and coordination. The explosion of political activism 
fuelled by the Internet and global media coverage caught the 
Soeharto Regime off guard. 
According to Menayang et al. (2002), various underground media that were 
emerging and gaining resonance with the public, particularly in the months that 
preceded Soeharto’s downfall, are in fact a sort of social movement.  Their selection 
and treatment of issues were necessarily carried out differently from the mainstream 
media, with the purpose of supporting their common goal -- to challenge the status 
quo.  This research provides two explanations regarding the influence of the 
underground media.  First, during the period when the Soeharto Regime was on its 
way out, the underground movement’s ideology (carried by the underground media) 
defeated the establishment’s ideology (voiced by the mainstream media), as shown 
in equivalent news frames and content of both media (p.153).  Second, 
ideologically, there was no significant difference between those working in the 
authorized press and those working underground.  The cause of the grievances was 
considered to be the same by both groups; however, one group decided to take 
action, while the other did not.  And “only when the Soeharto Regime almost fell, 
and repression of the press was gradually lifted, did both types of media become 
similar in terms of the openness of their reports about the common cause of 
grievances” (p.154).     
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Again, in most aspects, the above findings are parallel with McCargo’s 
assumptions (1999) that classify the Soeharto Regime as “semi authoritarian,” based 
on strong support from the military; and that the regime derived much of its 
legitimacy from relatively successful economic development.8   McCargo also 
considers that Soeharto was forced out by a combination of international and 
domestic political and economic forces.  What happened with the press at various 
junctures during the final years of the Soeharto Regime, according to McCargo, 
shows that it performed each of the three alternative modes of agency: stability, 
restraint, and change.  McCargo (1999, p. 25) illustrates: 
Central to Soeharto’s demise was his preoccupation with the 
maintenance of absolute sovereign authority, his unwillingness and 
inability to coexist either with higher powers (such as the IMF), or 
with subordinate powers, such as more outspoken press reflecting 
divisions in his regime, and in Indonesian society.  By refusing to 
allow the Indonesian press to evolve from serving as an agent of 
stability to functioning as an agent of restraint, Soeharto may actually 
have destabilized the New Order. 
In McCargo’s eyes, the kind of restraining influence practiced by Tempo, 
Editor and DeTik -- alerting both rulers and readers to important tensions within the 
elite -- actually served valuable purposes for the regime (for an overview of this 
kind of interaction, see Sen & Hill, 2000). 
In conclusion, we can say that during the May 1998 Revolution, the Media 
Performance Model shows how the Civil Society and the (more open to global) 
Market could fight back or corrode the Government control or legitimacy in 
astonishing ways.  The latent performances of alternative Media (Internet) and 
underground Media, together with rumors, helped enable the Civil Society and 
Market bring those impacts to bear on the Soeharto Regime.  Of course, finally, 
other (conventional) media could not help but support the revolution (see Figure 2 
Part B) that reached its peak with Soeharto’s downfall on May 21. He was 
succeeded by B.J. Habibie. 
 
7.   Indonesia During the Reform Era 
Learning from the causes and events of the May 1998 Revolution, analysts 
might predict that the Media Performance Model during the Reform Era would be 
more or less similar to that during the May Revolution.  This is due to the overthrow 
of the Soeharto Regime, which was not only a major achievement, but also 
promised to create a new atmosphere, that would allow more freedom for media 
performance and be more conducive to political communication practices and 
research. 
As reflected in its name, the Reformasi (Reformation) continues to be the 
buzzword of the Post-Soeharto Era.  The subsequent administrations–under massive 
internal and external pressures for reformation -- gradually freed the market, the 
society and the media from state intervention. The market was increasingly 
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liberalized through a series of “jungle clearing operations” in order to end a web of 
politically well-connected business privileges and monopolies that surrounded 
Soeharto’s inner circle.  It certainly opened up possibilities for diversity of 
ownership in the media industry.  The newly liberated civil society 9  also expressed 
itself in the rise of non-Governmental organizations (NGOs), advocacy groups, 
voluntary social and cultural organizations, independent labor unions, a more 
independent press council, and some forty new journalist associations.  But on the 
other side of the coin, the rise of civil society can also encourage the spawning of 
dangerous hate groups --promoting, organizing, and executing violence (see e.g., 
Chambers & Kopstein, 2001).   This phenomenon has appeared in the rise of 
violence in Indonesia during the Reform Era (see Tadjoeddin, 2002).  
Focusing on the media sector, the process of liberalization has included a 
series of deregulations, and more importantly, the liquidation of the Information 
Ministry.   The Information Ministry was one of the central features of Soeharto’s 
authoritarian corporatism, responsible for a long record of press bans.  A year after 
the resignation of Soeharto, the House of Representatives passed a new, liberating 
Press Law (1999) that, among other things, eliminated licensing requirements, 
revoked the Government’s ability to ban publications, guaranteed freedom of the 
press, and even imposed a stiff penalty of two years’ prison on “anyone who acts 
against the law by deliberately taking actions which could obstruct the work of the 
press.”  Since a publishing license was no longer required by the new Government, 
it is estimated that after Soeharto’s fall in 1998, the number of newspapers soared 
from 300 to around 1,000, and the number of radio stations increased from 700 to 
more than 1,000  (Mangahas, in Johannen and Gomez, 2001, p.125).  The new law 
also conforms with the spirit of global neo-liberalism by permitting foreigners to 
own up to forty-nine percent of shares in media agencies.  While a new 
Broadcasting Bill was being drawn up by the Parliament, five new private television 
companies entered the media market, competing with the five television companies 
that had been in the market since the early 1990s.  Indonesia’s media sector was 
then free to disseminate political information and function as a venue for the 
discussion of political issues.  Jonathan Turner, the Reuters Bureau Chief in Jakarta, 
agrees that, “Indonesia has become one of the world’s most open communities in as 
much as you can pretty well write what you want without fear of official sanction” 
(quoted in Goodman, 2000). 
The liberalization, in turn, plunged the media into a fierce competition for 
sales and ratings.  In the newspaper sector, for example, it is estimated that out of 
1000 newspaper which emerged during the seventeen-month Habibie presidency, 
only some 600 to 700 remained in the market when Abdurrahman Wahid was 
inaugurated President in October 1999 (Mangahas, in Johannen and Gomez, 2001, 
p. 125), or according to AJI (2000) only about 705 publications were still in 
business, of which a mere fifteen percent were believed to be in good shape 
financially. 
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8.   Research Interests During the Reform Era 
As shown in the previous analysis, the departure of the Soeharto Regime 
resulted in a more open and democratic, yet weak, Government, and a relatively 
stronger civil society.  As a result, the racial, ethnic, class, and sectarian-related 
tensions and animosities, most of which had been buried for many years, were able 
to rise up and color the Reform Era.  This situation was worsened by both partisan 
media and media that treated news merely as a commodity due to the fierce 
competition for sales, ratings, and advertisings, mainly by capitalizing on 
sensationalism.  This explanation is echoed by a number of researchers in the 
academic environment who are concerned about democratic media system, media 
reality construction, political conflicts with violence, and religious issues/influences 
in political communication. 
A study by Paidi (2002) attempts to examine the freedom of press for local 
newspapers published in Jayapura, the capital city of West Papua (category 1 in 
Table 1).  This province, together with Aceh and Maluku, has long been recognized 
for its latent or manifest appeals for separation from Indonesia.  Paidi’s research 
found that in general Papuans are genuinely interested in and search for news items 
from local newspapers concerning the secession issue.  As a matter of fact, the news 
items about the potential independence of West Papua from Indonesia seemed to be 
more ubiquitous in the newspapers published in Jayapura during the Reform Era 
than during the Soeharto Era.  The gatekeepers in each local newspaper agency, 
according to the findings of this research, deliberately selected and emphasized 
news items about secession.  Through statistical analysis, Paidi further discovered 
that the variable attitude about the independence of West Papua alone has a positive 
correlation with the favorable opinion of the Papuans toward secession.  Yet after 
being exposed to local newspapers contents that are factual and objective, both the 
attitude and opinion of Papuans in favor of separation from Indonesia increased 
significantly.  This study concludes that, on the one hand, having greater freedom 
was substantially beneficial for the local press in West Papua, while on the other 
hand it had a potential danger of putting the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia at 
risk. 
A dissertation by Rusadi (2002) fits the type of research needed to examine 
the structure of media industry & power relations (also in category 1), and at the 
same time explores the context of “bad elements” in civil society.  This study 
examined the negative aspects of capitalism in the newspaper institution (Kompas, 
Media Indonesia, and Republika daily).  Rusady analyzed the social riots and the 
power relationships that were being developed and reproduced at that time to serve 
the profit motives of the media.  The social riots chosen for this study case were: the 
Tasikmalaya Riot, the Semanggi II Incident, the Cibadak Mall Incident, the Glodak 
Plaza Incident, fighting among members of different communities, and fighting 
among students.  This research found that the social riots were developed textually 
in the newspapers as conflicts between powers of the majority and minority 
religions, between the powers of regime’s legimitation supporters and 
delegitimation supporters, between powers of the state and the masses, between 
powers of the up-economy class and the low-economy class, and between powers of 
the military and civilians.  All of those power conflicts were accumulated to give 
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the media high selling points.  Or in short, the media were inclined to survive and 
maximize their profits by selling these social uncertainties and disharmonies as 
commodities!  
Among the “media reality construction” studies (category 2), a study by 
Harahap (2000) was developed quite well and critically -- under the title “Realities 
of Farmers and Their Organizations in the Media: A Study of State Hegemony in 
the Media Discourse.”  This study examines how eight Jakarta-based media (six 
dailies, one weekly magazine, and TVRI) as well as six local newspapers, portrayed 
activities of several farmer organizations. It employs content analysis to see how 
ideology representation is used when covering three themes or events: farmer 
protests, the establishment and congresses of farmer organizations, and land 
disputes.  Its findings show that in almost all the exposure, the farmers and their 
organizations were generally portrayed in violent actions, such as staging protests 
by blocking roads and forcefully (re)entering land under dispute.  In contrast, the 
violence committed by other parties, such as shootings of farmers by military 
personnel seemed to be regarded as procedural misconduct only, or as acts of self-
defense against the attacks of angry farmers.   
Only a very few media have paid attention to the establishment and actions of 
the new farmer organizations; they have only featured the long-standing farmer 
organization developed during the Soeharto era, i.e. the Association of Indonesian 
Farmers’ Cooperative (HKTI, Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia).  Among the 
few, the coverage by Waspada and Mimbar Umum daily, both local newspapers, is 
considered quite intensive and objective.  During the protest by the farmer 
organizations in front of the Parliament Building, according to Harahap's findings, 
the Jakarta Post daily also gave the incident a proportional and objective reporting. 
Unfortunately, in the case of land disputes, the media never seemed to take any 
progressive steps to deconstruct the old image of farmers and their organizations in 
the media (under the influence of the state hegemony of the Soeharto Era), such as 
their being easily provoked into those disputes by third parties, or even possessed by 
the spirit of Communism.   
A research by Zen (2001) is quite unique among those studies examining 
religious issues/influences in political communication (category 5), which generally 
try to see how various media treat political issues that mix with religious issues in 
their news content in accordance with their religious alliances.  Zen’s study employs 
critical discourse and framing analysis to explore the historical contexts of political 
communication and conflict within the largest Muslim group in Indonesia, the 
Nahdlalul Ulama (NU).  It also compares the everyday live of this community with 
the way it was portrayed in several media.  The findings of this research show that 
in general the media pictured the NU members as village people with strong 
feudalistic and primordial attitudes.  Every time NU held its large and special 
religious meeting (called “istighotsah”), the media tended to portray the meeting not 
as a religious ritual, but as a political forum for NU leaders, with some outsiders -- 
usually influential figures -- as honorary guests.  Since NU had already vowed to 
return to “khittah” (their previous stance, that they would not get involved in 
political practices), NU should have kept a distance from any political parties, 
especially the PKB (National Awakening Party, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa).  This 
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party was in fact established by some of NU top leaders, including Abdurrahman 
Wahid (the then president-to-be), as a breakthrough so that NU members, who were 
interested in political practices, could channel their activities without officially 
involving the NU name.  The problem is that other NU leaders also established 
political parties, such as the PKU (Muslim Community Awakening Party), etc.  
Zen’s research found that the media tended to only interview certain n prominent 
figures of NU who were active in PKB (which proved to be the most successful 
among the parties related to the NU), but rarely asked for comments from NU 
figures active in other parties.  This resulted in conflicts between community 
members.  We have to note that the research also confirmed that the feudalistic 
practices (attributed by the media to this community) troubled the NU members 
themselves, especially the young generation.  Zen’s research also recorded the 
expectations of this young generation: that NU ulama (religious teachers or leaders) 
would gradually abandon those feudalistic attitudes.  With this summary, we can see 
how political communication studies can be conducted creatively at the community 
level.  It might tend to reshape or invent institutions, or “ritual” performance, to 
meet the collective needs of the community.       
Another category of research, that has consistently received much attention, is 
analysis of media effects (category 2).  One such study examines how political 
realities presented by Kompas, Republika, and Media Indonesia dailies impacted 
President Abdurrahman Wahid’s proposal to revoke the People’s Consultative 
Assembly Decree No. XXV/MPRS/1966.  This decree dealt with an issue that many 
Indonesians still consider controversial, i.e. the banning of Indonesian Communist 
Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI).  The ban was associated with the1966 
attempted “coup d’état” (Soeharto’s description) launched by some units under the 
PKI, an event that is far from being clearly understood.  Even though there were 
some different viewpoints among the three newspapers, as seen in their articles, this 
research concludes that all three tried to send the message that it was not the right 
time for Abdurrahman Wahid to continue with his proposed action.  They all 
reminded the President about the critical conflicts he was having with Parliament at 
that time.  According to this research, Abdurrahman Wahid finally listened to this 
message.  The media had a profound impact in this case: the President did not take 
any decision by himself but instead sent his suggestion to the Assembly for 
discussion.   
The sudden increase in the number of political parties after the fall of 
Soeharto resulted in a rise in the number of studies regarding effective campaign 
strategies (category 4).  These have included issues such as how the public relations 
department of a political party should be developed and how this department should 
deal with given political issues.  Examples of this type of study include “Public 
Relations Management of Nation Awakening Party in the 1999 Election” (Iskandar, 
2001) and “Political Campaign of the National Mandate Party in the 1999 Election” 
(Kulsum, 2002).   
The number of gender studies also increased during the Reform Era.  Proof of 
this increase, and its implications in political communication, may be seen in a 
dissertation by Atmonobudi (2004).  While other research projects tended to 
examine how various media portray a woman’s career or opinion in the context of a 
          Political Communication in Indonesia: Revisiting the Media Performance in Three Eras 
41 
 
 
 
patriarchal society such as Indonesia, this study with its critical approach, examines 
the ways in which middle-class housewives assign meaning to the political career of 
President Megawati.  The results are then compared with meanings assigned by the 
contents of Kompas daily from January 1993 to the end of 2001, especially 
concerning whether it is appropriate for Megawati as a woman fill the post of 
Indonesia’s President; Megawati’s intellectual capacity and emotions; and 
Megawati’s profile that is not considered outstanding (at least compared with her 
father, Soekarno, who was considered to be a brilliant political thinker).  
Atmonobudi concludes that while Kompas did not express a clear opinion regarding 
the appropriateness of a woman President, most informants did “the negotiating 
reading” over the meaning provided by the media.  According to the housewives 
supporting a woman for the presidency, it is already an accomplished fact that 
Indonesia has a female President.  However, some housewives seriously questioned 
whether a woman President could carry out the domestic roles of a woman, such as 
childrearing, given the heavy duties of the Presidency.  Some worried that a woman 
like Megawati could be easily controlled by other people, especially male 
politicians surrounding her.  It is important to note that informants of Chinese 
descent gave “the critique of silence,” by saying that no matter who becomes 
Indonesia’s President, regardless of gender, the fate of Chinese Indonesian will 
never improve.  They will still be regarded second-class citizens, who will never be 
viewed as appropriate even for the lowest political position such as Lurah (head of 
several villages or communities).  
Concerning the intellectual capacity and emotions of Megawati, the Muslim 
housewives who were born during the Soeharto Era assigned the same meaning as 
that presented by the media: that Megawati is not very intellectual and cannot 
handle her emotions well.  Megawati tends to react emotionally to criticism on 
unimportant issues, when there is no need to reply at all.  Some Christian 
background housewives who were born before the Soeharto Era held the opposite 
opinion.  As to Megawati’s profile, there was strong agreement; all informants 
agreed with the media that the Indonesian people did not consider Megawati to 
possess a high profile, especially when compared with the charisma of her father or 
the success of her husband, Taufik Kemas.    
A dissertation by Gayatri (2002) employs critical discourse analysis to 
examine how three newspapers construct realities concerning Soeharto’s leadership.  
This study might simply have fallen into the group of studies comparing media 
reality constructions, if Gayatri had not chosen a relatively unique context together 
with that comparison.  In this study, Soeharto’s leadership is analyzed in the 
specific context of Javanese culture (category 5, ethnicity issue in political 
communication).  According to Gayatri’s findings, the realities of Soeharto’s 
leadership presented in newspapers are primarily based on his speeches and 
quotations.  Thus, they resulted in a myth that Soeharto’s leadership style was 
Javanese, because he frequently stated his opinions or attitudes using Javanese 
terminology.  He also often stressed Javanese principles of leadership as an example 
to be followed by all Indonesians.  If fact, this research demonstrates that Soeharto’s 
words and actions were consistent with the traditional Javanese leadership style 
only during the first of four stages of his hanggayuh kasampurnaning hoerip (a 
Javanese concept referring to stages in a person’s life during which he accomplishes 
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his vision and mission).  In the second period, pengamalan (putting into practice 
what had been said), and the third period, pematangan (maturation of the leader and 
fulfillment of his vision), as well as the final, climactic period, Soeharto’s words 
were in contradiction to his actions.  In other words, Soeharto’s actions no longer 
reflected the values of a Javanese leader.  The weakness of the media was that they 
took Soeharto’s words at face value, never evaluating his actions in terms of 
Javanese leadership principles.  The media portrayed Soeharto’s leadership style as 
Javanese up until his downfall; this tended to bring the original teachings of 
Javanese leadership into disrepute.  
There is also a research project conducted in the context of Sundanese 
ethnicity.   The subject is the effectiveness of traditional leadership by the utilization 
of religion and magic (Djuhana, 2002).  This study employs an ethnographic 
method in collecting data and describing the findings.  Its object is the “golokmerah 
leadership” (red machete leadership) known to have existed in the village of 
Panyingkiran, West Java, since the Dutch Colonial Era.  The research describes red 
machete leadership, in the first place, as being related to magic, which is contrary to 
effective leadership according to Muslim teachings.  According to Islam, leadership 
must be based on religious teachings only.  However in practice, the Muslim ulama 
(leaders) also have long used magic. For example, in case that they thought their 
roles were treated by other parties, such as people who were categorized as 
“intellectual” in that area who can give some alternative views differing from the 
Muslim leaders’ mainstream views. The magic used by these religious leaders was 
only known to a very limited circle. On the other hand, the red machete leaders also 
used certain Islamic terminology to maintain or call on their magical powers.  Thus, 
at the same time they employed magic, they justified themselves by using religious 
terminology. Djuhana concludes that for the people living in that area, Islam could 
be seen as magic as well as religion, since the religion provided the leaders spiritual 
teaching while magic gave them practical powers.  Their leadership styles depended 
on how they balanced these two contradictory-but-complementary aspects of 
leadership.  As Indonesia is rich in the plurality of ethnicities and cultures, this line 
of research is promising, and might contribute to enriching the unique identity of 
political communication research in Indonesia.   
Finally, we have to note that from early 2000 to the end of 2003, a concerted 
research effort was launched to create a more democratic climate in the 
broadcasting landscape in Indonesia.  It is not easy to say which parties initiated this 
effort, but it then gained more and more support from various groups working for a 
freer and equal communication system, and has become an effort belonging to all 
those parties.  The area of promoting diversity of ownership and plurality of 
contents of broadcasting was jointly pioneered by the Graduate School of 
Communication, University of Indonesia, together with all state and local 
universities, as well as a large number of non-Government activists and community 
leaders in thirteen provinces across Indonesia.   
There were at least three motives behind this joint research effort.  Firstly, the 
liberalization of the media industry in the post-Soeharto era, and the domination of 
market pressures over the media industry, quickly put Indonesia into the so-called 
“fallacy of the two-model choice” (Bagdikian, 1997, p.248).  This fallacy holds that 
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there are only two choices available: the state-controlled media (as during the 
Soeharto Era) and the uncontrolled media, characterized by libertarian media 
content -- such as bloody crime reporting, programs focusing on supernatural or 
magic, celebrity gossip shows, imported and Indonesian version of telenovela, and 
other programs produced or bought for the rating consideration only.  Secondly, the 
broadcasting field was in urgent need of a new broadcasting law (replacing the 
suppressive Broadcasting Law No. 24/1997) and an independent regulatory body to 
oversee its implementation. Thirdly, in line with the first and the second reasons, the 
Broadcasting Law should thus recognize the existence of other types of 
broadcasting in addition to the ten Jakarta-based TV stations, i.e. national public 
TV, local public TV, local commercial TV, and community TV, as well as local 
public radio and community radio stations.   
This joint effort finally contributed to the passage of the new Broadcasting 
Law No. 32/2002 in December 2002, and the establishment of the first Indonesian 
Broadcasting Commission (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia, KPI) in December 2003 
(see Gazali, 2003; Gazali et al., 2003).  However, some parties, especially the 
existing commercial TV station owners, still consider that the new Broadcasting 
Law only revives the spirit of the Soeharto Era by establishing the KPI in place of 
the Ministry of Information (Kompas, September 18, 2002).  These parties 
apparently either do not have a clear picture of the roles expected of an independent 
regulatory body such as the KPI, or they are threatened by the fact that Indonesia 
currently has approximately 1000 community radio stations, twenty-three local 
commercial TV stations, and one local public TV station. 
Another positive sign is that efforts by a coalition of seventeen NGOs have 
resulted in a draft Freedom of Obtain Information Act (FOIA).  In February 2001, a 
second draft was released and presented to the Parliament.  Basorie (2001: p. 81) 
writes:  
The draft FOIA covers six principles:  (1) the right of every 
person to obtain information; (2) the obligation of public 
administrators to provide and serve requests for information in a 
quick, low-cost and simple manner; (3) tightly restricted 
exemptions; (4) the obligation of public agencies to streamline their 
information service and documentation system; (5) legal sanctions 
and penalties for parties that obstruct public access to information; 
and (6) the public right to exercise legal recourse if the right to 
obtain access to information has been violated. 
 
9.  The 2004 Election 
As predicted earlier, the Media Performance Model in the Reform Era might 
not be extremely different from that which existed during the May 1998 Revolution 
(see Figure 2 Part C).  Certainly, the Market appears to be stronger and is feared as 
the dominant power capable of determining which media can exist and dictate the 
style and content of programming.  The interplay between Media and Civil Society 
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could be seen in three directions.  First, due to the freer climate, the elements of 
Civil Society are able to present their views openly in the media.  However, in some 
cases, they have attempted to force the media to carry their views and beliefs 
through threatening the journalists (it refers to what could then be categorized as a 
“bad element in civil society”).  Second, the media has not played significant roles 
in supporting Civil Society, because many members of the media are still heady 
with the freedoms they are enjoying.  The result is often sensational and superficial 
reporting (Basorie, 2001, p.64) or even instances of malpractice and excess 
(Dharma et al., 2003). Third, media have tried their best to enhance the Civil 
Society in Indonesia. The second and third directions might be related to McCargo’s 
observation (1999, p.28) that the “media practitioners are inclined to overstate their 
own importance, communication specialists are inclined to depoliticise media 
activity, and political scientists tend to discount the media’s role.”   
Amidst those circumstances, approaching the 2004 Election, a heavy 
responsibility was placed on the shoulders of the Indonesian media.  They were, 
directly or indirectly, entrusted with the task of informing the public about the 
upcoming election, which was described by King (2004, p.1) as “a series of 
elections that are some of the most complex and challenging to have been faced by 
any democracy, let alone an emerging democracy such as Indonesia’s”.  It consists 
of three new election systems.  The first system is a single non-transferable election 
(SNTV) system for the new Regional Representative Council (DPD, Dewan 
Perwakilan Daerah).  This council is equivalent to a Senate in some countries.  The 
candidates running for this Council must sever any attachment to political parties.  
The second system is the so-called “open-list proportional representation system” 
for the national legislature (DPR) and regional legislatures (DPRD).  Both elections 
were held on April 5.  These elections represent the first time in Indonesian history 
that citizens can vote directly for a candidate.  In fact, the Election Law requires 
voters to select both a party symbol and a candidate in order to be counted as a valid 
vote.  Voting only for the candidate will be considered invalid.  A candidates who 
does well (receives say 200,000 votes), but still not enough to pass the threshold for 
a seat in a certain council (say 220,000 votes), must give up the seat to a candidate 
whose name appears higher on the party's preference list, even though that 
candidate receives less votes (say 10,000).  Democracy activists fear that many 
parties have already worked the system to ensure their hacks are elected (see 
Economist, May 4, 2003).  The third system is the election for the Presidency on 
July 5, also the first time in Indonesian history that an Indonesian President is 
elected directly by the electorate.  If no candidate receives a majority of the votes in 
addition to a threshold in some provinces, a second round will be held between the 
top two candidates on September 20.  Pre-election surveys indicate that a huge, last 
minute effort is needed to educate the Indonesian public, not only about new 
election processes, but also about the new and revised institutions being created 
(quoted in King, 2004). 
From what may be observed during the six months prior to the election, it is 
quite fair to say that the Indonesian media will has not been able to carry out their 
task very well.  What has appeared to be a priority for the media has been how to 
grab the largest share of the money that will be spent by the political parties to buy 
media space for political ads during the campaign period.  The total amount of 
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campaign advertising, according to some sources, ranges from three billion Rupiah 
(data from an interview by the first author 10  with the Chairman of the Indonesian 
Advertising Companies Association) to thirteen billion Rupiah (according to a 
businessman, quoted in Fajar Daily, January 12, 2004).  The latter figure might 
include expenditures for promotion outside TV, radio and newspapers, such as T-
shirts, umbrellas, banners, posters, and other paraphernalia with political party 
symbols and slogans.  In addition to political ads, some parties have also paid for 
access to TV programs, such as talk shows; the KPI has alleged that some stations 
have sold time slots for very high sums.  
For TV producers, the main challenge is to design programs that have some 
relationship to the election and at the same time can ensure a high rating.  In this 
sense, the producers and advertisers consider that spending a lot of time educating 
the electorate about the new election system would not be very interesting to most 
audiences.  Instead of doing so, some TV stations resorted to polling through SMS 
(short message services).  The polls asked people to select their favorite candidate 
for President.  Of course the stations were criticized immediately, since they didn’t 
employ any standard scientific polling method, and could easily mislead the 
audience (see Hidayat, Kompas, Jan. 6, 2004, Qodari, Kompas, Jan. 19, 2004).  
Even though some media personnel acknowledged those problems, most of them 
kept conducting this type of poll.   
Meanwhile, activists fostering the production and distribution of Public 
Service Announcements (PSA), in an effort to educate people about the election, 
frequently expressed their disappointment with the attitudes of all TV stations, 
which only wanted to carry the PSA as long as it brought with it an economic value.  
Agus Pambagyo, of the Foundation for the Nation Youth Vision (Yayasan Visi 
Anak Bangsa), in an email interview said, “We have to pay the full-rate for PSA 
similar to other commercial ads. Sometime we try to develop a joint program with 
some TV stations, such as holding a competition to compose songs related to the 
election.  But the chance is really limited!” 
This is not to say that the Indonesian media did not contribute anything to the 
political education process, or provide a variety of information that the people might 
need in relation to the 2004 Election.  A journalist from Kompas daily, Nasrullah 
Nara, in an email interview with the first author stated: 
In general, all media have tried to do their best in presenting the 
recent stages of political dynamics approaching the election, both in the 
form of straight informative news and in-depth exploratory articles.  
Much more spaces are now opened for the public to channel their 
comments about the election process via comments from the readers, 
letters to editors, or call-ins for broadcast media.  To the best of my 
knowledge, some media also give free space for the PSA to enlighten 
people about the new election system.  But, unfortunately, there are a 
few media, by disguising matters, appear to mislead the public by 
blatantly taking sides with certain political parties or figures!  A 
commercial TV station has even shown one particular presidential 
candidate conducting campaigns across Indonesia in most of its news 
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from early morning to late night.  It is hard to believe that it even 
broadcast live a certain party’s last round campaign in Jakarta!  This 
partisanship might spread a bad image to other media too!    
The station in question, Metro TV, has been widely criticized for being 
blatantly partial in its coverage of the political campaign of its owner, Surya Paloh.  
Surya, one of the six presidential aspirants, clashed with party leader and 
presidential contender Akbar Tandjung over some of the latter’s party policies.  
Inside sources told the Strait Times (March 18, 2004) that in recent meetings, 
editors have implied that Metro TV would not run reports on Akbar’s campaign, 
unless they involved protests against him.  In the same Strait Times’ report, one of 
the station’s senior journalists showed his discontent, “A lot of news items, which 
we thought should be priorities, got bumped off for reports on Surya’s campaign!”   
Another senior newscaster at Metro TV, after a live interview on Press Day (with 
the first author, February 9, 2004), also told that they felt uncomfortable doing 
unbalanced reporting in favor of the owner of that TV station. 
Media observers agree that the Indonesian media has made some progress 
approaching and during the 2004 Election.  Agus Sudibyo of the Institute of 
Information Flow, in an email interview (with the first author) agrees that, except 
for the Metro TV case, TV stations gave a relatively fair coverage for all political 
parties.  Of course, it is understandable that they pay a bit more attention to the 
larger political parties.  However, Agus Sudibyo also added:  
On the other hand, only very few spaces were dedicated to educating and 
informing the public about the complicated new election system.  TV 
stations are more concerned with the debate among the political elites.  In 
short, it can be said that while the expectations for the role of the media 
before the complex 2004 Election was significantly high, the attention and 
capabilities of the media on average have not increased to the same level. 
What makes it worse, only very few communication scholars have paid 
attention to these matters. 
The main media targeted for observation by relevant parties during the 2004 
election were first television and then radio.  According to Andreas Harsono, 
Chairman of the PANTAU Foundation (in an interview with ABC, March 25, 
2004), ninety percent of Indonesian voters get their political news from TV; hence, 
controlling a television station is very strategic in winning voters.  The News 
Director of one of the largest television stations in Indonesia, RTCI, was replaced 
by order of the ruling party.  This party was also reportedly behind a recent 
reshuffle of the top management of the state-owned TVRI (The Strait Times, March 
18, 2004).   
Outside the broadcasting arena, several publications and Internet sites with 
close links to parties or presidential contenders have emerged over the past few 
months.  One example is Mega Demokrat, which was established in late 2003 by 
Taufik Kiemas, President Megawati Soekarnoputri’s husband.  With a circulation of 
15,000, the biweekly tabloid has been providing the latest news about the President 
and her party, PDI-P.  The People’s Mandate Party (led by Amien Rais) also 
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established its own publication in August 2003 under the name, “The People’s 
Mandate Media” (MAR).  But since January 2004, this publication has been put on 
hold, as many of its staff members and supporters are embarking on political 
campaigns; however, its online version continues to be updated on the regular basis. 
Analysts have predicted that such websites would not make much of an 
impact, since they are in general very segmented.  According to data from the 
World Development Report 2000/2001, the number of Internet hosts per 10,000 
people in Indonesia was only 1 (quoted in Basorie, 2001, p.64).  What is more 
significant to observe, according to Andreas Harsono (in the interview with ABC, 
March 25, 2004), is a change in the way politicians and business leaders try to 
influence the media.  Harsono says: 
They have developed friendships with the editors of those news 
organizations.  These are friendly phone calls like: "Your reporter 
is doing this, doing that, I am not happy with that, it is not accurate, 
it is not proportional, it is not comprehensive, more like social 
pressure rather than direct business pressure.” 
Finally, in addition to the controversial polling via SMS, the utilization of 
SMS to distribute political messages, during the build-up to the 2004 Election, has 
not yet received the attention it deserves.  According to a study by Asia Market 
Intelligence (quoted in Kompas Cyber Media, August, 12, 2002), 76 percent of the 
cellular phone users in seven Asian countries  (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Philippines, Vietnam, India, and Indonesia) prefer to use SMS to send message 
rather than email.  Data from the Vice President of Product Development, Selular 
Indosat, Trias Kater Kartasasminta (quoted in Kompas, April 16, 2004) shows that 
in the two weeks approaching the voting day, the number of SMS sent every day, 
which is normally fourteen to fifteen millions SMS, increases by around twenty to 
twenty-five percent.  Kartasasmita also noted some unique phenomena during those 
weeks, such as SMS sent from a cellular number to a huge number of receivers, let's 
say 10,000.  In terms of economic value, it only costs a political party or candidate 
approximately 3.5 million Rupiah to send SMS, as opposed to the huge amount 
required for placing a political ad on TV, for instance.   
Political SMS, according to Andi Mallarangeng (ABC, March 25, 2004), 
serves the public in several ways.  For example, when Golkar and PDI-P were 
buying political ads, a lot of SMS ridiculing those advertisements were sent, among 
others making jokes about the style of Akbar Tanjung, the Chairman of Golkar, in 
those ads.  However, some parties also take advantage of this popular technology to 
damage the reputation of other political parties or figures.  Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, a strong presidential candidate from the newly-established Demokrat 
Party (PD, Partai Demokrat), needed to give a special press conference to deny 
accusations launched against him, mainly through SMS, and but also through 
anonymous letters and phone calls.  There are five slanderous accusations 
surrounding him, i.e. he had converted to another religion (no longer a Muslim), 
that he has two wives, that the CIA supports his nomination for President, that he 
received funding from America and some notorious mafia figures in Jakarta, and 
that he has strong prejudices against Muslims and Chinese Indonesians.  
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10.   Concluding Remarks 
In the last two decades, Indonesia has faced three fascinating periods.  Firstly, 
the Soeharto Era, categorized by some analysts as a “semi-authoritarian” regime or 
a “corporate authoritarian” regime, which came into power in 1966.  Using the 
Media Performance Model as a tool, we can see that during this period, the Soeharto 
Government became the center of interplay among the Media, the Market, the Civil 
Society, and the Government itself.  Even though phenomena in this era were 
potentially interesting topics for political communication research, they could not be 
explored to the fullest extent due to the constraints imposed by the regime in power.  
Moreover, the political communication major had just been introduced in a very few 
departments of communication and politics at that time.  The Government also 
ensured that no research interests would pose a threat to political stability as well as 
to the regime’s political legitimacy. During this era, the success of implementing 
open-market policies and maintaining political stability were both considered as key 
factors for achieving economic growth, and hence essential for reproducing the 
legitimacy of the Soeharto Regime. 
Secondly, the May 1998 Revolution, that could be seen as the result of 
internal contradictions within Soeharto’s political, economic, and communication 
policies, exacerbated by international pressures.  Approaching May 21, 1998, the 
interplay among elements in the society made the Soeharto Government 
increasingly vulnerable to, and eventually bow to, the performance of Civil Society, 
Market and Media.  This revolution seemed to arrive and take place in a 
comparatively short time.  Therefore, it has been extremely challenging (even until 
recently) for political communication researchers to attempt a comprehensive 
explanation of the event.  If the experience with the 1966 Revolution (that brought 
Soeharto into power) is any indication, the May 1998 Revolution may go down in 
history with very little comprehensive research.  It may be remembered that the 
1966 Revolution has never been seriously and consistently explored for a more 
comprehensive and open-to-the-public exposition. 
Thirdly, the Reform Era, after the departure of Soeharto, resulting in a more 
open and democratic, yet weak, Government, and a relatively stronger Civil 
Society, Market and Media.  This period should have been a new and fertile ground 
for political communication research.  And the researchers indeed have risen to the 
occasion and have tried to answer this challenge.  The data collection at the four 
main universities in Indonesia shows the increase in quantity of research, as well as 
in research interests in certain subjects.  These subjects include the following: media 
law and freedom of press, structure of media industry and power relations 
surrounding it, religious issues or influences in political communication, political 
conflict with violence, as well as studies on elections and campaigns due to the rise 
of a great number of political parties.  
Two important phenomena are noteworthy, along with those increases, i.e. the 
fact that research on the May 1998 Revolution and during the Reform Era started to 
employ a multi-disciplinary approach, and the new way the researchers picture the 
interplay between structure and agency in the media industry.  During the Soeharto 
Era, almost all of the studies used only either communication or political theories.  
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Since then, researchers have made use of a significant number of theories from 
other fields, such as concepts from sociology, political economy of media industry, 
etc.  If, during the Soeharto Era, the most researchers assumed that the journalists 
could be easily controlled by the political and economic structures, now most 
researchers have opened their minds to the interplay between structure and agency, 
as well as to the power relations analysis among the Government, Market, Civil 
Society and Media at a   (more) macro level. 
From the data collection, we also learn that research at the community level, 
such as on political socialization and the selective exposure in the media and 
content choices among community members, deserves much more attention in the 
near future.  As Indonesia is rich in terms of plurality of religions, ethnicities, and 
cultures, this line of research -- comparing these matters among communities with 
different backgrounds -- is certainly promising.  Along with research on efforts 
using mediated and non-mediated political communication in conflict-resolution 
management, which was still hard to find until recently, they might contribute 
toward enriching the unique identity of political communication research in 
Indonesia.    
Finally, it is important to note that even though the Reform Era indeed 
provides an opportunity to open up what was previously considered taboo in 
political communication, there is still no sign that researchers are enthusiastic about 
exploring this opportunity.  The only study in our data collection on Soekarno’s 
thinking, for example, does not provide any new dimension for discussion.  A fresh 
historical narrative and critical analysis on the social and political roles of the 
Armed Forces in the transition era is also still waiting to be developed.  In other 
words, studies concerning concepts and practices surrounding the Government 
deserve further exploration.  Likewise, the power relations between the media and 
other elements around the 2004 Election clearly shows that Indonesia’s media have 
just started to learn how to place themselves in a (more) macro interplay with other 
interest groups beyond their routine institutions and practices. What is more, the 
concepts and practices surrounding that election -- the first direct election in the 
Indonesia’s history -- have also received very little attention from political 
communication scholars.  
Again, we have to see the delay in responding appropriately and creatively to 
the newly and suddenly open challenges in political communication research in 
Indonesia as part of a larger picture, where this field seems to be just waking up, 
and thus in need of more effort at keeping abreast with developments taking place in 
other academic centers.  Developing more cooperation with researchers from other 
countries -- until now only a handful of cooperative efforts are recorded -- could 
constitute a breakthrough.  In that way, political communication researchers in 
Indonesia could share and learn how to effectively envision this field, given its 
unique characteristics and elaborate methods, which would enrich their research.  
Creative research methods, using the Internet for example, are still far from a reality 
in Indonesia.  
However, all these shortcomings might still be compensated for by the fact 
that not only academicians, but also a great number of activists in non-Government 
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organizations, together with media practitioners, have jointly undertaken action-
research efforts, placing citizens where they should be, as active information 
gatherers and processors.  These efforts are very important in enhancing the 
relatively equal interplay among Media, Civil Society, Market and Government (in 
the Media Performance Model).  This endeavor still has a long way to go, but it has, 
to a certain extent, contributed to the changing media landscape in Indonesia, with 
the passage of the new Broadcasting Law, mushrooming local, public, and 
community media, the establishment of Indonesia’s first Broadcasting Commission 
(KPI), as well as the submission of the draft version of the Freedom to Obtain 
Information Act (FOIA) to Parliament.  Together with all the research at the micro 
and meso levels -- such as analyses of media content, production and consumption 
of media content related to political communication, and its potential effects -- this 
effort is clearly in line with the direction for the future pointed out by Chaffee 
(2001) envisioning the politics of communication.     
 
Second Chapter 
 
 
In Search of Quality Measures for News Programming  
on Indonesian Television 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
Television in Indonesia is changing fast: within a short period of time, five 
commercial stations were launched with objectives that are diametrically opposed to 
those of the state-owned broadcaster. Until 1989 the state-owned TVRI enjoyed a 
monopoly that had lasted for more than thirty years. Television, both for informing and 
entertaining purposes, is relatively young in Indonesia; the same goes for television 
news reporting. This paper is an attempt to assess the context within which news is 
currently being produced on television and the developments news reporting is 
undergoing or may undergo in the near future.  
Assessing the state of news reporting becomes even more interesting when one 
talks to the communicators, that is, the newsmakers and policy makers themselves. 
Central questions here are: “what is your definition of a good news program and of a 
good newsmaker?”, “how do you reconcile creativity and station policy and what 
problems are you facing?”. This paper also aims to formulate suggestions in order to 
optimize the quality of Indonesian news programs. It is important to never lose sight of 
the Indonesian news production context. News quality can certainly not be assessed 
against Western standards exclusively. Neither can one hide behind the Eastern 
outlook according to which individual interests are invariably subordinate to those of 
the community or, to put it more politically, where the Government views the interest 
of the state as the interest of the people, and the will of the state as the will of the 
people.  
 
2.  Historical Background 
2.1.   Geographical Context 
These developments need to be assessed in connection with the country's 
peculiar geography (an archipelago of 13,500 islands of which 6,000 are inhabited) as 
well as its specific social, cultural, economic and political context. This is 
characterized by inequalities in both population spread and level of development. 
Indonesia's population accounts to more than 200 million (a figure to which 3.5 
million people must be added each year) with on average rather low to moderate 
education levels.  
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Table 3    
Indonesian Population by Educational Level 
 
Educational level (15+) 1996 (,000) 1996 (%) 1997 (,000) 1997 (%)
No schooling 699 5.2 653 4.7
Elementary school not finished 1,157 8.6 1,075 7.8
Elementary school 2,829 21.1 2,977 21.6
Junior high school 3,046 22.7 3,159 23.0
Senior high school 4,433 33.1 4,635 33.7
Non-university higher education 611 4.6 611 4.4
University 618 4.6 664 4.8
Note: SRI Media Index, Media Scene, 1996-97. Figures are based upon six major cities: Jakarta, 
Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya, Medan, Ujungpandang. 
Indonesia is a highly diverse ethno-cultural society (more than 300 ethnic groups 
with each group its own language and culture) – a diversity whose potential 
development is stifled by the “national” unity discourse heavily propagated through 
the media (especially television) by the Government, which vehemently puts down 
every opposition. Even with a rise in prosperity levels for all income groups, including 
the lowest ones, millions of Indonesians still live below the poverty line, while a small 
group of people is extravagantly rich. The gap between these two groups is becoming 
even larger, and so is the anger generated by this state of affairs. Two thirds of the 
population live in Java and Bali, which together make up 7 percent of the total land 
mass. The country's nerve center has been (since the Dutch colonization) and continues 
to be Java, which influences society in many areas, including television (Keuning et 
al., 1987: 9 and 27-9).    
 
2.2.   The Social/Cultural Context: Unity in Diversity  
Since the end of the 1960's the Government's “building” programs are part of an 
active development policy spread throughout the whole region. The definition of 
“building” is to be understood very largely: in addition to economic and social 
construction, the Government considers also the political system, the relationship 
between the local and national culture, the construction of a national judicial system 
together with religious interaction as building blocks for this definition of unity 
(Keuning et al., 1987: 49). The strong, centralizing Government in Jakarta misses no 
opportunity to tell the population they all belong to one country. The interest in ethnic 
diversity comes second. Nevertheless, the national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, or 
Unity in Diversity, is still an unrealized ideal.  
The main component of this unity building Government policy is the “five 
pillar” ideology, or Pancasila (panca means "five," and sila means "pillar"). These 
pillars, which are presented as indivisible, are as follows: belief in one God, 
Compassion, State unity, Democracy by negotiation and agreement, and Social justice 
(Ricklefs, 1981: 197). This state ideology is applicable to all aspects of social life: all 
organizations, including private businesses, must accept the Pancasila state ideology as 
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their one and only guiding principle. The same goes for the different television 
broadcasters: all programs need to be screened according to this ideology (McDaniel, 
1994: 215). This attempt on the part of the Government’s to propagate uniform rules 
for all citizens creates problems, however, because the various ethnic groups have no 
intention of abandoning their own local customs and cultural habits.  
 
2.3. The Political Context: Applied “Pancasila Democracy” 
The Pancasila ideology constitutes the basis of all aspects of Indonesian society. 
Indonesia cannot look back upon a democratic tradition as experienced in the West. 
After Indonesia declared its independence from the Netherlands in 1945, a bitter 
struggle followed, resulting in the recognition of Indonesian independence by the 
Netherlands in 1949. In 1950 a parliamentary democracy was installed, which led in 
the following years to an ever growing number of small political parties which were 
unable to establish a stable coalition, which resulted in growing political unrest 
(Ricklefs, 1981: 225-44). President Soekarno turned parliamentary democracy into a 
“Guided Democracy” in 1959. In his opinion Western parliamentary democracy was 
an unworkable concept in his country. Nevertheless, the Guided Democracy period led 
to even more chaos: the economic situation grew worse every day and the political 
situation became even more explosive, which forced the president to look for allies 
among the members of the rising Communist Party. In 1965 seven senior officers were 
murdered by a group of soldiers with left-wing sympathies. The coup was defeated by 
troops under the leadership of Soeharto, commander of the Strategic Reserve 
Command. The latter seized the opportunity to seize power. Since Communist Party 
members were suspected of active involvement in this coup, Soeharto chose to 
eliminate them. It  was estimated that half a million of party members and potentially 
involved individuals were killed. Soeharto was appointed president and replaced 
Soekarno's Guided Democracy with the Orde Baru, or “New Order”. This New Order 
aimed at economic growth and restoration of peace and order. From 1971 elections 
were held every five year (Ricklefs, 1981: 272-9). By order of the president the nume-
rous existing political parties were regrouped in three main parties: on the one hand 
Golkar (Golongan Karya, professional groups), the largest party which constitutes the 
political power base of the president, and on the other hand, the PDI (Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Party) and the PPP (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan, United Party for Development). The powerful Golkar party enjoys the 
support of the Government, the military forces and the business community.  
 
2.4.  Governmental Media Control  
The increasing reach of radio and television has made it easier for the 
Government to exert influence. All tools to control what is said and written in public 
are at its disposal. While newspapers and magazines may be privately owned, they 
exist only by the grace of the Government, which delivers and revokes licenses at will. 
The state-owned radio station Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) and TV station TVRI 
are considered mere Government propaganda tools. Commercial broadcasters must 
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renew their license every five years, which guarantees Government censorship. Since 
1975, Indonesia has been ruled according to the SARA doctrine, which dictates 
portrayal of “unity,” or more properly of “diversity within unity.” Four issues are 
taboo in the media: ethnicity (Suku), religion (Agama), race (Ras) and social class 
(Antargolongan) (Schulte Noordholt, 1991: 21). This does not only refer to prohibition 
of negative reporting: any mention of these four issues is prohibited, including neutral 
news reporting. Consequently any topic loosely connected to the SARA is simply 
ignored by the print and the audio-visual media. Interpretation of the SARA doctrine is 
entirely up to the Government. In practice this results in the so-called “telephone 
culture”: one phone call from security services or the information ministry is enough to 
dictate what can or cannot be brought into the open (Schulte Noordholt, 1991: 22). 
In this relentless pursuit of national unity, a lot of weight is given to the notion of 
“national culture.” By national culture, one means the dominant Javanese culture 
which is considered superior to all other cultural expressions. One of the characteristics 
of Javanese culture is the avoidance of bringing up problems: the notion of non-
confrontation in order not to disturb harmony is central here. The acronym for this 
phenomenon is ABS, which stands for Asal Bapak Senang, that is, “keeping the boss 
happy,” which means one would rather fit facts to expectations than talk about 
problems openly. In order to propagate this “national culture” throughout the country, 
the Indonesian Government has tried to expand access to TVRI and RRI. The launch 
of Indonesia's first communications satellite (Palapa) on August 17, 1974 certainly 
contributed to this enlarged access (Keuning et al., 1987: 51; McDaniel, 1994: 228). 
From that moment on TVRI and RRI were able to broadcast throughout the entire 
archipelago: for the Government this was the ultimate opportunity to indoctrinate all 
citizens with the national unity thought. Due to the arrival of commercial broadcasters, 
television penetration in Indonesia has increased formidably over the last years and the 
struggle for audience maximization is at full pitch. The number of television sets 
rapidly increased from 7.6 million in 1990 to about 20 million in 1997, for a 
population of over 200 million (or about 18 million households). There are 92 million 
TV viewers of ten years of age and older, with 52 million living in rural areas (PPI, 
1996b: 28). Perception of television as a luxury good has been steadily dwindling: 
according to the latest research carried out at the Graduate Program in 
Communications of the University of Indonesia from January to June 1997, people 
in Jakarta and surroundings watch television for about 4 hours daily. Surrounded by 
fast changing communications technologies in a global world, the Indonesian 
Government tries hard to preserve the ideological values of national culture and 
national unity. But the technology which once favored the Government’s centralizing  
efforts, now threatens to tear these ideological values apart. 
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Table 4   
Profile of Indonesian TV Viewers (based on sex and age, in millions) 
 
Year Total Male Female 0-14 15-19 20-29 30-39 40+ 
1987 172.0 85.6 86.4 65.4 18.3 29.5 21.7 37.1
1988 175.6 87.4 88.2 66.0 18.9 30.2 22.5 38.0
1989 179.1 89.2 89.9 66.2 19.5 31.0 23.0 39.2
1995 195.3 97.4 97.7 65.5 21.5 35.0 28.3 45.0
1996 198.3 98.9 99.4 65.2 21.9 35.9 28.9 46.5
1997 201.4 100.4 101.0 65.0 22.1 36.8 29.4 48.0
Note: Unless indicated otherwise, all figures mentioned in the tables and/or throughout this chapter are 
compiled from several sources: personal interviews with and/or questionnaires sent out to officials at all 
Indonesian TV stations; Media Scene (the official guide for advertising media established by the 
Indonesian Association of Advertising Agencies); SRI (Survey Research Indonesia); research conducted 
at the Graduate Program in Communications at the University of Indonesia, January to June 1997, in 
Jakarta and surroundings, entitled “Television’s Image and Positioning.”  
 
2.5.  The Indonesian Broadcasting Act of 1997  
The fast rise of commercial television broadcasters brought along at least one 
problem: according to the law TVRI was still the one and only television broadcaster. 
Although the Government did not try to block the emergence of commercial stations, 
there was no legal recognition of the situation until 1996. Commercial stations thus 
found themselves in a “twilight zone”, with no official status or guidelines. This 
situation endured until a new broadcasting bill was passed in December 1996 and 
approved of by the President on September 22nd, 1997. From then on commercial 
stations were officially authorized to broadcast their own news programs. This 
decision formally broke the monopoly in the field of television news. Nevertheless, the 
commercial stations have to live up to all the same rules and regulations. They are 
required to broadcast the 7 and 9 p.m. TVRI news programs and all Government 
messages. The commercial stations already broadcast news before 1996, under the 
guise of so-called “information programs,” the goal being to circumvent the 
prohibition on news broadcasting. 
Table 5    
News and Information Programs on All Indonesian Television Stations 
(Broadcasting Hours and Minutes) 
 
Category TVRI RCTI SCTV TPI ANTV IVM 
Information 04.45 06.00 02.42 02.30 03.20 00.30 
News 03.30 05.00 02.30 02.15 03.00 01.30 
Note: “Information” category also includes talk shows, etc. “News” refers to daily news magazines. 
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Table 6   
News Content  on  the Basis of Origin 
 
Category TVRI RCTI SCTV TPI ANTV IVM 
Local 55.0 47.0 78.13 100.0 85.0 30.0 
Regional 20.0 19.25 - - 8.0 65.0 
International 15.0 9.25 3.13 - 4.0 5.0 
Foreign 10.0 24.5 18.74 - 2.0 - 
Note: “International” category refers to news items mentioning Indonesia; “Foreign” category 
refers to news items in which Indonesia is not mentioned. 
 
Table 7   
Categories of News Items (%) 
Category TVRI RCTI SCTV TPI ANTV IVM
Politics 30.0 11.25 14.06 15.0 15.0 30.0
Crime 5.0 6.5 9.38 13.0 10.0 20.0
Sex - 1.25 - - - - 
Technology/Science 5.0 7.75 3.13 - - 
Sports 5.0 8.25 1.56 3.0 20.0 5.0
Health 11 1.56 15.0 5.0
Economy 25.0 16.25 17.18 33.0 25.0 30.0
Human Interest 5.0 12.14 17.18 3.0 10.0 5.0
Arts & Culture 5.0 6.88 6.25 - - 5.0
Law - 4.5 20.32 - - - 
Environment - 2.25 9.38 3.0 - - 
Social 15.0 4.5 - 10.0 - - 
Disasters - - - 10.0 - - 
Women  - 7.5 - - - 
Inter-media Content Analysis 5.0 - - 10.0 - - 
Note: At least 25 percent of all crime reporting relates to crimes of a sexual nature such as sexual 
harassment, rape, etc. 
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Table 8   
Total Program Output per Channel (%) 
 
Category TVRI RCTI SCTV TPI ANTV IVM 
Film 5.5 21 26 24 7.3 21
Drama Series 2 10 24 15 8.8 36
Comedy Series 1.5 4 3 7 4.4 5
News & Information* 50.7 48 25.36 23.70 27.10 9
Music 15.7 3 8 11 27.80 7
Quizzes 3.4 3 2 3 6.1 1
Sports** 2.5 3 4 1 12.9 5
Traditional 3.4 0 0 1 0 6
Children (e.g. cartoons) 3.4 5 6 3 1.5 7
Women 3 - - 3 - 1
Education 5.4 - - 6 - -
Other*** 3.5 3 1.64 2.30 4.1 2
 
Notes: 
 *   “News & Information” also includes “religion” (usually 3 to 4%.) 
 **  For ANTV, “Sports” is calculated separately from “News & Information,” while at the other 
stations, it is also part of “News & Information.”  
 ***  The “Other” category includes special event programs, light entertainment, infotainment, and 
variety shows. 
The new broadcasting bill did not end censorship, however: the Government is 
clearly still pulling the strings. The commercial broadcasters' licenses need to be 
renewed every five years. If they do not behave according to the Government's will, 
licenses can be withdrawn: in this way, the threat is always there, as is the case with 
the print media. While the Government can withdraw print media licenses without 
cause, withdrawal of a commercial station's license must be decided by a court of 
justice. The influence of the Government remains very powerful, however: expressions 
of violence, sadism, pornography, superstition, gambling, permissive and 
consumption-oriented attitudes, hedonism and feudalism are not allowed on 
Indonesian television screens in order to “protect the people” (Gatra, 21 December, 
1996). Communist and Marxist-Leninist ideas are taboo; the same goes for programs 
that do not correspond to the religious and national unity doctrines. Infringements are 
punished with fines or imprisonment of up to seven years, or with license withdrawal. 
Furthermore, the Government can – pending a court's final decision – “freeze” a 
commercial station's license. The Government can refuse renewal of a license without 
a court's sanction. In other words commercial stations remain very dependent upon the 
Government, nor can they ever be sure of having a future. The parameters within 
which the commercial stations are required to function hardly differ from those of the 
state-owned media: although the Government does not exercise direct editorial control, 
licensing procedures and regulations clearly stipulate newsroom directives. Add to this 
the lack of diversity in the ownership structure of commercial stations, all of which are 
in the hands of one big presidential family clan; this guarantees direct compliance with 
Government policy. The Soehartos’ business empire is legendary; it encompasses 
power generation, toll roads, electronics, paper factories, one commercial airline, 
construction, broadcasting, banking, telecommunications, newspapers, property, 
shipping, and cars.  
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3.     Indonesia’s Television Landscape 
3.1.   Televisi Republik Indonesia (TVRI) 
Due to the long-standing monopoly of the state television Televisi Republik 
Indonesia (TVRI), Indonesian TV long remained in a state of stagnation. As a state 
channel, TVRI's mission is one of propaganda, of informing the population from the 
perspective of the Government only. The Indonesian Government soon realized the 
importance of television as a policy instrument: central goals in TVRI's promotion 
campaigns were and still are national unity, integration and development, and political 
stability (Alfian et al., 1981: 23). Nevertheless, this mission was hampered by 
geography (a vast and fragmented archipelago) and by an enormous diversity among 
peoples and cultures. To overcome this problem, the Indonesian Government decided 
in 1974 to launch its own communications satellite: Palapa (Sanskrit for “unity”) in 
order to be able to reach the whole country. Television was no longer an exclusively 
urban phenomenon. 
Although the Indonesian Government recognized TVRI's social importance and 
Palapa's huge possibilities for a rapid expansion of the television network, this does not 
automatically imply that these media have been efficiently used. Right from the start 
TVRI had to face major problems of a political, social/cultural, economic, and 
organizational nature (Alfian et al., 1981: 39). As a state-owned broadcaster, TVRI is 
under the authority of the ministry of information, which implies a bureaucratic mill 
slowing down even the smallest decision. Moreover, TVRI has to reckon with the 
other Government departments, all defending their own interests and all wishing to see 
their successes shown on television (Alfian et al., 1981: 30). 
Social/cultural problems are apparent on the side of the audience, due to 
numerous differences among the rural and urban population. Television has always 
been and continues to be a mainly urban phenomenon: city-dwellers only – both as 
policy makers and TVRI program makers – leave their mark on the programs. Norms 
and values of the rural and urban population groups do not always match, and the rural 
audience often recognizes too little of its own cultural values and identity on the 
television screen. Trying to portray the myriad different values and cultures in a 
balanced way appears almost impossible (Alfian et al., 1981: 33). An attendant 
circumstance is the omnipresent dominance of the Javanese culture, which distorts the 
situation even more. 
As for economic problems, TVRI has a very tight budget. The Indonesian 
Government never provided enough money to adequately equip TVRI’s studios. 
Moreover, TVRI cannot gather advertising revenues. At first it was allowed to do so, 
but in 1981 president Soeharto banned ads from the television screen, from fear that 
the ads – being too Western and too urban – might evoke too high expectations among 
the audience. According to Soeharto, TVRI had to protect the Indonesian public, and 
had to focus more on developmental issues. This change in policy meant a sudden and 
important financial loss for TVRI. Given its tight budget, TVRI has to look for ever 
cheaper, foreign/Western productions that are equally in contradiction with the values 
and goals set by the Government (Alfian et al., 1981: 39-40). This tight budget also has 
implications for the staff: even minimal in-service training classes are unaffordable. 
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TVRI's regional stations throughout the country could all use better trained staff. The 
training capacity available to TVRI – with only two training schools throughout the 
country – is insufficient for this. 
In 1964, TVRI started with a news department, focusing on developmental 
activities run by the Government (Alfian et al., 1981: 83). TVRI's news provision is a 
far cry from balanced information, since only Governmental successes are shown. 
Nowadays, TVRI schedules four daily news programs on its first channel: regional 
news (Java) from 5:00 to 6:00 p.m., national news from 7:00 to 7:30 p.m., internati-
onal news from 9:00 to 9.30 p.m. and the late news from 10:30 to 10:45 p.m. 
Complementary to this, since 1996, short news flashes of about one minute every hour 
are broadcast: starting from 3:00 p.m., featuring the most recent events, nationally as 
well as internationally. The second TVRI channel (TVRI II) broadcasts daily news 
within the Jakarta area  from 5:30 to 6:00 p.m., and English national and international 
news from 6:30 to 7:00 p.m. 
The more TVRI focuses on the Government's developmental activities, the more 
it avoids any news on possible changes among political and social powers. Any critical 
comment from influent politicians, intellectuals, religious leaders or students have no 
chance of making it to the TVRI television news (Alfian et al., 1981: 84). According to 
the Government, such comments might endanger the country's political stability and 
unity. What is allowed is “responsible and constructive” criticism. This term is 
deliberately kept vague, so that nobody really knows what exactly is allowed and what 
is not. Although self-censorship is widespread among journalists, there is always a risk 
of displeasing the Government. According to the latter, the Indonesian media are free – 
free but responsible. In addition to the news criteria - timeliness, interest, and 
significance - the Government has introduces a fourth criterion: “safety,” meaning that 
the news item should not provoke social unrest (Wahyudi, 1984: 17). According to the 
Government, the population is not yet ready for information about, for instance, 
ethnicity, religion, race and social groups (SARA). Therefore, all information is 
severely selected and screened before going on air: there is no such thing as freedom 
of information gathering and dissemination on many social issues. 
If  TVRI wants to achieve its set goals then, first of all, it needs an audience! 
Since the start of commercial stations, its audience has shrunk continuously. While in 
general the number of viewers in Indonesia is increasing rapidly, the numbers of 
people watching TVRI are decreasing. As a result TVRI is less and less capable of 
conducting the Government campaigns in an adequate way. In line with its open-sky 
policy, it is the Government itself which gives out broadcast licenses to commercial 
stations; the same goes for the licenses to foreign channels, received through the 
Palapa satellite and the many private satellite dish receivers. This practice begins to 
conflict more and more with TVRI's mission and goals, and therefore also those of the 
Government. Commercial pressure might undermine the social goals set by the 
Indonesian Government (McDaniel, 1994: 299). The attempts of the Indonesian 
Government to control the situation by putting in place a strong regulatory framework 
are constantly being challenged by the pressure exerted by commercial stations 
seeking to maximize their profits. Ironically, these entrepreneurs are part of the 
presidents' family or belong to his circle of close friends. 
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3.2.   RCTI: The Pioneer of Indonesian Commercial Television  
As early as in 1981 the Government decided that TVRI, as a “state enterprise” 
with a developmental mission, could not be involved in commercial activities. That is 
why in 1987 the Government granted a broadcast license to Rajawali Citra Indonesia 
(RCTI), a commercial station, allowing it to start broadcasting first in Jakarta only, and 
later on throughout the country (Deppen, 1995: 164). This decision was taken as the 
result of a process of deregulation within the Indonesian television context (Kuswandi, 
1996: 38; Chan & Ma, 1996: 48). Deregulation and commercialization stem from an 
internationalization process taking place in many Asian countries, including Indonesia, 
in the sectors of television and new information technologies (Chan & Ma, 1996: 48). 
Until some years ago the Indonesian public could watch only a couple of foreign 
programs. Owing to the rapid development of private commercial channels, the public 
is now overloaded with foreign (mainly Western) programs. These also bring in 
foreign (Western) influence. Viewed from this angle, the rapid development of 
commercial broadcasters can be seen as the response from the Government to the ever 
increasing pressure from transnational television. The Indonesian Government has 
realized that its best defense against transnational television is “to improve the compe-
titiveness of domestic television industries” (Chan & Ma, 1996: 48). The best way to 
do so is to ensure the rapid growth of commercial broadcasters able to broadcast 
attractive, national alternatives. At the same time, the Indonesian Government 
maintains tight control and therefore the only commercialization allowed is 
commercialization without independence (Chan & Ma, 1996: 49). The commercial 
broadcasters avoid crossing the (vague) political and ideological line drawn by the 
Government, for fear of repercussions that might lead to final closure of the station. 
It is significant that the president's son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, is the president 
and chairman of RCTI's Board of Directors. Bambang's company, Bimantara, also has 
the majority of the shares. The Government decided that RCTI, and with it all other 
future commercial broadcasters, had to pay 12.5 percent of its advertising revenues to 
TVRI per year, beginning in 1992. The Indonesian television culture that existed at the 
time RCTI started broadcasting was based on the model of state-owned broadcaster 
TVRI. RCTI's way of working and broadcasting is totally different: less bureaucratic 
and aimed at maximizing profits. 
Right from the start the commercial stations had a much larger budget at their 
disposal than TVRI. The economic development of Southeast Asia, including 
Indonesia, has been astounding. This has created a huge demand for more advertising 
channels in order to be able to sell more products; as a result the advertising industry is 
developing rapidly. Thanks to the ever growing audience with increasing amounts of 
money to spend, the commercial broadcasters could start with realistic chances to 
survive. Currently, the largest part of the advertising revenues goes to the commercial 
television stations, which signifies important losses for the print media. These 
advertising revenues give the commercial broadcasters a strong economic base, 
necessary to cover their own investments (Chan & Ma, 1996: 49). Nevertheless the 
Indonesian commercial broadcasters still are in their infancy and still have a long way 
to go before reaching maturity. Indonesia is not yet a real consumption society, 
although it is rapidly becoming one. 
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From the start RCTI was not allowed to broadcast its own news programs. There 
is a law which requires all commercial stations to rebroadcast the TVRI news at 7 and 
9 p.m.. In order to broadcast news programs of their own, the commercial stations 
created “information programs”. The Government turned a blind eye to this stratagem, 
which was made legal by the Broadcasting Act of December 1996: news broadcasting 
by commercial stations is now allowed. RCTI has several daily news programs. The 
first one, Nuansa Pagi (Morning Nuances) starts at 6:00 a.m. and features national and 
international news, in both Indonesian and English, for two hours. At noon starts the 
30 minute long Buletin Siang (News at Noon), which includes “ladies subjects.” The 
third news program, Seputar Indonesia (Throughout Indonesia), starts at 6:30 p.m. and 
features national news for 30 minutes. Until now this has been the most popular news 
program of all on commercial stations. It is the backbone of RCTI's news department. 
At 11:30 p.m. starts the last news program, Buletin Malam (Evening News), which 
lasts 30 minutes and focuses mostly on international news. RCTI has PT Sindo Citra 
Media as its own production house for all news programs. Since RCTI is a commercial 
broadcaster, it has other goals than state-owned broadcaster TVRI. Therefore its 
program content, especially as regards news programs, is also different: its news 
programming have a higher entertainment value.This means a totally different appro-
ach, both content- and format-wise. Moreover, this approach has the overall support of 
the audience. 
 
3.3.   SCTV: RCTI’s Little Brother 
By the end of 1989 the second commercial station, Surya Citra Televisi (SCTV), 
was licensed to go on air. SCTV has more or less its origin in RCTI, to which it was 
attached until August 1993 (Sedel, 1995: 10). Although it is now independent, SCTV 
is often regarded as RCTI's “little brother”, not in the least by RCTI itself. SCTV is in 
the hands of Sudwikatmono, the president's stepbrother, and businessman Henri 
Pribadi. SCTV broadcasts the following daily news programs: Liputan 6 Pagi 
(Morning News at Six) from 5:30  to 7:00 a.m., News Watch (English National and 
International News) from 7:00 to 7:30 a.m., Liputang 6 Siang (Noon News) from 
11:30 to 12:00 a.m., Liputan 6 Petang (Evening News at Six) from 6:30 to 7:00 p.m.. 
All these programs focus on national news, with the morning program featuring 
mainly the most recent news from the night before in Jakarta and Surabaya. Internatio-
nal news accounts for about 20 percent of the total news on offer. The evening 
program mostly concentrates on crime reporting and political news. 
 
 
3.4.  TPI: The Educational Commercial Station 
In August 1990, a third commercial station was given a license to broadcast. 
Because there were already two generalist commercial stations, this third one was 
allowed only provided that it focus on education and that its name reflect this. This 
was the start of Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia (TPI). Although TPI is a commercial 
station, it has collaborated with TVRI from the beginning. In the morning TPI rents 
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equipment and infrastructure from TVRI in order to broadcast its educational programs 
throughout the whole country. In the afternoon and evening, TPI uses its own equip-
ment and infrastructure. 
Until recently, TPI was in the hands of Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, President 
Soeharto’s eldest daughter. Apart from formal education, TPI's program supply also 
includes out-of-school and informal education, news and information, sports, entertain-
ment programs, music, quiz programs, series and movies. Unlike the other commercial 
broadcasters, TPI has to hand over 20 percent of its advertising revenues to TVRI: the 
normal 12.5 percent plus 7.5 percent for the rental of TVRI's equipment and 
infrastructure (Deppen, 1995: 72). 
The amount of local productions in TPI's program supply is striking, especially 
when compared with the other commercial broadcasters. Although in theory TPI needs 
to focus mainly on education, its educational programming has been dwindling, being 
replaced by an increasing entertainment output. As a matter of fact, There is hardly 
anything educational in TPI’s program supply, and it is being increasingly criticized 
for this (Kuswandi, 1996: 46). For its defense TPI argues that the notion of education 
has to be interpreted in a broad way, as it would not be able to survive should it 
concentrate on narrow, traditional educational programming. Not being sponsored by 
the Government, TPI has to compete with four other commercial stations. As a result 
TPI is trying to profile itself as a family channel and considers “education” as relevant 
only as far as its broadcasting license is concerned. 
TPI has two daily news programs of its own – one in the morning, from 6:00 
a.m. to 7:00 a.m.: Selamat Pagi Indonesia (Good Morning Indonesia), and one in the 
afternoon, from 5:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.: Lintas Lima (Report at Five). TPI focuses 
mainly on local news: it has so far broadcast no international news. Concerning the 
national news, it mostly focuses on crime and news from major metropolitan areas 
throughout Indonesia. 
 
3.5.  ANteve: The Fourth Commercial Station 
On January 1993, a fourth commercial station, Cakrawala Andalas Televisi 
(Anteve or ANTV), was granted a license by the ministry of information. Compared 
with the other commercial stations, ANteve's reach is smaller. ANteve is in the hands 
of the Bakrie Brothers Group. They belong to one of the most important 
entrepreneurial families in Indonesia. As the fourth commercial station to emerge in a 
short time, it took ANteve a while before it really took off (Kuswandi, 1996: 41). The 
more numerous the commercial stations, the more difficult survival becomes. 
Although the percentage of advertising expenditures is still growing (44.4 percent in 
1996, as compared to 8 percent in 1990, according to Sedel, 1996: 12), the lion's share 
still goes to RCTI, the first commercial station. RCTI’s position is firmly entrenched, 
which makes it all the more difficult for the others, especially the newest ones. 
Like RCTI and SCTV, ANteve is a generalist commercial broadcaster. ANteve 
has been striving to profile itself in three areas: news, sports and music. In the 
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beginning it broadcast mainly music and sports, with a clear focus on young people. In 
the beginning, ANteve rebroadcast 6.5 hours of MTV programs every day (Kuswandi, 
1996: 45). It is still doing this, but the station also started to focus on news and 
information in order to create a more general image, in order to attract adults as well 
(PPPI, 1996: 151). The hope is that this strategy will bring about an increase in 
ANteve's advertising revenues. 
ANteve broadcasts two daily news programs: Hallo Indonesia (from 6:00 a.m. 
to 7:30 a.m.) and Cakrawala (Horizon) from 5:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.. Both programs 
focus on a general audience and deal with topics politics (albeit in a limited manner), 
economics, sports and foreign news (also strictly limited). Mostly, though, the focus is 
on national news, with Cakrawala being almost totally dedicated to crime and political 
news from the capital. Apart from these two programs, there is a short news break 
every hour (40 seconds) in connection with news program Aktualita (Current Affairs). 
These center on the most recent national and international news, referring to 
Cakrawala for more detailed information. ANteve's seriousness with respect to news 
reporting is apparent inasmuch as it has hired foreign journalists and cameramen in 
order to significantly improve professionalism in its sports and news department. 
ANteve was also the first Indonesian station opening an overseas office in Washington 
in 1997. 
 
3.6.   Indosiar Visual Mandiri (IVM): The Latest Newcomer 
That it is becoming increasingly difficult to start a commercial station, was 
shown by Indosiar's difficult take-off. Indosiar, or IVM, is Indonesia's fifth 
commercial broadcaster. Like RCTI, SCTV and ANteve, IVM is a generalist 
commercial station. As early as in 1991 IVM was granted a national license, but it was 
not before January 1995 that the station actually went on air (Kuswandi, 1996: 42; 
Sedel, 1996: 12). Not that there was a lack of finances: IVM is in the hands of the 
Salim Group, one of the biggest and most powerful conglomerates in Indonesia, with 
Chinese businessman Lim Sioe Liong as its president. IVM’s difficulties in getting 
started stemmed from a lack of advertisers and quite a long search for a conclusive 
program strategy, both directly linked with the problem of building up a sufficiently 
large audience base. But after two years IVM was able to attract more advertisers and 
now reaches the allowed advertising maximum of 20 percent of the total program 
supply. IVM has been trying to profile itself as a channel for all social/economic 
groups in all age bands. And this strategy seems to be paying off: while as the most 
recent newcomer it is in the most difficult position, IVM has been able to secure a 
good share of Indonesian viewers. 
It still remains to be seen whether all commercial broadcasters will be able to 
survive: five new stations emerging within a four years period (1989-1993) is a lot, 
and the competition is very tough. Although disposable income is increasing among 
the Indonesian population as a whole (this is especially true for the expanding middle 
classes), Indonesia is not yet a consumer society. Besides, owing to the fierce 
competition among commercial stations, they are all starting to look alike. 
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IVM used to broadcast one news program, Horison, on air twice a week. In 
November 1996 IVM the program was renamed Focus; it is broadcast daily between 
12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m.. Unlike all other commercial stations, IVM did not produce 
Horison by itself, but subcontracted the task to production house Indomedia. The 1996 
Broadcasting Act no longer allows this practice: nowadays commercial stations must 
produce their own news programs. 
 
4. In-depth Interviews with Indonesian News-Makers and Policy-Makers 
By “communicator” we mean any person, group, or institution participating 
directly – either by designing, producing, or controlling – in the production of a 
message intended for dissemination by a mass medium, namely television. This 
includes all television broadcasters in Indonesia: state-owned broadcaster TVRI, and 
the five commercial broadcasters, RCTI, SCTV, TPI, ANteve and IVM. By “program 
makers” we refer to the creative people such as producers, journalists, camera people – 
that is, those people responsible for collecting and shaping a station’s news output. By 
“policy makers,” we mean program directors, editors-in-chief, news managers, general 
managers, and any persons with decision-making powers with respect to the subjects 
to be aired and the way in which this should be done. By “news programs” we refer to 
news programs broadcast every day at a specific time and for a fixed duration. 
We tried to interview (at least) one program maker and one policy maker for 
each one of the above-mentioned stations. Altogether 18 persons were interviewed: 
eight policy makers and ten program makers. The interviews were conducted between 
September 30 and October 30, 1996. On average each interview took one and a half 
hour. The interviews were recorded to ensure accurate transcription afterwards. All 
interviews were conducted in the Indonesian language, except for one, at the request of 
the interviewee. When doing qualitative research on sensitive subjects, the use of the 
interviewees' own language is highly recommended. 
The aim of the interviews was to get to know the interviewee, to probe into his 
or her reality: what meaning does the interviewee give to his/her surrounding in his or 
her day-to-day-life? In order to do this, the researcher has to be able to place 
him/herself in the position of the interviewee, to gain an understanding of the 
interviewee’s thought processes. Only, in this way can the researcher come to a recon-
struction of the interviewee's perspective (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). 
At the beginning of the research, a list of concepts was drawn to be used as a 
guide by the researcher during the interviews. All concepts needed to be dealt with: the 
order in which this was done as well as the actual questions to be asked were less 
important, depending on the interviewee, the orientation and content of each answer. 
Underlying relationships between the concepts were sought in order to come up with a 
clear vision of the connections and interrelations among all concepts/categories. Based 
on these concepts, the goal was to elucidate the various visions of all communicators 
interviewed in order to establish a measured classification of the various categories.  
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4.1.  Creativity and Freedom 
Creativity and freedom of expression are clearly hampered by Government 
imposed restrictions and control mechanisms. First of all there is self-censorship, 
which makes people apathetic and excessively cynical. The interviewees agree that 
some degree of creativity is allowed provided it agrees with station policy. Stations are 
not able, however, to define their policy without Government interference. They all 
have a censorship commission of some sort which screens all news before going on 
air. Although this is a sensitive subject, one interviewee talks in detail about this: 
“We have to put up with a censorship commission here. Anything we want to 
broadcast has to be checked and approved by this commission. The same goes for 
news programs. If the commission decides that there is too much criticism on certain 
subjects  or individuals – such as the Government, Government policy, the president 
and his family, the owners of the station and their (business) relations – the whole item 
must be dropped. This is hardly conducive to creative work. Both the station’s 
management and the censorship commission interfere too often. I am required to 
submit any planned item to their approval, without which I cannot do anything.” 
Coincidence or not, the telephone starts ringing. On hanging up the interviewee 
comments: 
“There you have it. This is exactly what I mean. From time to time they 
impose a subject on us which we do not find suitable, but are required to air 
anyway. We always get lots of memos! Even when the subjects are not 
interesting at all, we have to broadcast them.” 
This situation creates many tensions between policy makers and program ma-
kers. Policy is necessary, but the policy makers have great power and according to 
some program makers this is hampering their creativity, even though some intervie-
wees express say that the restrictions are merely challenges to try to work in a different 
way, by looking for possibilities that are allowed. One striking example is Perspektif 
(‘Perspective’), a talk show hosted by Wimar Witoelar on STCV. This talk show 
received enthusiastic feedback from its captive audience, especially from middle 
and upper class viewers, due to its topic selection and perspective: acerbic, people 
oriented, and at times a little too critical of the Government. On September 16, 1995 
SCTV management suddenly pulled the plug on this program, without a clear 
justification. This decision is a clear example of self-censorship on the part of 
SCTV management: it was thought that should they fail to stop the program, the 
station’s relationship with the Government would suffer. 
Another cause of restricted creativity is a lack of experience and training. The 
people currently active in television lack professionalism.  
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4.2.   Station Strategy 
Generally, it can be said that the commercial stations are beginning to look alike 
because of the fierce competition between them. Although RCTI, for example, focuses 
a little more on the Indonesian society’s upper social and economic echelons, and TPI 
more on the lower ones, actual differences are minimal. All commercial stations share 
the same aim: maximizing profits. Their news programs all focus on human interest 
subjects, the grislier, the better: crime stories – assaults, robberies, murders, rapes – are 
ubiquitous. The same goes for accidents. It is striking that almost all commercial 
stations focus on metropolitan news mainly from Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, and 
Medan. Chan & Ma (1996: 54) express their concern about the television scene being 
dominated by the urban centers. This might result in what they call “internal cultural 
imperialism.” News programming on the commercial stations are mostly intended for 
city-dwellers, those groups which have the most money to spend. The majority of the 
people, however, sees wealth and abundance only on television, without being able to 
take part in it. Lifestyles on offer on television are far beyond their spending capacities. 
Some interviewees in commercial stations argue that entertainment is a very 
important factor in the news making process. According to them the news programs 
also must be entertaining, or better, “infotaining.” This perspective is obviously the 
result of hard news often being taboo. So news makers lean towards entertainment 
because everything else is out of bounds. In addition, commercial stations cannot yet 
specialize on one news-avid audience segment. Indonesia is not yet ready for this type 
of channel: the average buying power is still too weak for such stations to survive. On 
the opposite end of the spectrum is the state-owned broadcaster TVRI, which must 
follow a strategy of complete subjection to the Government and its policy. 
 
4.3.   Importance of Viewing Figures and Program Research 
Indonesian viewing figures are collected in six major cities: Jakarta, Surabaya, 
Bandung, Semarang (all four on Java), Medan (Sumatra) and Ujung Pandang 
(Sulawesi). Viewing figures are based upon diaries, gathered by Survey Research 
Indonesia (SRI). Although all interviewees at the commercial stations say that viewing 
figures are not the only standard for them, they do admit that these figures are 
important since they are the only indications available for the advertisers. 
 
Table 9   
Market Shares of Commercial TV Stations, 1997 (in percentages) 
 
RCTI SCTV TPI ANTV IVM 
38 17 12 9 24 
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Table 10  
Audience Segmentation by Age, Sex, Education Level (in percentages) 
 
Age RCTI SCTV TPI ANTV IVM 
0-14 18 26 25 18 26 
15-19 16 21 20 23 20 
20-29 13 17 30 22 22 
30-39 12 18 20 19 19 
40+ 42 18 13 18 13 
Sex RCTI SCTV TPI ANTV IVM 
Male 50 45 36 45 45 
Female 50 55 64 55 55 
Education RCTI SCTV TPI ANTV IVM 
Elementary school& below 23 35 62 25 30 
Junior high school 25 24 20 21 24 
Senior high school 26 21 18 21 22 
Non-university higher 
education & university 26 20 2 33 21 
 
The value of these market shares and audience profiles (as shown in Tables 7 
and 8) is put into the right perspective by all interviewees: they express their doubts 
concerning both the validity and reliability of these figures. Apart from the fact that the 
SRI works with diaries, nobody really knows how the SRI works. Another stumbling-
block for many interviewees is the fact that the figures are taken from six major cities 
only, which is not representative of the whole Indonesian audience. Some interviewees 
(only from commercial stations) say the opposite, arguing that these figures are in the 
first place intended for the advertisers and that the largest buying power is located in 
the six above-mentioned cities. Therefore the figures are representative. For TVRI, 
viewing figures are not important, although TVRI interviewees say they should be 
taken into consideration because they are an indication of what is happening: viewers 
are deserting TVRI en masse. As one of the TVRI interviewees puts it: “What is the 
use of talking, if nobody is listening?” 
Probably because Indonesian television is still very young, little program and 
audience research, complementary to viewing figures, is being done. Some of the 
interviewees say they value research, but they add that too often station management 
underestimates the significance of research. As a result only a small budget is assigned 
to research and most stations do not have an R&D department of their own. For TVRI 
reality is a bit different. Since TVRI is directly managed by the ministry of 
information, all research is being done by and via the latter’s R&D department – but 
due to budgetary constraints, this does not amount to much. 
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4.4.   The Relationship with the Audience 
Commercial stations consider the relationship with the audience as very 
important. While TVRI’s primary allegiance is to the Government and its policy 
choices, commercial stations are mainly concerned with the daily life of city-dwellers. 
They are also more depended on their audience, which means they need to achieve 
audience loyalty. But this is a goal not easily met with five commercial stations 
simultaneously on the air. Furthermore, while commercial stations pay lip service to 
the importance of their audience, often they do not know much about it. Little research 
is being done to remedy this situation. Some information on the audience comes from 
letters and phone calls as well as off-air activities, but this is far from providing a full 
picture. As regards news programs, one interviewee had the following to say: 
“Of course in theory we want the audience to watch our news program and we 
want  people to believe they need to watch it. We want them to feel that had they not 
watched it, they would have missed something. But it is a difficult matter.” 
News programs in Indonesia, however high in quality, cannot compete with a 
good movie or an attractive entertainment program. Therefore, it is very difficult to 
build up a loyal audience for  news programs. The Indonesian audience (still) does not 
regard news as a necessity. This has everything to do with the lack of political consci-
ousness among the population, which stems from the highly monotonous nature of the 
country’s political life. The audience knows that there can be nothing new in political 
reporting, as far as there is political reporting at all. 
 
4.5.   Station Policy and Obstacles for Policy-Making   
The main obstacles to station policy are political restrictions and control 
mechanisms. There is no such thing as editorial independence. This will not change 
with the new broadcasting act. Every five year commercial stations need to have their 
license renewed by the Government, which is thus able to keep a tight rein and can 
even close down a commercial station if it wants to. Another obstacle frequently 
mentioned is lack of experience – Indonesian television is still very young – and lack 
of sufficient education and training possibilities. Some schools for TV journalism do 
exist, but they belong to TVRI and are not accessible to people from other television 
stations. The people who work for commercial stations and need the training the most 
can only count on on-the-job-training. There is a great shortage of capable television 
professionals in Indonesia. Because of this shortage the quality of the news programs 
is still far removed from what it could and should be. 
According to the TVRI interviewees, bureaucracy is among the biggest 
obstacles. Editors are not allowed to make autonomous decisions: everything has to 
pass through the ministry of information no matter how painstakingly slow this 
process may be. The TVRI interviewees plead in favor of more autonomy and freedom 
for TVRI in order to be able to work faster and more efficiently. With five commercial 
stations breathing down their neck this is absolutely necessary. Another big obstacle 
for TVRI is the tight budget which hinders both efficiency and modernization. Several 
In Search of Quality Measures for News Programming on Indonesian Television 
69 
 
 
interviewees also point out that insufficient attention is being paid to research, 
especially on the part of the management. One interviewee argues that the fact that still 
too many entrepreneurs consider promotion as an expense rather than as an investment 
is an obstacle as well. Furthermore, the power of Indonesia's economy to advertise is 
still not important enough. Another obstacle, mentioned by several interviewees, is the 
lack of teamwork and team spirit. 
 
4.6.   Politics and Political Control 
The interviews made it clear that political control is the most powerful and 
complex factor interfering with all aspects of Indonesian television news making: all 
program makers interviewed referred to the political limitations imposed on them by 
the Government. These interventions are to be explained in light of the Government's 
efforts to maintain an artificial national stability and national culture at all costs. The 
above-mentioned SARA subjects (ethnicity, religion, race and social classes) remain 
taboo. Formal and neutral items related to SARA are only becoming somewhat 
acceptable today. Freedom of expression on societal problems is still very much 
limited. One of the producers we interviewed (who asked to remain anonymous) put it 
this way: 
“We have to avoid all political issues or all issues that have to do with 
Government policy, the president, his family or the army. The same goes for economic 
issues that have anything to do with the Government. Items on owners of the station or 
their business relations, friends or family are equally to be avoided. There isn’t much 
freedom of expression in Indonesia: this often leads to frustration. Furthermore, 
nobody really knows what are the limits of what can and cannot be reported on, 
because there are no explicit directives given by the Government.”  
Limitations are largely dictated by the so-called telephone culture: one call to the 
newsroom is enough to nip any potential revelation in the bud. In order to ensure that 
journalists play by the political rules, every station has a censorship commission which 
screens all items before going on-air. Items ready to be broadcast are often suppressed 
at the last moment. The opposite also happens: restrictions and control may lead to 
self-censorship, including cynicism and apathy on the part of the news makers. 
Excessive interference from above (management and Government) largely determines 
the relationship between program makers and policy makers: management decides, 
often on Government orders, and program makers cannot do much against it (if they 
care for their position). An example in this respect is the talk show Buah Bibir (Talk 
of the Nation) on RCTI since the beginning of 1997. At first, the majority of the 
topics explored were related to “deviant” sexual behaviors which are becoming 
increasingly common in Indonesian society but which most Indonesian people do 
not find tolerable: infidelity between married people, free sexuality among 
teenagers, executives, etc. Precisely because of the topics it dealt with, the talk show 
became highly controversial. The minister of information and the MUI (Indonesian 
Council of Muslim Leaders) intervened, which resulted in the replacement of Host 
Lula Kamal and a far less controversial selection of topics. Another striking 
example is a decision made in November 1997 by TVRI to end its live coverage of 
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the finance minister’s question time at the House of Representatives because 
“editing would be needed to ensure that the public gets to hear the right information 
only.” This was widely criticized in the print media, which questioned TVRI’s right 
to censor an open session of the House of Representatives. Previously, there was 
some controversy following a statement by the minister of information that only 
TVRI has the right to broadcast such sessions: SCTV and ANTV, which had 
announced that they would broadcast the session live, were not allowed to do so. 
In short, there is hardly any room for exploring and researching real conditions 
in Indonesian society or for any creative use of the medium: according to some of the 
producers interviewed, any expression of creativity is stifled at birth because in 
Indonesia the Government always comes first; money comes in second. The print and 
audio-visual media come in a poor third; they have no substantial power. A social 
watchdog function for the media is out of the question.  
While commercial stations are financially independent, their editorial freedom is 
practically nonexistent because they are equally susceptible to Government 
interference, as confirmed by all of our interviewees. This vulnerability is increased by 
the fact that most commercial stations are owned either by family members of the 
president or powerful political party figures. As one channel director told us: “The 
owner is the owner is the owner: it is him who determines the channel's orientation, 
including the news.” As a result, balance in news reporting is virtually unknown. It is 
remarkable that all interviewees mentioned an incident dating back to July 27, 1996 as 
evidence of political control. On that day violent riots took place in Jakarta, attracting a 
lot of attention from foreign media, but the strongly censored news of the state-owned 
broadcaster never even mentioned them. The riots were caused by growing dissatis-
faction with the lack of political freedom and the authorities' stranglehold on the 
media, but no interviews with PDI (Democratic Party) leader Megawati conducted on 
the occasion of the riots were ever shown on TV, due to management or Government 
pressure. One of the producers we interviewed confessed that political restrictions and 
control preclude any quality news reporting. Although journalists are expected to work 
within the framework of Pancasila – with the notion of balance as one of its keywords 
– the Government clearly fails to meet this very principle. Golkar must always get the 
most attention. This is incompatible with the Pancasila ideology. In this respect, 
several interviewees referred to election periods, when TV reporting on Golkar is 
much more extensive than reporting on PDI and PPP. One respondent still believes, 
however, that despite all the difficulties, there is still some space to do a proper job, as 
long as one “knows the rules of the game”… 
A remark heard many times among the interviewed is that the audience is very 
well aware of this situation: they know who are the commercial stations' owners and 
therefore do not have a lot of illusions and do not really consider the news as 
important. Many of the interviewed believe it will be more and more difficult for the 
Government to continue to assert political control because, among other things, of a 
dangerous contradiction in Governmental policy: a great many foreign channels are 
allowed to broadcast, while national channels remain under strict Government control. 
What the people are not allowed to see on the national channels they can increasingly 
view through the foreign channels, which provide a far more complete picture than 
Indonesian channels ever do. TV signals from a staggering 100 satellites 11 can be 
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picked up in Indonesia using dish aerials. The companies which invested in satellite 
TV distribution – Indovision  and Astro – are planning on a market of 2 million 
satellite dish owners in Indonesia. Indovision, the first satellite TV distributor, 
established by PT Matahari Lintas Cakrawala, started late 1994. At first it offered 
packages including channels such as HBO, Discovery, ESPN and Turner 
Broadcasting channels (CNN, TNT Cartoon Network). In addition to dish antennas, 
viewers also need a decoder. During two years Indovision could only count on 
18,000 customers, while the target was 100.000 customers. In 1997, Indovision 
introduced a digital decoder and four more packages:  
• VISI MULTI (20 channels): Star Sport, Star Plus, Phoenix Channel, Channel V 
International, Channel V Asia, CNBC, NBC, CNN International, TNT & CN, 
BBC, Discovery, Citra Hiburan, Citra Melati, Citra Junior, ESPN, RCTI, TPI, 
SCTV, ANTV, IVM. 
• VISI SINEMA (22 channels): 20 VISI MULTI channels plus HBO and Film 
Indonesia. 
• VISI SINEMA PLUS (22 channels): 20 VISI MULTI channels plus Star 
Movies and MGM. 
• VISI SUPER SINEMA (24 channels): 20 VISI MULTI channels plus HBO, 
Film Indonesia, Star Movies and MGM. 
Currently Indovision can count on about 25,000 customers with digital 
decoder packages (10,500 of whom switched from analog to digital). Astro is still 
preparing to launch its own packages to compete with Indovision. This will 
probably take place next year. Internet access has also become a feasible proposition 
in Indonesia, offering a wealth of information unheard of on Indonesian TV channels.  
 
4.7.   Professionalism  
Television in Indonesia is still very young. Therefore there still are few people in 
the country with television production experience. All of our interviewees confirm the 
severe lack of professionalism and experience, which is felt as an obstacle for both 
channel strategy and creative freedom in news reporting. After political control, lack of 
professionalism is the second most important factor responsible for the poor quality of 
news reporting today. In this respect, the absence of enough training possibilities in 
television journalism (apart from a couple of training centers created by TVRI and 
which only take in journalists from the state-owned broadcaster) is a major problem. 
This is the reason why ANteve decided to hire (mostly American, plus a few 
European) professional journalists and camera people as on-the-job trainers: the whole 
newsroom, both technicians and managers, must be familiar with the television 
medium. Although starting in 1989 five commercial stations were issued a license by 
the Government, no measures were taken to make the existing schools accessible to 
their staff. Commercial stations have had to look for guidance elsewhere, finding it in 
CNN, whose formats they attempted to emulate. All stations try to remedy this lack of 
professionalism with on-the-job-training, no matter how short and minimal.  
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4.8.   Quality Measures for News and Newsworthiness  
Our interviews made it quite clear that political interference is the single most 
influential factor determining the Indonesian news category and no doubt the main 
obstacle to quality reporting. According to all respondents. the ways in which the 
Pancasila doctrine is being manipulated in journalistic practice, including the 
contradictions and hypocrisy which characterize the Government's policy in the matter, 
will probably lead to an erosion of the doctrine itself. They consider Timeliness as one 
of the most important quality guarantees for quality news and news-worthiness, 
stressing that political restrictions and control made it impossible to achieve, however. 
Often news items with high news-worthiness are suppressed by the station’s cen-
sorship commission just before going on air, or following a telephone call from the 
Government. Rapidity is seen as another important quality measure, but here again 
journalists (mostly at TVRI) confess that the bureaucratic way in which the station is 
run does not allow for swiftness.  
Accuracy, correctness and balance (all angles being presented) are highly valued 
quality assurance criteria by our respondents: for all three criteria the above-mentioned 
limitations are felt to be significant obstacles. A related criterion, understandability of 
the news through avoidance of jargon, logically structured news items, and relevant 
off-screen commentary, is also highly valued by the respondents. Every one of them 
mentioned a low level of professionalism together with an overall lack of experience 
with TV as a medium, and stated that this should be remedied soon. Proximity is also 
mentioned by the interviewees as an interest-arousing element: in order to find the 
news interesting, viewers must be able to recognize certain elements from their daily 
life. Some of the interviewees (all of whom, unsurprisingly, work for commercial 
stations) believe the news must contain some elements with entertainment value, 
something upbeat (arguably to counterbalance the relentless focus on crime). 
All these quality criteria as defined by the journalists we interviewed cannot be 
implemented owing to one single, constant, overwhelming factor:  Government 
interference. In addition there is a major internal problem: an overall lack of 
professionalism at all levels of the news making process.  
 
5.     Conclusions 
The first part of the chapter sketched the fast-changing Indonesian television 
landscape: until a few years ago Indonesian audiences were used to watching the state-
owned TVRI channel only. Nowadays they can choose among five additional 
commercial stations: RCTI, Indonesia's commercial TV pioneer; SCTV, RCTI's “little 
brother;” TPI, the commercial, “educational" station; Anteve; and newcomer IVM. At 
the end of December 1996 the Indonesian parliament passed a Broadcasting Act 
which, for the first time, allowed advertising on television and provided at the same 
time “national” alternatives for the many and popular foreign satellite stations. 
These developments need to be assessed in connection with the country's 
peculiar geography (an archipelago of 13,500 islands of which 6,000 are inhabited) as 
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well as its specific social, cultural, economic and political context. This is characte-
rized by inequalities in both population spread and level of development. The country's 
nerve center is Java, which influences society in many areas, including television. In-
donesia is a highly diverse ethno-cultural society (300 ethnic groups) – a diversity 
whose potential development is stifled by the “national” unity discourse heavily 
propagated through the media (especially television) by the Government, which puts 
down every opposition. Even with a rise in prosperity levels for all income groups, 
including the lowest ones, millions of Indonesians still live below the poverty line, 
while a small group of people is extravagantly rich. The gap between these two groups 
is becoming even bigger, and so is the anger against this situation. This is a reality, 
however, which the news media have to handle with care: these are the so-called 
SARA issues which the people are “not ready yet” to hear about in the media, at least 
according to the Government, which fears that coverage of these subjects would set the 
country ablaze. 
The second part of the chapter looked at the extent to which the national context 
allows for “quality” in television news or, on the contrary, constitutes an impediment 
for it. In-depth interviews with local newsmakers and policy makers in both state 
television and commercial television stations highlighted two major problem areas for 
news-making: omnipresent political control and lack of professionalism. Due to fierce 
Governmental control, stations are restricted to covering low-risk news items that 
usually also have less news value: human interest and crime stories. Most attention 
must be paid to the Government and the Golkar party. This tight Governmental control 
also applies to commercial stations, even though they are financially independent. 
Moreover, most commercial stations are owned by family members of the President or 
by powerful politicians. The second major problem area is lack of professionalism: 
there is still not enough local knowledge of and experience with television journalism 
around. There is an urgent need of facilities for television journalism education and 
training where people can get the necessary professional knowledge. In any case, the 
professionalism problem will be more easily solved than that of Governmental control 
and interference. Indonesia as a society cannot reach maturity before the dissemination 
of information becomes free. In other words, what this country needs is actual and full 
freedom of speech. This could take a long time. 
 
 
 
Third Chapter 
 
The Soeharto Regime and Its Fall through the Eyes of the 
Local Media 
 
The first part of this chapter elaborates on the content and media 
management dynamics in local newspapers and radio stations during the period 
leading up to the fall of the New Order in Indonesia. The second part deals with the 
early reform period after the downfall of Soeharto. In-depth interviews were 
conducted with editorial policy-makers of the newspapers and with various radio 
station staff members in four cities where media consumption and other data had 
rarely been documented. The findings in the first part reveal omnipresent political 
control at two levels – local and central Government. Because of this control, the 
local media personnel acknowledge their limitations, but strove for as much 
freedom as possible within the system. The second part shows that in this historical 
context, changes are taking place in both agency and structure. Both parts support 
the thesis that there is an interplay between agency and structure as opposed to the 
Instrumentalist and Structuralist orthodoxies.  
 
1.  Statement of the Problem 
The landscape of Indonesia’s mass media is colored by the phenomenon of 
television which has since 1989 been a striking example of a centralized medium. 
The first commercial station, RCTI, was established in 1989, followed by a number 
of others. Attempts were made to expand the bases of commercial stations beyond 
the capital, Jakarta, but these failed. The new stations which were initially built and 
based in Surabaya (SCTV) and Lampung (ANTV) were forced to be relocated to 
Jakarta within the second or third operational year. The main reason was that 
advertisers were mostly centralized in Jakarta. This is outlined in greater detail by 
d’Haenens, Gazali & Verelst (1999), among others, in their research on television 
news-making before and after Soeharto.12 
In contrast to television, newspaper and radio have enjoyed a long history as 
part of the daily life of Indonesia's population. Certainly, the Jakarta-based 
newspapers also have some captive readers in local areas; however, the sum of local 
newspaper circulation in most cities outside Jakarta is on average larger than the 
circulation of the Jakarta-based daily.  
During the New Order era, Soeharto (who came to power in 1966), treated the 
press throughout the country as a state ideological apparatus. The regime sought to 
be effective through control mechanisms that affected almost all aspects of the life 
of the press. 
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Those mechanisms are as follows: 
1. Controlling preventively and correctively the ownership of the media 
institutions, through the issuance of print licenses (SIT), which later became 
license for publishing press (SIUPP). These licenses were issued mainly on 
the basis of political criteria. 
2. Controlling individual and professional practitioners (journalists) through 
selection and regulation mechanisms, such as the requirement for journalists 
to join the one and only journalists' organization allowed at the time, the 
requirement for chief editors to attend courses on state ideology (Pancasila or 
“Five Pillars”), which was in fact an indoctrination process. 
3. Controlling the appointment of individuals for certain positions in the 
Government-owned media. 
4. Controlling the production of news texts (both content and format) through 
various mechanisms. 
5. Controlling the resources, for example, a monopoly on paper. 
6. Controlling access to the press, for example, by forbidding press coverage of 
opposition leaders (Hidayat et al., 2000: 6). 
Given such tight control of the press, over such a long period (more than three 
decades), one may not easily accept the fact that the regime which enforced them 
could be brought down. It is worth looking, then, at those factors which, in addition 
to the student and activist movements, may have significantly contributed to the 
event which was called “the unthinkable” by some foreign media, and to examine 
whether the changes had something to do with the press. In the affirmative, we may 
then want to investigate whether there were distinctions between what was taking 
place both in the Jakarta-based media and in the local media since the local media 
should be geared to local communities that might be greatly different from those of 
the Jakarta-based residents. 
 
2.  Theoretical Section 
To help analyze the changes that might take place in a mass medium and its 
circumstances, we can refer to the political-economic studies of mass media. In this 
analysis, the historical context in which the changes occurred reflected the 
conditions at a given time in history that should be analyzed comprehensively at the 
macro level (socio-cultural practices in which the production and consumption of 
texts were taking place), the meso level (discourse practices or the processes of 
producing and consuming media texts), and the micro level (texts produced by the 
media).  
At the macro level, most analyses of the political economy of the press tend to 
be divided into two types: economism and reductionism. In the first approach, the 
media are featured as capitalist ventures for which the function of producing 
ideology is only a secondary concern that receives less attention. Smythe (1977: 1) 
stated: 
The Soeharto Regime and Its Fall through the Eyes of the Local Media 
77 
 
(…) the media’s primary function is to create stable 
audience blocks for sale to monopoly capitalist advertisers, 
thereby generating the propensities to consume which complete 
the circuit of production. 
In the second type, the Marxist Cultural Theories tend to focus more on the 
ideological function carried out by the media: “(…) the media belong first and 
foremost to the region of ideology” (Connel in Hibbin, 1978: 75). This is generally 
done by observing the media text in an excessively isolated manner so that it loses 
some links with the press as an economic institution within a capitalistic system. In 
fact, the efforts to understand the function of producing ideology carried out by the 
press cannot be separated from the efforts to comprehend the dynamic processes 
taking place at a certain stage of a certain capitalism in which the media industry 
lives. Golding and Murdock (in Barrett et al., 1979: 210), for example, stated that: 
(…) the mass media are first and foremost industrial and 
commercial organizations which produce and distribute 
commodities within a Late Capitalism economic order. 
Consequently, we would argue, the production of ideology cannot 
be adequately understood without grasping the general economic 
dynamics of media production and the determination they exert. 
(see also Hidayat et al., 2000: 432) 
Efforts to examine the production of ideology carried out by the press during 
the New Order in Indonesia cannot be separated from efforts to examine the 
economic dynamics of the then late capitalism. Furthermore, it might also relate to 
something more complicated than the late capitalism during the New Order era 
alone, for example the development of global financial structure at the time in 
which the New Order political economic structure was included (see Sri Mulyani & 
Chatib Basri et al. in Hidayat et al., 2000). In this context, external pressures played 
their roles during the economic crisis that hit Indonesia in the end of the Soeharto 
era. International financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Found (IMF) at the time could be viewed as: “(...) built-in systemic 
mechanism of economic deregulation, opposing not only socialism but national 
capitalism as well, in favor of the progressive extension of international market 
forces” (Wood in MacEwan & Tabb, 1989). 
It means that we cannot relate the analysis of the ideological function of the 
press during the New Order era only to the general capitalism ideology, but also to 
the more specific capitalism ideology, i.e. the neo-liberalism that was interested in 
expanding the global economic liberalism, whose dimensions were in fact 
contradictory to the New Order capitalism ideology.  
This leads us to consider that there are some aspects at the macro level that the 
capital owners, the media management staff, and the journalists might never have 
had a chance to deal with. For example, there was the economic crisis that hit 
Indonesia in 1997, whose epicenter was far from its sphere of influence. A crisis of 
such scale and intensity was a structural risk for global capitalism, which then 
achieved a certain stage of structural elaboration, specifically from the aspect of 
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international capital mobility (Hidayat et al., 2000: 443). This was not only the case 
for those outside Jakarta, but also for those based in Jakarta itself. The center was 
probably far from the sphere of influence of the political actors also. 
A further macro analysis of the political economy would be beyond the scope 
of this chapter. We are more interested in the fact that connecting both the micro 
and meso analysis to the macro analysis will eventually bring us to the analysis of 
the interaction between structure and agency. In general, the term “agency” refers to 
social actions carried out by social actors either as an individual or as a group. It 
could also refer to social actions of human agents in a broader sense, not only 
individuals, but also including organized groups, organizations, and the state 
(Himmerstrand, 1986: 9). 
By opening our mind to the probable interaction between structure and 
agency, the analysis of the press on the “May 1998 Revolution” would not easily be 
trapped in the Structuralist and Instrumentalist orthodoxies. Structuralist analysis 
tends to view the structure as a monolithic and static entity. It then ignores the 
capacity of social agencies to respond to structural conditions. Althusser’s structural 
analysis might lead us to the conclusion that the characteristics of the media texts 
simply represent the existing structures. But this would amount to ignoring the 
social interactions between agencies (performers of journalism duties), including the 
chances for the journalists to produce the news as they want. Schudson (1989: 266) 
judges that the process of producing news is directly related to the economic 
structure of the media organization or media industry, and everything in between is 
a "black box" that needs not be examined.  
From this Structuralist approach, the expectation was that the economic 
structure of the media industry would be found to be controlled by Soeharto’s 
family and cronies. In cities outside Jakarta, the media were controlled by locals 
who were considered loyal to the local Governments, the military, and the ruling 
party, Golongan Karya (Golkar). The changes were then merely associated with the 
changes taking place in the structure of the mass media. 
Conversely, the Instrumentalist approach focuses on the use of media as an 
instrument of the capitalists to determine the public discourse premises, the 
information which may be consumed by the public, and the propaganda which will 
produce the desired “public opinion” (among others Herman & Chomsky, 1998: xi). 
It tends to assume that the capital owners are fully able to use the media as 
propaganda tools because they have access surplus to the media, legality to control 
the media, the monopoly of license, and a superior position over their workers. 
However this was belied by the findings of Golding and Murdock regarding the 
position of the Government and the capital owners in the capitalist media industry. 
Golding and Murdock (in Curran & Gurevitch, 1991: 19) stated that: “They operate 
within structures which constrain as well as facilitate, imposing limits as well as 
offering opportunities.” As opposed to the Structuralist approach, the 
Instrumentalist approach tends to ignore the structural factors, ascribing excessive 
influence to individuals or journalist groups as actors able to fully use the media as 
an instrument to actualize their idealism in the social change processes. Again, as a 
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matter of fact, the journalists' acts and resistance by various structural 
contradictions, just as is the case for capital owners.  
There is an alternative or third approach chosen for this research, stating that 
in the studies on the political economy of the mass media we should acknowledge 
the existence of an interplay between structure and agency. The goal of this 
approach is: “(…) to explain how structures are constituted through action, and 
reciprocally how action is constituted structurally” (Giddens, 1976: 161). Or to be 
more specific, the studies on the political economy of the media should describe: 
“(…) how structures are produced and reproduced by human agents who act 
through the medium of these structures” (Mosco, 1996: 213). This approach, then, 
creates space for social relations and interactions that might take the form of 
alliances as well as conflicts at certain times, not only in the media industry but also 
in society at large. At each given time, a certain historical context determines the 
relative weight put on the causal relationships between agency and structure. Ritzer 
(1996: 424-425) states: 
In some time periods structure may gain ascendancy over agency. At other 
times the agents may play a greater role, and the significance of structure would be 
reduced. One cannot posit a single agency-structure relationship for all history. 
While trying to capture the comprehensive analysis at those levels, we should 
pay attention to the fact that the circumstances of the Jakarta-based media may be 
different from those of the local media. For example, the political concerns of the 
Jakarta residents could be different from those of people living in other regions. 
Many studies have concerned themselves with the sense of localism and the role of 
local media. Studies by Park (1975) show that reading the local newspaper 
contributes to the feeling of commonness in local organizations. Janowitz (1952) 
also concludes that reading local newspapers positively contributes to community 
orientation, to building and maintaining a local consensus, as well as building local 
traditions. Edelstein and Larsen (1960) report that local print media positively 
influence community togetherness as well. A study by Greer (1965) shows that the 
local press encourages involvement in local political activities. Most recently, a 
study by Viswanath et al. (2000), examining local ties, media uses, and the 
knowledge gap theory, found that local newspapers are an important source of 
information for the community.  
As for radio, some studies, although not specifically conducted on local 
media, show that listeners, especially when listening to talk shows, pay a lot of 
attention to politics and get actively involved in the political process (Hofstetter et 
al., 1994; Media Studies Center, 1996). In the case of the United States, it was 
found that such listeners had voted in the four previous elections (Bucy et al., 1997; 
Media Studies Center, 1996). Surely, there are some studies in certain contexts that 
reach different conclusions (among others: Weaver et al., 1998).  
One conclusion that may be drawn from the above studies is that the media in 
each location should be geared toward, and adjusted to, local conditions. Thus, the 
contents of local dailies and radio broadcasts might be different from the contents in 
the Jakarta-based media. In turn, media content geared to local conditions outside 
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Jakarta could help local residents to build a community commonness and 
orientation that might be greatly different from those of Jakarta-based residents.  
 
3. Research Questions 
Based on the likely distinctions listed above, on the political and economic 
analysis of the press, and on the assumption that the press might have played a 
significant role in toppling the New Order regime, we can ask the following 
research questions to show directions in elaborating on the content and media 
management dynamics in the local newspapers and radio stations during the period 
leading up to the fall of the New Order in Indonesia: 
a) How did local media personnel perceive the influence of the New Order 
regime on their daily lives, given the fact that the New Order administration 
was mainly based in Jakarta? Or, to be more specific, how did the local media 
personnel view the implementation of Governmental regulations regarding the 
press, which were decided upon in Jakarta and implemented across the 
country?  
b) How would local media personnel compare local newspapers or radio stations 
with media produced or published in Jakarta?  
c) How did local media personnel view the reform movement, whose pioneers 
were largely pictured as students or NGO activists from Jakarta, while in fact 
the students in their cities might have also already staged similar 
demonstrations before or concurrent with those in Jakarta? 
d) What processes occurred in their respective institutions during the reform 
movement, which led to the fall of the New Order? 
e) What did the early reform era mean to them in terms of new opportunities and 
challenges? 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1  Sampling: Cities and Procedures 
In order to elaborate on local perspectives that are rarely documented, we 
purposely avoided the cities that are frequently referenced in the media rating 
system in Indonesia, namely Jakarta (the national capital), Surabaya (capital of the 
East Java province), Bandung (capital of the West Java Province), Semarang 
(capital of the Central Java Province), and Medan (capital of the North Sumatra 
Province). We selected four other large cities associated with newspapers which 
have a long history and a large readership.  
First, Yogyakarta, situated in Central Java, which is also the capital city of the 
province, or special area with the same name. Yogyakarta has the oldest newspaper 
in Indonesia, “Kedaulatan Rakyat,” published since 1945. Yogyakarta has always 
been associated with the “Keraton”13 culture, which constitutes a blend of the 
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Javanese aristocratic system and Islamic teaching. Second, Makassar, the capital 
city of the South Sulawesi Province. It has the second oldest daily, “Pedoman 
Rakyat,” published since 1947. Makassar is also the name of the kingdom which 
once existed there. The aristocratic system prevails in South Sulawesi as well as 
Islamic principles, yet the practices are significantly different from those in 
Yogyakarta. Makassar is famous for its daring sailors, who frequently sailed to 
other countries and continents. Third, Bali, better known as “the island of the gods.” 
The “Bali Pos” daily has been published there since 1948. Bali, both as a capital 
city and as a province, is colored with the Hindu practices. Fourth, Padang, which is 
the capital city of the West Sumatra Province, in which the newspaper “Haluan” has 
been published since 1949. The name of the original ethnic group of West Sumatra 
is Minangkabau. This ethnic group is famous for producing leading intellectuals in 
the struggling era against Dutch colonialism. In addition to being closely associated 
with Islamic teachings, they are frequently included among the more egalitarian 
ethnic groups of Indonesia. 
In addition to the above newspapers, this research also elaborates on the 
perspective of local radio personnel. These interviews were conducted between July 
15, 1999 and February 15, 2000. In most cases, two newspapers and two radio 
stations with different backgrounds were selected in each city. In Padang, the 
interviews were conducted at three radio stations, since a sectarian issue had 
recently arisen in that city. Altogether, eighteen persons were interviewed – ten 
from the newspapers and eight from the radio stations. When it came to the 
newspapers, we interviewed the editorial policy-makers, such as the chief editor, the 
deputy chief editor, the senior editor, and the operational editor. At the radio 
stations, we interviewed radio personnel of various departments, such as the first 
director, the broadcast director, the news director, the music director, the general 
manager, the program manager, production staff, and reporters. On average, each 
interview took one and a half hour. All interviews were conducted in the Indonesian 
language, the national language, but periodically the interviewees used phrases in 
their ethnic language; when this occurred, we asked them to translate the phrase into 
Indonesian.  
The aim of the interviews was to get to know the interviewee, to probe into 
his or her reality: what meaning did the interviewee give to his or her entourage in 
his or her everyday life? In order to do this, the researcher had to be able to place 
him or herself "in the shoes" of the interviewee in order to gain an understanding of 
the latter's thought processes. Only in this way can a researcher come to a 
reconstruction of the interviewee’s perspective (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). 
The initial research procedures were similar to those used by other scholars 
who researched the Indonesian television industry (d’Haenens et al., 1999: 139). 
These procedures include the following: 
A list of concepts was drawn up to be used as a guide by the 
researcher during the interviews. All concepts needed to be dealt with. The 
order in which this was done as well as the actual questions to be asked 
were less important, and depended on the interviewee, the orientation and 
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content of each answer. Underlying relationships between the concepts 
were sought, in order to come up with a clear understanding of the 
connections and interrelations among all concepts/categories. Based on 
these concepts, the goal was to elucidate the various answers of all the 
communicators interviewed, in order to establish a measured classification 
of the various categories. 
This research also considers the issue of syndicated newspapers and radio 
stations that are part of the larger media business based in Jakarta and in other large 
cities. When conducting interviews with a syndicated medium, we tried to explore 
the amount of local contents it carried as well as the quality of "localism" in the 
staff's opinion. 
 
5.  Results and Discussion 
5.1  New Order Means False Freedom 
When asking what freedom during the New Order rule meant for them, all 
interviewees stated that there was no freedom during the New Order administration. 
Their overall term for the New Order was “the Smell 14 Order.”   The main reason 
was because all statements made by the New Order were in fact false. As for 
freedom of press, they concluded that the meaning of the motto, “A free press, but 
with social responsibility,” is “A free press, as long as it follows at all times what 
the Government wants.” When asked to point out who imposed media control in 
their cities, they mentioned the provincial branch of the Ministry of Information, the 
local Government, and various elements of the Indonesian Armed Forces (at the 
time still called ABRI) such as the police, Kodam (the regional military command), 
Kodim (the district military command), Korem (the military command at the level 
below the residency), and militias – forces that constitute a blend of civilian and 
military, who also dealt with security issues in smaller political subdivisions, such 
as RW (neighborhood) and RT (subdivision of neighborhood). 
Cases that could serve as examples range from the trivial to the serious. As an 
example of a trivial issue, the “Kedaulatan Rakyat” daily in Yogyakarta was once 
ordered by telephone (typical in the then popular “telephone culture”) not to print 
news about the collapse of a stage built over a swimming pool belonging to a 
“bupati” (regency head), who had been hosting a traditional ceremonial meal. The 
incident was caused by a live concert given by a group performing “dangdut,” a 
popular local style of music. The second case also involving the “Kedaulatan 
Rakyat” was a ban on printing news about a plane which crashed in Klaten, a town 
close to Yogyakarta. They were never told the reason behind the ban. 
Something relatively serious befell the “Fajar” newspaper in Makassar. It was 
warned twice by the provincial branch of the Ministry of Information. First, when it 
printed a letter from a reader criticizing the ruling party, Golkar. Second, when it 
printed speeches by opposition parties leaders, during a campaign period, which 
criticized the Soeharto family.  
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The “Bernas” daily newspaper in Yogyakarta faced two more serious 
accusations. First, in 1992, its editors were summoned to the Kodam office (office 
of the regional military command) in Semarang. They were shown a list of mistakes 
allegedly committed by the editors. One of the “mistakes” was a published 
photograph showing a platoon of ABRI (armed forces) standing face-to-face with 
the people in a political rally, during the period preceding an election. In fact, the 
demonstrators were prevented by the armed forces from continuing their rally. The 
regional military command thought that the photograph would worsen their image. 
It even threatened that, if the “Barnas” editors’ response did not satisfy them, they 
would then be brought before the intelligence section to continue proceedings. 
Fortunately, the editors were able to make up an excuse: their objective in 
publishing the photograph was to show that the military were serious and firm in 
facing any parties who tried to disrupt the election and its preparations. This seemed 
to satisfy the military. 
Another interesting experience of the “Barnas” newspaper concerned the head 
of the provincial branch of the Ministry of Information. In its editors’ opinion, those 
officials considered their newspaper to be a serious political threat; so the ministry 
staff would start each day by checking the contents of the “Barnas” daily. When a 
student, Moses Gatotkaca, was killed in a demonstration in May 1998, and “Barnas” 
brought the news, the branch head called the chief editor early in the morning. The 
call was not made to his office, but to his home. He asked the editor how he knew 
the victim was a student. The chief editor replied that a reporter got the information 
from the Panti Rapih Hospital where the victim was treated before dying. The 
Government official was still not satisfied with the answer, and accused the editor 
of attempting to pit the armed forces against the students. It is important to note that 
this occurred only several days before the fall of Soeharto. Ironically, the Jakarta 
version of the daily also printed the same story.  
In the case of radio, there are similar examples. The editor of CDBS FM in 
Bali was summoned by the local prosecutor’s office; he was even told to report to 
that office every day for a period of time. This was due to a prediction by the station 
that unrest would occur during the upcoming elections (1997). As a matter of fact, 
CDBS FM had only quoted some Jakarta print media. Radio “Smart” in Makassar 
was also warned that it would only be allowed to produce and air a talk show 
analyzing the political conditions if the interviewees were not members of 
opposition parties.  
In Padang, according to the General Manager of Radio “Arbes,” it was 
believed that an official from the provincial Ministry of Information was assigned to 
monitor each radio station. Periodically, the officials summoned representatives of 
all private radio stations and informed them of violations. They once accused radio 
“Arbes” and “SIPP,” its sister station, without giving a clear explanation or writing 
an official letter.  
A different action was taken against radio station “Dikara Bawana,” which is 
associated with the Padang Catholic Diocese. It was charged with producing a 
program that disturbed the SARA Doctrine. SARA stands for “Suku, Agama, Ras, 
dan Antar Golongan,” which means, “Ethnicity, Religion, Race, and Groups.” 
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These four issues constituted a very serious taboo on the Indonesia media scene 
(Schulte-Noordholt, 1991: 21). The editors were told to submit scenarios of 
programs which touched upon those issues. Since they did not know exactly what 
programs the ministry information staff were talking about, they submitted the 
scenarios of all programs aired during the preceding two weeks, in order to prove 
that there were no grounds for indictment. The response was a complete surprise: 
from then on the officials did not mention the SARA issues again, but shifted their 
attention to technical matters, such as transmitters, etc. 
The various examples mentioned above demonstrate how relentlessly, 
extensively, and coercively the Government and military officials used their power 
to control and suppress local newspapers and radios under the Soeharto Regime. 
 
5.2   Local Strategies 
Given the omnipresent political control, it is interesting to explore how local 
media personnel dealt with it, which strategies they adopted in order to survive. 
Strikingly, all interviewees told us they always attempted to oppose any control 
mechanism in various ways, yet approximately eighty percent stated there was a 
need to continuously exercise self-censorship. This is because the local media could 
be closed down much more easily by the authorities, than their Jakarta-based 
counterparts. According to those interviewed, before closing down a newspaper or 
radio in Jakarta, the authorities had to consider the effects of negative publicity 
resulting from such closings. This negative publicity could involve domestic media 
in Jakarta, international media, as well some noted non-Governmental organizations 
(NGOs). Fear on the part of local editors was also due to the two levels of authority 
they had to face. First, the local authorities; second, the central Government 
authorities. In other words, when recognizing their existences as local media, there 
was both a sense of inferiority to, and jealousy toward, the Jakarta-based media.  
By means of an illustration, the ban on printing news about the plane crash in 
Klaten, and the accusation of publishing groundless news about the dead student in 
Yogyakarta, was not issued to the Jakarta-based media, which carried the same 
stories the following day. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, the central 
Government officials might be regarded as problems at the macro level for the local 
editors and for the local capital owners as well. They might think that the central 
Government officials were far from their sphere of influence. 
In explaining what they meant by “self-censorship,” almost all interviewees 
gave a relatively similar description, i.e. they had to uphold the principle of 
neutrality, they had to convey information from as many conflicting or involved 
parties as possible, and they had to criticize in a subtle manner, hoping that the 
audience would understand what they were implying. It also meant there was no 
need to be outspoken or be explicit. This is consistent with the Javanese way of 
criticizing, given also the context of the relationship between the central/national (or 
even Javanese) culture on the one hand and the local cultures on the other. It 
confirms what Keuning et al. (1987: 9, 27-29) observed: “The country’s nerve 
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center has been (since the Dutch Colonization) and continues to be Java, which 
influences society in many areas, including television.”  
When referring to their strategies, some of the editors mentioned the 
compromises they felt they had to make with Government and military officials. For 
example, in May 1998 all media editors in Yogyakarta were forbidden to publish a 
report about students who demonstrated and set fire to a paper statue of Soeharto in 
a “becak” (pedicab). The “Kedaulatan Rakyat” editors succeeded in making a 
compromise by proposing that they would print the story, but not mention the 
burning of Soeharto’s effigy. They also promised not to print any photographs of 
the event.  
Editors of local radio stations were fully aware that the law prohibited them 
from initiating any news reports on their own. They were only allowed to relay the 
news originating from the state-owned RRI (Radio of Republic of Indonesia). In 
order to manipulate the regulation to their advantage, the local radio stations 
frequently broadcast live reports of events, for example seminars, without calling 
them “news.” This strategy was called “guerilla tactics” by the Director of Radio 
“Geronimo” in Yogyakarta, or “Tom and Jerry tactics” by Radio “Unisi” (also in 
Yogyakarta) and Radio “Arbes” in Padang.  
The tone adopted by the local media personnel reflected the degree to which 
they were willing to resist Government control. Radio “Geronimo,” which 
according to its First Director was the number one station in Yogyakarta, showed a 
more compromising attitude. On the contrary, Radio “Unisi,” which is associated 
with a university in the same city, was more assertive. Even though they had to face 
the same warnings – in writing or by telephone – radio “Unisi” tried to produce a 
talk show to which critical political figures were invited. The issues raised in the 
discussions were at times quite sensitive, such as the dual role of the armed forces. 
Through this dual function doctrine, the armed forces had long influenced and 
controlled many aspects of national life. Radio “Unisi,” in certain cases, had to edit 
its morning talk shows before rerunning them in the evening. The First Director of 
Radio “Geronimo” made it clear that his radio would not play with fire. He even 
elaborated, “we had to survive first. If we were closed down, we would not have 
had any chance to struggle for anything. We realize that some parties will call us 
‘collaborators.’ That's fine with me!” He also compared the strategy he chose with 
that of Indonesia's largest newspaper, Jakarta-based “Kompas”.  
We must note that some of our planned interviewees were representatives of 
the capital owners. As shown in previous research conducted on Indonesian 
television, the owners were often not available for an interview. It seemed that 
generally the owner and his circle avoided talking with interviewers, because the 
political situation was still fraught with uncertainty in the early days of the reform 
period. This was true, even though we might assume that they were aware that from 
then on a greater freedom to express personal opinions would be given to them. The 
owners also generally talked about the overall picture and referred us to their staff 
for more details. They tended to be sparing in their comments, while editors were 
much more outspoken. 
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5.3   Internal Interaction 
During the reform movement, interplay took place in the local mass media 
structure regarding regulation and institutional structure; delegation of authority 
became very dynamic. The interviewees divided the first half of 1998 into various 
periods. They called January to February 1998 an “eye-opening period” during 
which they saw the portents of massive change. All interviewees realized that they 
saw clues, yet no local media dared to take part in the movement. The editor of the 
“Pedoman Rakyat” daily (Makassar) said he was still worried that, if the Soeharto’s 
regime was in fact still strong and could handle the situation, it might close down 
his newspaper. He really considered that his employees would be the first group to 
suffer, had that happened. 
By March 1998, certain local media, which had more nerve than others, for 
example “Bernas” (Yogyakarta), “Pedoman Rakyat” (Makassar), and “Haluan” 
(Padang), started to get involved in the reform movement. This period could be 
called “the pioneers’ time.” The editor of “Fajar” (in the same city as “Pedoman 
Rakyat”) saluted the media that had the courage to participate in the movement by 
directly or indirectly stating their stances through the content of their newspapers. 
At the same time, there was no special reaction from the local radio stations. 
According to the general manager of Radio “Arbes” (Padang), they still kept their 
neutrality. 
From April to May 1998, the local media started to realize that they had no 
choice but to officially take a stand in support of the reform movement. This was a 
period of oscillation and soul-searching. While the pioneers were already dedicating 
a large percentage of each newspaper issue to opinions, demands, and reports of the 
reform leaders asking for resignation of Soeharto, others who had called themselves 
“neutral parties” now began to gamble with the political conditions. The word 
“gamble” was used by several interviewees. Except for the phone call made by the 
provincial head of the ministry of information to the “Bernas” editor in Yogyakarta, 
all interviewees said that, especially in the first weeks of May there was a “vacuum 
of power” in that no one was attempting to control the mass media any more. 
During this period, the editors frequently held meetings. Editors of the 
“Kedaulatan Rakyat” daily (Yogyakarta) even held four meetings daily to update 
themselves on the minute-to-minute political progress. This also happened at the 
“Haluan” (Padang) which barely held an editorial meeting once a day before this 
period. 
The situation in each meeting was reportedly tense. In some cases, not only 
the editors, but also certain staff members from the business or management 
departments, were also invited or even required to take part, to make sure that all 
aspects were taken into consideration before issuing an editorial policy. 
Interviewees from radio “Smart” (Makassar) acknowledged there were conflicts 
between those sides. For example, at “Pro2” (Bali), which according to its statutes 
as a subsidiary of RRI (Radio of Republic of Indonesia) should have sided with the 
Government, in fact supported the student movements by broadcasting much of 
their rallies. Another example was the serious conflict in the “Singgalang” 
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newspaper (Padang). As a result of this conflict, shortly after Soeharto stepped 
down, eighteen of its editors and reporters demanded the replacement of the chief 
editor and reviewed the ownership shares held by the employees and the employer. 
Finally, the group of eighteen resigned, found a new investor, and founded a new 
daily, the “Mimbar Minang,” claiming to be the first newspaper in Indonesia 
belonging entirely to a cooperative.  
 
5.4   Reporters and Audience 
The background of the reporters and their basic audience were taken into 
account by the interviewees when asking about their personal attitudes and opinions 
of their audience, in judging the dynamic changes occurring around them. The 
“Bernas” daily (Yogyakarta), for example, proudly stated that most of it reporters 
were activists. The editor also discussed the 27 July Incident in Jakarta, when the 
New Order used militias backed by military personnel to attack the PDI-P 
headquarters (the Indonesian Democracy Party for Struggle). The PDI-P was at the 
time led by Megawati Soekarnoputri who is now the Vice President. Soeharto made 
every effort to topple Megawati from her position by supporting another national 
party congress which elected Suryadi as the new president. So, there were then two 
competing presidents of the PDI-P. In that historical attack, one reporter of the 
“Bernas” daily was trapped in the headquarters building. 
The “Pedoman Rakyat” newspaper (Makassar) felt they had a network based 
on synergism with the students. According to the editor, most of their reporters were 
either students in their final year of graduation or wishing to complete their 
bachelor’s degree. In general they were also activists for the reform movement on 
their respective campuses. In the view of the editor of the “Haluan” daily (Padang), 
the newspaper could also rely on a very good relationship with the students. He 
even thought that the students’ movements in Jakarta and outside were exactly the 
same in terms of their militancy. The difference was only due to the greater media 
exposure dedicated to the Jakarta-based students. 
Radio “Unisi” (Yogyakarta) always based its programs on the needs of its 
main audience, i.e. university students, always actively following and reporting on 
the demonstrations staged by the students. Most of the reports were live broadcasts. 
On the other hand, the director of “CDBS” Radio (Bali) thought that her station 
erred by producing and airing news about student demonstrations, since its main 
audience is youth. According to her, it should have focused on programs considered 
as “fun” for young people. If her radio also aired news about the student 
demonstrations, it was only because of pressure from the students. The latter came 
to the studio and asked for broadcast time dedicated to information from the student 
political action front. 
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5.5   Freedom as a New Commodity 
Evaluating the early reform period, i.e. the first year after Soeharto stepped 
down, all interviewees said they started to realize that freedom of expression could 
become a “new commodity.” On average, according to their own sources, 
circulation of the “Pedoman Rakyat” daily (Makassar) increased by almost fifty 
percent. Our respondent at the “Haluan” daily (Padang) stated that we could assume 
that, due to the new climate of freedom, the daily could increase its circulation too; 
yet, mushrooming of other, new media should also be taken into account. According 
to him, in and around Padang, the numbers of daily and weekly newspapers in the 
early reform period increased by three hundred percent, compared to the figures in 
the Soeharto Era. Given these circumstances, maintaining the previous circulation 
could already be considered a satisfactory achievement.  
Local radio stations did not seem to follow the same trend as radio stations in 
Jakarta, where news programs became a “new commodity” that sold well. Most 
sources confirmed this when asked about the opportunity to creatively present and 
package the news. In general, they recognized that opportunities were wide open 
now that they no longer had to relay some thirteen Government daily news 
programs. One of the reasons behind the different trend in local radio was given by 
the director of Radio “Geronimo.” According to him, the Yogyakarta audience did 
not feel the need for periodical news yet. They only needed breaking news, when 
special events took place. This opinion was shared by Radio “Smart” (Makassar) 
that once aired a ten-hour live broadcast on a flood and received a lot of positive 
responses from its listeners. The director of Radio “Geronimo” stressed that he 
waited for new regulations that might be issued by the Government. If the new 
regulations allowed the production and airing of news programs, his radio station 
might consider it. We have to note that, since the abolition of the Ministry of 
Information by the president in August 1999, some parties thought that there were 
no de facto broadcasting regulations, since there was no Government agency to 
enforce them. 
The quality of the news aired by local radio stations left much to be desired, 
specifically owing to the lack of depth of their news coverage. According to our 
respondent at Radio “CDBS” (Bali), for instance, at times news that had already 
been published in the newspapers or made available on the Internet was merely 
quoted. Radio “Dikara Bawana” (Padang) supported that choice for a different 
reason. As a small station, which is functionally associated with the Padang 
Catholic Diocese, it always avoided deep involvement in political programming – 
talk shows and news programs. For this station it was more important to provide 
information that met the needs of Catholics and other people in remote areas like 
Mentawai.  
Radio “Pro2” (Bali) worried that its listeners might become bored with too 
much news. According to our respondent, the listeners were assumed to read 
already enough political and violent news in the newspapers; therefore, should his 
radio station also offer this kind of programming, the audience might choose to shift 
to other channels. The interviewees at Radio “Arbes” (Padang) added that their 
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audience did not show a lot of enthusiasm for news programs either; for them, 
entertainment came first. 
 
5.6.   Future Challenges 
One serious future challenge, in the view of the editors, is the quality of 
human resources – not only in terms of education, but also of experience. The news 
director of Radio “Smart” (Makassar), whose educational background is in 
communication science, observed that his staff initially served only listeners who 
made musical requests for themselves or someone else. Now, they were suddenly 
asked to package and present news programs. Certainly, the gap between the needs 
and the capacity of available personnel is quite wide. Therefore opportunities are 
needed to build up that capacity. 
The broadcast and production director of Radio “Unisi” stated that the need 
for trained radio broadcasters, especially for local radio stations, is very urgent. 
Moreover, most of the interviewees were certain that the development of radio 
programs (in general, not only news) will be very rapid in the near future. 
The respondents also mentioned that some cooperative “radio networking” 
efforts had already been carried out, with radio news agencies such as the Internews 
and the 68-H. What they meant by “radio networking” is actually NGOs helping to 
run workshops, distributing equipment provided by donors to local radio stations, 
and providing news programs to be aired by stations joining their network. The 
local radio station staff already asked for more opportunities to attend those 
workshops and training sessions. Yet, it is interesting to note that small stations 
dedicated to minority groups such as Radio “Dikara Bawana” in Padang never 
received invitations to the workshops nor help in the form of  equipment. 
Apart from the positive responses to the training sessions and workshops, 
there were also some objections about the way in which they were conducted and 
what materials were on offer. For instance, the director of Radio “Geronimo” 
regretted that some of his reporters were invited directly or by name by the NGOs 
supplying the workshops. In his opinion, the invitations should have been sent to the 
director who would then have decided which reporters or other staff should attend. 
He also argued that instead of running training sessions and workshops for 
reporters, the NGOs should first conduct them for the managers. According to him, 
if the training sessions and workshops were not in line with the media outlet 
owner’s vision, they would never work out or be put into practice. 
One significant factor in the human resources of the local media is the shift 
from the old to the new generation of staff. According to sources at the “Pedoman 
Rakyat” and “Haluan” newspapers, thanks to this shift a climate has developed 
which is conducive to healthy competition aiming at sufficient openness for new 
ideas and for improving the overall media performance. The second challenge 
comes from the need to use alternative media such as the Internet. Since 1997, some 
local media have begun to look at the Internet as an information source. Yet, they 
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frequently argue that the Internet cannot be considered a credible information 
source. They usually refer to the news derived from the internet only to draw an 
issue map to be elaborated on further. 
Our interviewees thought that the information they obtained from the Internet 
before the downfall of Soeharto was uncertain and unclear, because most of the 
reports did not provide accurate facts. Only thirty percent of the local media staff we 
interviewed had access to websites that were popular during the reform movement 
or which contained protest news, such as “Siar,” “Apakabar,” etc. The local media 
did not appear to realize yet that, in the new or reform era, they should also use the 
internet for larger purposes, such as finding out accurate data about events, not only 
at the national level but also in the global arena. The third challenge comes in the 
form of a code of conduct. In the view of local media personnel, the downfall of 
Soeharto also meant the end of a press code of conduct. For the newspaper editors, 
in the early reform era, there were serious doubts whether it was proper or not to 
print the full name, or even the photograph, of alleged perpetrators. Initially, they 
thought it was not appropriate to do so. Yet, they noticed that the TV news 
programs did mention the full names and showed pictures of people accused, but 
not yet convicted, of crimes. They eventually changed their stance and started to 
follow the same practice, even though some of the editors continued to believe it 
was not a proper thing to do. 
The most serious challenge in the future is what our respondents call “the 
mass dictatorship” or “mob rule.” By this term, the sources mean a mass movement 
or action that is usually conducted in a violent manner. Some demonstrators also 
brandish machetes or swords, threatening reporters or even destroying the premises 
of a media outlet whose news is regarded as detrimental to their cause. The “mass” 
is comprised of friends or followers of a certain group, who sympathize with the 
person in the news or (very often) who are unemployed and are paid to join. This 
threat was stressed by all the interviewees, although only one of them provided a 
real example involving their office. The “Bernas” daily (Yogyakarta) once printed 
an article about an affair involving a public figure in Sleman, near Yogyakarta. A 
large “mass” of people then came to the newspaper’s building to express their 
disappointment, because according to them the news was false and had ruined the 
reputation of a person they respected. Apart from the four cities where we 
conducted this research project, at least five serious cases of a massive attack 
against a mass media office occurred in the same period in reaction to the news 
content supplied. In other words, our sources seemed to think that this problem 
might be a trade-off for the freedom of expression they had newly experienced after 
the downfall of Soeharto. In fact, it is certainly related to the ineffectiveness of the 
security agencies, whose personnel are haunted by their bad reputation regarding 
human rights abuses. They seemed undecided about what constitutes expression of 
freedom and what exceeds the limit and becomes a criminal act.  
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5.7   Locality and Capital Movement 
Did the respondents see their localities in a new way after Soeharto stepped 
down? In general, they said that even though they were aware of the fast and 
massive changes that were taking places, they still regarded their local areas as more 
positive than Jakarta, in terms of harmony and security.  
Further research is needed to ascertain whether the news content of the local 
newspapers and radio stations at the time indeed already reflected what the editors 
or directors stated. But, in general, we can say that from our observations, some 
contents of the local media in Padang could be interpreted as provocative. Or, in 
other words, it was not really in line with the principles of “peace journalism” that 
they told us to be more concerned with than the Jakarta-based media. 
Regarding news coverage of the widespread autonomy and independence 
movements in various provinces, the local media seemed to handle it very well. The 
editors tried to provide their audience with factual accounts of independence 
movements and comprehensive analyses of the ability of each area or province to 
survive, in case their demands were accepted. The local media also proved 
themselves to be good partners of the local audiences in their struggle for human 
rights and in the tendering for local development projects, which in the past had 
always been orchestrated by the central Government and won by its cronies in and 
outside Jakarta. 
When responding to questions about the ideal percentage of local news 
compared with national news, the interviewees generally agreed that, given their 
local character, they should pay more attention to local problems. Yet, they did not 
think there would be a significant increase in local news during the reform era. They 
suggested percentages that ranged from a 60-40 to a 70-30 composition of local vs. 
national/international news. In terms of what usually influenced them in selecting 
the main issues for their own media outlets, most of the interviewees mentioned 
television as the benchmark. Some of them added that what they received from the 
television news was a sense of how deep an issue was explored on television and 
how brave television reporters were to expose sensitive aspects of, or persons 
involved in, that issue. This stance could result in certain headlines or main issues 
being similar to those of the mainstream media in Jakarta. 
Local radio station directors were generally willing to accept incoming capital 
flow from networks that usually led to syndication. Five of the stations where the 
interviews were conducted are already part of a network. But such was not the case 
with the newspapers. Most of the directors or editors stated that they preferred to 
work for themselves and not be exploited by outsiders. They were confident that 
with a freer climate and improvements in their internal structure, they could 
succeed. They were also certain that the local audience would appreciate their long 
history with the local media, so that the directors and editors did not need to worry 
much about losing business. Thanks to teleprinting, the morning editions of the 
Jakarta newspapers could be distributed at the same time as the local papers. This 
does not mean that they would not welcome cooperation with investors from other 
cities, especially Jakarta. Nevertheless, they frequently reminded us that, although it 
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might initially seem to be a win-win situation, they might end up under someone 
else's control, pointing similar situations noted in certain cities during the New 
Order Era. 
Most of them did not worry about production processes, although there were 
already some new competitors and there might be more in the near future. Even 
though the printing facilities in some local newspaper offices were limited, they 
could still maintain their normal printing schedule. The “Haluan” and “Pedoman 
Rakyat” dailies had their own printing presses. Their only worry pertained to paper 
supply. Sometimes they were required to pay in advance for paper; in some cases, 
the paper was delivered late, even though they had paid in advance. According to 
them, the syndicated newspapers in their area would have never faced that problem.  
 
6.   Concluding Remarks 
It is not easy to decide exactly what came first in a large reform movement 
such as the one which took place in Indonesia. It has been largely believed that the 
students and NGO activists kick-started the movement with their protests. The 
Jakarta-based media certainly focused their reports on the protests by students and 
activists in Jakarta, although they also published some articles about student and 
activist protests in other locations. Even though we might differ with this belief, we 
cannot assume that there was no such movement among the media people in 
Jakarta. We have to take into account that the structure of the media industry in 
Jakarta might have constrained that movement for a long time.  
When we ask this question to the local media, the same conditions may apply. 
What made the local media face the problems differently, or even weakened their 
resolve, was the fact that they had to face two levels of authority – local and 
national. The local media personnel, consisting of the owners, management or 
business executives, editorial executives and reporters, might take different stances 
regarding those two levels of control. Moreover, a close relationship with, and 
loyalty to the authorities was the main prerequisite for the issuance of a license at 
the time. Therefore, some of the local media personnel assumed that there were 
problems at the macro-level which they could not handle or influence. In other 
words, Governmental control was just a fact of life. At the extreme macro level, or 
global level, there were also problems (capital movements, etc.) which even the 
New Order regime was powerless to influence. 
The alternative approach acknowledging that there is an interplay between the 
structure and the agency helped us explain why the interrelations of external and 
internal factors could lead to a movement that forced Soeharto to step down. Using 
this approach we evaluated the historical context of the Jakarta media and the local 
media and reached relevant conclusions. We found that some of the local media, 
taking into account specific internal and external considerations, became 
immediately involved in the reform movement in their areas, and contributed 
significantly to its acceleration; other local media, with other considerations, either 
“gambled” or were forced to support the movement at the last minute before 
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Soeharto was overthrown. The internal interplay among the local media at the time 
was very tense and dynamic. 
During the early reform period, the local media were challenged to attribute 
new meanings to their localities, both in terms of opportunities and challenges in 
facing competition from the Jakarta-based media. Although they worried about the 
threat of violent “mass” protest against their news content, they thought they could 
succeed in the reform era. The changes in (social) agencies and structures have 
helped them seize opportunities and overcome challenges. They are also certain that 
their long history will cause their local audiences to support them in the foreseeable 
future. In addition, this connection will encourage the local media to support the 
goals of the local populations better than outsiders would. By putting into practice 
local wisdom, however, they are in no danger of pushing the limits of freedom the 
way it was done by the media in Jakarta and other large cities. One factor that could 
either help or hinder them is television news programming, which is generally used 
as the benchmark for evaluating both the subjects and depth of coverage.15 
 
Fourth Chapter 
 
Negotiating Public and Community Media  
in Post-Soeharto Indonesia 
 
Abstract 
Indonesia and its media are going through a rapid stage of transition. While 
the goal of this reform movement is the transition to a civil society and creation of a 
more democratic media system, the main result so far has been the liberalization of 
the media market, in line with global media trends, which as such does not 
necessarily guarantee a more democratic communication system. One way to 
counter this development is though the decentralization of radio and television, and 
the establishment of public and community media, which was under discussion in 
the Indonesian Parliament. This chapter presents the results of a qualitative research 
project carried out in several regions throughout Indonesia, which gave local people 
a platform to voice their ideas on the media portrayal of their ‘multiple identities’ 
(e.g., cultural, political, economic, ethnic), and their perception of the ‘viability’ 
(problems, prospects, and promises) of alternative broadcasting in relation to the 
state and commercial broadcasters. 
 
 
 
1.  Background: Indonesian Media in Transition 
There is little doubt that the media system during the New Order regime in 
Indonesia (1966-1998) was authoritarian in nature. The Soeharto administration 
employed a systematic and comprehensive strategy to ensure that the mass media 
function as a control instrument of power: by preventively and correctively issuing 
licenses, controlling news texts, and controlling the career track of the practitioners 
(journalists). The Government television station, TVRI (Television of the Republic 
of Indonesia), remained the only television channel until 1987. The first five 
commercial television stations were in the hands of Soeharto’s family members and 
cronies. The Government-run RRI (Radio of the Republic of Indonesia) was without 
competition until 1970. Then, entrepreneurs whose loyalties to the regime were 
without question could start private radio stations.  
What could challenge such a situation? Some analysts state that without a 
revolution in the commercial television newsrooms, there would have been no 
reformation in Indonesia (see Ishadi 2002a; 2002b). This is supported by the fact 
that local radio and print media personnel generally referred to television news 
programming, particularly the commercial stations’ news during the Reform 
movement, as a benchmark for evaluating both the subjects and the depth of the 
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news coverage (Gazali 2002a, 138). Other analyses suggest that, seen from a wider 
perspective, the demise of Soeharto’s regime had been caused by Asia’s economic 
crisis. The principal cause of the latter was the market itself that continued to be 
driven by global capital markets and global liberalization pressures (see Beeson 
1998; Emerson 1999; Hidayat 2002b). It is not easy, however, to decide exactly 
whether media (agencies) or (structural) economic pressures started the Reform 
movement. Golding and Murdock (1979, 210) consider both analyses as 
complementary. They state that the efforts to understand the production of ideology 
by the media cannot de facto be separated from the efforts to comprehend the 
dynamic processes in the society within which the media industries operate.  
Following this political-economic analysis, the Reform movement would be 
marked further by freer and interrelated market, media, and civil society. This type 
of analysis is usually presented in a triangular model of those elements (for the 
Indonesian case, see Hidayat 2002b). According to Charles Taylor (1990, 95-118; 
also in Keane 2001, 786), there are three different levels of civil society. Firstly, the 
civil society exists in a minimal sense where there are free associations not 
operating under the tutelage of the state. Secondly, a stronger sense of civil society 
ensues “where society can structure and co-ordinate its actions through such 
associations.” Thirdly, a public dimension of civil society is strongest “where the 
ensemble of associations can significantly determine or inflect the course of state 
policy.”   
In Indonesia, the Reform movement has led to a liberated civil society 
together with the rise of hundreds of new non-Government organizations (NGO’s), 
advocacy groups, voluntary social and cultural organizations and independent labor 
unions, including 24 new journalist associations. Observers tend to agree that many 
of such organizations in this new era improve their quality of activities (see 
Tajoeddin 2002, 23). Accordingly, these developments can meet two of three 
Taylor’s levels of civil society; for the third one, a recent research reveals that 
Indonesia’s index only achieves a 2.4 score out of a maximum of 4, according to the 
Civil Society Index developed by CIVICUS (Yappika 2002). The fact that the third  
dimension can only be achieved if a democratic communication system is in place 
(Herman 1995; Heath 1999) explains that still low index.  
Checking Indonesia’s current communication system, we can see that the 
liberalization has taken place hand in hand with deregulation in the media and their 
related market sector. More important is the liquidation of the Ministry of 
Information, the executor of the former oppressing system. One year after 
Soeharto’s resignation, the House of Representatives passed a new Press Law (No. 
49/1999) stipulating that a publishing license was no longer required. As a result, 
the number of newspapers soared from 300 to around 1,000 (Mangahas quoted in 
Johannen and Gomez 2001, 125; Hidayat 2002b, 3). In addition to that Press Law, 
the 1999 Broadcasting Bill proposed by the Parliament allows foreigners to own up 
to 49% of shares in media agencies. These reforms undoubtedly conform the spirit 
of global neo-liberalism.  
This liberalization has resulted in a libertarian interpretation of media-making. 
Jonathan Turner, Reuters bureau chief in Jakarta, states that “Indonesia has become 
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one of the world’s most open communities inasmuch as you can pretty well write 
what you want without fear of official sanction” (Turner quoted in Goodman 2000, 
1). As to broadcasting programming, two president directors of commercial 
television stations openly describe the commodification process taking place. They 
acknowledge that what commercial stations have really done is nothing else than 
“competing in order to fool the people” (see Gazali 2002b, 4). A few commercial 
radio stations, however, still try to serve their audiences with a great deal of news 
and talkshows on most recent public affairs. In short, the liberalization of media and 
market brought about by the Reform movement has only resulted in what Bagdikian 
(1997, 248) calls “the fallacy of the two-model choice,” as if people can only 
choose between an authoritarian system and a libertarian system; both, in fact,  do 
not meet the conditions required by civil society.  
Hidayat (2002b in Gazali 2002c, 4-18) argues that there are at least three 
reasons why commercial market-driven media – implying “the logic of 
accumulation and exclusion” (Kellner 1990, 6-7) and preferring large-scale 
communication forms – cannot guarantee a platform for equal access and 
democratic discussion. Firstly, issues addressed in these media will be determined 
by the extent to which they do not interfere with the interest of capital expansion. 
Secondly, without audience maximization and without access to financial resources, 
it would be difficult for minority segments in society to acquire broadcasting time to 
conduct a peaceful, rational discussion on issues of interest to them, such as 
unemployment and health of the poor. Thirdly, those two previous conditions 
potentially cause the homogenization of media content. In the end it would just 
resemble the former state repression which – in the Indonesian case – once led to 
the so-called “national culture” or to the definition of social reality from the 
perspective of the Government, which was regarded as the only valid and logical 
one (see Hill and Sen 1990). 
In reality, Indonesia is a very heterogeneous country in terms of local areas, 
ethnic groups, cultures, and ways of life. Therefore, a centralized television policy 
could never have answered the needs for media suitable for that plurality. Things 
were even worse in 2000 with the existence of 10 commercial television stations; all 
obtained a national license and their bases are all in Jakarta (for a full account of the 
original set of television stations in Indonesia, see d’Haenens, Gazali and Verelst 
1999, 127-152 and d’Haenens, Verelst and Gazali 2000, 197-232). Although the 
local commercial radio stations had been blooming since 1970, the latter only 
operate in cities having significant amounts of advertising expenditures. Their 
programming was also influenced much by the Jakarta-based radio stations. 
Against this background, it is clear that what Indonesia needs to address in its 
Broadcasting Law is the democratic reordering of the media and their public 
accountability. Splichal (1993, 8) suggests some necessary preconditions to do so: 
that is providing genuine access to the media and a more equitable distribution of 
media ownership, media time, and space. These preconditions are based on the 
abolition of all limitations of rights of citizens. These are also the presuppositions of 
“public sphere” (Habermas 1993; Curran and Gurevitch 1992). A comprehensive 
interpretation of public sphere can be found in public communication that includes 
not only mass communication, but also other forms of communication (Hollander, 
Negotiating Public and Community Media in Post-Soeharto Indonesia 
98 
 
Stappers and Jankowski 2002, 22-23). One is community communication whose 
emphasis is on the communicative exchange and social action within the context of 
geographical localities and/or communities of interest. Through that communicative 
exchange and social action, community communication is expected to bridge the 
gap between the policy coming from outside or being imposed on more than one 
community (such as state policy) on the one hand and the collective (social) 
authentic experiences and needs, and multiple (i.e., cultural, ethnic, religious) 
identities that are relevant to a specific group or category of individuals on the other. 
When it comes to institutional aspects, community media are generally seen as 
relatively small-scale institutions, concerned with locally oriented and produced 
programming, essentially publicly financed, and whose ownership and control are 
often shared by members in the community. All these ingredients together might 
help to become relatively more independent from the dictatorship of both the state 
and the market. These characteristics are similar to those of public broadcasting 
institutions, except for, at least in some smaller countries, the coverage area of 
public broadcasting being larger than that of community broadcasting. Public 
service broadcasting might start from the idea of a national network like in most 
Western European countries, similar to TVRI and RRI in Indonesia, serving more 
than one community, positioned as a national integrating tool, or as a symbol of 
national unity. Also, the public stations are generally run in a more bureaucratic, 
politicized, and professional fashion than community media (for an overview of the 
general characteristics found in community media, see Jankowski et al. 1992; 
Jankowski and Prehn 2002, 7-8; Fraser and Estrada 2001; for an overview of 
indicators of public broadcasting performance, see Barnett and Docherty 1991, 23-
27 or the Political Declaration of the Council of Europe in d’Haenens and Saeys 
2001).  
Community communication, in fact, also implies decentralization (Hollander 
1992, 9): this is effected in Indonesia through the implementation of the 1999 
Regional Autonomy Law No. 22. If one considers decentralization or community 
communication to be significant in the Indonesian media transition, it should be 
placed in the model used to comprehend the transition process. Offe’s model (1998, 
4-6) is potentially relevant because he includes the ‘community’ as a key element of 
analysis in an effort to understand where one is on the trajectory of social transition. 
This understanding, according to him, is a prelude to the construction of a valid 
social policy. Besides the community, other actors are: the state and the market. 
Offe (1998) believes that whereas the state is driven by reasons, and the market by 
interest, the community’s engine runs on passion (e.g., love, loyalty, cohesion, 
honor, and pride). Whereas the market allows for acquisition, the community 
provides for identity; or as Hollander et al. (1992) suggest, it provides for collective 
(social) authentic experiences, needs, and identities. With these senses, ‘community’ 
is presumably better substituting the position of ‘civil society’ used in Hidayat’s 
model (2002b, 1-3) or to be addressed first, since the stagnancy of community 
empowerment might contribute to the current failures to achieve the strongest 
dimension of civil society as well as failures of decentralization in Indonesia (see 
Niessen 1999). Yet, our proposed model still leaves the state out (similar to 
Hidayat’s), as Indonesia is now in a specific juncture: just being freed from the state 
suppression on media and civil society initiatives. In other words, in current 
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Indonesia, the struggle to get the state to fairly guaranteeing and enforcing equal 
rights of citizens, as suggested by Offe, has just started. Thus, communities should 
first keep a close watch on the state’s performance in dealing with media and 
market sectors. Also Jakubowicz (1993, 46) states that in a changing context of 
communication democratization, a potential enemy is “the state” (about the three 
models see  Figure 3 below): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The new triangle still stands in a complex relationship to the negotiation of the 
new broadcasting policy. Among others, due to the recent history, it is much easier 
to educate the population about the evil of a suppressive Government than about the 
potential of a manipulative capitalistic structure in the media system. In any case, 
the proposed model suggests that the  essence of the Indonesia's reform should be 
the creation of opportunities for community members in various provinces to be 
actively involved in directing the development in Indonesia's broadcasting industry 
as well as the state media policy. 
This chapter presents the results of a qualitative research project carried out in 
several regions throughout Indonesia in an effort to investigate the ‘viability’ (e.g., 
problems, prospects and promises) of the decentralization of radio and television, in 
relation to the former state and new commercial broadcasting agencies. The general 
research question is: What are the perceptions of potential local stakeholders about 
the broadcasting situations, the problems with those situations, and the solutions to 
those problems? Implicitly addressed is the question of the perceived abilities of the 
community members to assess and interact with other elements of our proposed 
triangular model. In order to observe the relevant developments of each element of 
the new triangular model and its surroundings in the field, this research proposes to 
place the study results in a Media Organizational Performance Model (adapted from 
McQuail 1992a, pp. 81-95) (see Figure 4 below) 
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2. Research Questions 
Referring to the general research question (above), the data collection and 
analysis aim at answering four specific research questions: 
1. What are the taken-for-granted assumptions about the recent developments of 
the broadcasting industry in Indonesia in general, and the positioning of TVRI 
and RRI in particular among the key local representatives in ten provinces 
throughout the country? 
2. What are the perceptions of the stakeholders and their needs relating to public 
and community types of broadcasting? Answers to this question were 
‘triggered’ by introducing concrete community and public broadcasting 
experiences in other societies (e.g., the United States of America, Canada, 
Germany, Japan). 
3. Do local audiences perceive the need to maintain multiple layers of regional, 
local, community identities and cultures, using alternative broadcasting 
sources and how do they position the maintenance of those identities in the 
context of both national and global programming? 
4. What conditions should be fulfilled, including through legislation, in order to 
guarantee public access to ownership, control of, and participation in 
community and public broadcasting? 
 
Figure 4:         Media Organizational  Performance Model 
                        (adapted from McQuail, 1992 a, pp. 81-95)) 
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3.  Methodology: Stages and Procedures  
The present research adopts the qualitative, grounded research approach that 
relies mostly on observation and records of statements made in private and public 
meetings as well as in personal interviews. The paradigm used as point of departure 
is ‘working with the people,’ as opposed to ‘working for the people.’ In other 
words, this research is based upon so-called comprehensive people participation 
(Cohen and Uphoff 1980). By people participation is meant participation in 
assessing, decision-making, implementing, sharing the benefits, and in evaluating. 
Therefore, every session began with exploring public assessment of all relevant 
issues (i.e., starting on the access to and use of existing broadcast stations), in other 
words, starting with their closest environment. This procedure is very much in line 
with the spirit of the grounded research approach. This approach allows the 
researchers to reconstruct the interviewees’ perspective (Glaser and Strauss 1977; 
Strauss and Corbin 1990).  
In general, the results from the first stage will determine the subsequent 
stages.  
First stage: pre-assessment sessions 
A research team of communication scholars of the University of Indonesia 
started out with a set of preliminary activities, called ‘pre-assessment’ sessions in 
ten cities in Indonesia. The selection of the ten cities was carried out purposively 
with the plan of using each city as a hub where relevant parties from the 
surrounding areas would gather. Almost covering the whole span of Indonesia, the 
cities are, from West to East in Indonesia: Medan, Padang, Bandung, Yogyakarta, 
Surabaya, Denpasar, Samarinda, Makassar, Manado, and Jayapura. The pre-
assessment sessions were conducted between July 2000 and January 2001, during 
which the researchers met key representatives of the local communities. Taking into 
account the principle of democratic representation of local community members, 
our sources included: NGO activists, academics, TVRI and RRI staff, commercial 
radio personnel, local media staff, local Government representatives, local 
legislative members, social leaders, artists and cultural observers, religious leaders, 
business leaders, and advertisers.  
During this stage, after inquiring the stakeholder representatives about their 
assessment of the existing broadcasting, the researchers briefed the participants on 
issues regarding community and public broadcasting (Barnett and Docherty 1991). 
Relevant laws, specifically the 2000 Government Regulations 36 and 37, were 
discussed to stress the fact that legally TVRI and RRI were already transformed into 
public broadcasting stations. At the same time, drawing from experience in other 
countries (for instance, in the United States of America), it was argued that 
community and public broadcasting should not be limited to stations established by 
the state, and that universities, NGOs, and other institutions should equally be 
allowed to establish public and community broadcasting stations.  
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Second stage: assessment sessions or seminars 
During the pre-assessment round, most informants suggested to widen the 
assessment by including many more relevant parties within the local public. As a 
response to this demand, a set of large public forums – by means of focus group 
discussions were organized in the above-mentioned ten cities. These seminars were 
run between April 26 and August 3, 2001, and in total attended by 1,345 
participants originating from the host cities and 64 surrounding cities and villages. 
The composition of the participants was as follows (figures in parentheses show the 
range of percentages of each category in each city): NGO people (16-25%),  TVRI 
& RRI staff (14-18%), cultural observers (10-15%), artists (10-12%), scholars (10-
12%), students (8-10%), local Government staff (5-10 %), local Parliament 
members (5-10 %), religious leaders (5–9%), media people (5-6%), business people 
(5-6%), others (4-5%). 
As recommended in the pre-assessment rounds, four international speakers 
with extensive experience in the public broadcasting sector of their home country 
were invited: David Brugger and Bob Ottenhoff (United States), Jim Byrd (Canada), 
and Eric Voght (Germany). In each city, only two international speakers were 
present, accompanied by on average six national and local speakers. The domestic 
speakers included academics, NGO activists, media people, local Government 
officials, local Parliament members, and representatives of the central Government 
(Ministry of Telecommunications). In addition to the speaker presentations, the 
seminars also featured program samples brought by the international speakers, the 
producers of local TVRI and RRI, and some NGOs working on information flow 
analysis and media production advocacy.   
Near the end of the two-day seminars, a session took place where the 
participants were assigned into two groups. The first one was the broadcasters group 
composed of producers from TVRI and RRI and other staff as well as some 
producers from commercial stations. The second group was the users group 
comprised of the rest of the participants. The results of each group discussion were 
brought afterwards into a final plenary session. The outcomes of the discussions will 
be presented in the following sections. 
 
4.  Findings and Thematization of the Data 
We found six major themes revealing essential similarities and differences 
with regard to the ways in which stakeholders in the ten cities under scrutiny dealt 
with the research questions. Each theme, not listed in order of priority or 
significance, will be presented, followed by a brief discussion. The themes include 
the stakeholders’ perception (1) on community access to the existing broadcast 
stations; (2) on community identities and cultures; (3) on the positioning of TVRI 
and RRI; (4) on suggestions for future market strategies of public or community 
broadcasting; (5) on the making of broadcasting law; and (6) on  transnational 
capital and public sphere. 
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Theme 1: Community access to the existing broadcast stations 
The first emerging theme is that of community access to the existing broadcast 
stations. The informants expressed expectations for what could be seen as citizens’ 
“power to communicate” (Andrën 1993, 61). Regarding access to media exposure, 
our informants state that people living in remote areas can only watch TVRI or 
listen to RRI, or in some areas, people do not have access to any media; for 
example, recently in the Sentani area in Papua, the transmitter tower of RRI was 
broken.  
With regard to media ownership, most informants thought that the television 
stations were still controlled by Soeharto’s family members, their cronies, or by 
Jakarta-based conglomerates. They strongly criticized the fact that people in local 
communities never get a chance to build their own television station. 
Our informants’ concerns on freedom of expression were clearly revealed in 
comments such as: “Television and radio programming are determined by the elite. 
It is not in their interest to channel the voices of minority groups or people living far 
from Jakarta.” The NGO activists also believed not to have access to the media to 
evaluate the performance of executive and legislative staff. It was interesting to note 
that the local Government officials  and Parliament members felt that they did not 
have access to the media either.  
 
Theme 2 : Community identities and cultures 
A second theme regularly brought up in the discussions  are community 
identities and cultures. This theme became much more prominent when the 
dominance of Javanese traditional performances was reflected upon (about Java-
centrism, see Keuning, van der Mark and Palte 1987, 9, 27-29). Not surprisingly, 
these comments were mostly voiced by informants living outside Java, especially in 
Bali, West Sumatra, Papua, and East Kalimantan. They believed that “the Java-
based programs are causing alienation to local people from their own culture.” 
When asked about their appreciation of cultural plurality, they replied: “It is not 
about resisting other cultures but it is more about demanding to see our local 
programs in the right proportion,” and “we would like to be the host in our own 
home.” 
About cultural and social standards, cultural observers and community 
leaders, academics and NGO activists found that commercial television programs 
aired and supported anti-social messages. They stated: “Look at sex and violence 
that are always part of television movies!” They referred to the extravagant life style 
and consumerism achieved without hard work that were blatantly exposed in both 
imported and local soap operas. Some also accused commercial television and radio 
programs of airing and supporting anti-traditional norms and values such as living 
together before marriage and discussing sex matters in public. They were also 
critical about the sensual outfits worn by famous actors and actresses in commercial 
television programs: “Attires like the one worn by Britney Spear is dangerous for 
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our traditional norms on clothing etiquette;” and “We can’t stand much more 
Britney Spearism!” All religious leaders taking part in the discussions voiced their 
concerns about the decreasing amount of religious teaching programs on television.  
In contrast to all criticisms, there were always some informants (although very 
few) who showed their appreciation towards commercial television and radio 
stations as well as towards TVRI and RRI, since both had succeeded in offering 
informative and entertaining programs helping Indonesian people overcome their 
alienation from global advancement and  international trends. 
 
Theme 3: Positioning of TVRI and RRI 
Around 60% of informants think that TVRI and RRI still – to a certain extent 
– function as Government propaganda tools. The rest acknowledged that TVRI and 
RRI have improved significantly compared to the days under the Soeharto regime. 
For example, some saw that, “They have aired some interactive public debates.” 
On the use of the existing TVRI and RRI programming, the community 
leaders together with NGO activists and academics from areas outside Java found 
that TVRI and RRI air less and less programs that give practical assistance to people 
living in villages and small towns. For instance, instructional programs on 
agriculture, animal raising or home economics.  
In reaction to these criticisms, the TVRI and RRI staff in general underlined 
the obstacles they had to face everyday in the production, given the very limited 
production budget available. In spite of those obstacles, most of them still try to 
defend that most of their programs already meet public needs and wishes. They also 
objected to being criticized by the public simply due to the fact that they are the 
front liners. They stated: “Everybody knows that we really depend on the central 
policy and its budget allocation!” Finally, it was very important to note that almost 
all of the TVRI and RRI staff agreed to support any social action that would be 
carried out by the local community members to improve TVRI and RRI 
performances.    
 
Theme 4: Suggestions for future market strategies of public or community  
broadcasting 
A fifth theme that emerged from the discussions were the suggestions for 
future market strategies of public or community broadcasting.  Most informants 
stated: “I think we already agree that the commercial stations define their audience 
as consumers while the public and community broadcasting see their audience as 
citizens.” Representatives of the local Government, particularly those from the local 
offices of information (former local branches of the Ministry of Information), could 
not hide their ambition to ensure that the local Government should regain their 
unlimited access to local TVRI and RRI. They argued: “If local TVRI and RRI 
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stations are to be supported by the local Government budget, they have to serve the 
functions needed by the local Government!” The NGO people, students, and 
academics rejected this idea categorically, arguing that the funding from the local 
Government budget is in fact public money.  
Surprisingly, it were the representatives of the community business in 
Surabaya, Bandung, and Yogyakarta (all big cities in Java) who came forward to 
suggest the importance of the stakeholders’ support. For local legislators, the 
justification from the stakeholders is of paramount importance. For instance, they 
said: “There should be some public agencies to plan and evaluate the program 
together with TVRI and RRI.” 
Most informants supported the establishment of those public forums. They 
suggested: “These forums should act like the pioneers who keep marketing the basic 
ideas of public and community broadcasting so that the numbers of stakeholders 
who are concerned with those alternative broadcastings grow bigger and bigger;” 
“These forums should be active in obtaining the recognition of both central and 
local management of TVRI and RRI as well as from local Government staff and 
legislators. Then, they should propose a program planning together with fund-
raising activities;” and “It is very urgent that these forums soon jointly produce 
programs which catch the attention of the wider stakeholders, for instance in the 
form of town hall meetings discussing issues of interest to the local public. This will 
prove to be the most effective marketing strategy!” Some suggestions were made on 
how to name such a stakeholders’ forum. One widely preferred term was Local 
Consultative Forum (LCF).     
 
Theme 5: Broadcasting Law in the making 
A sixth theme that emerged was the making of Broadcasting Law. The NGO 
activists, students, and academics in all cities strongly advised all participants to pay 
close attention to the legislation process, as this had been a ‘mystery’ to local people 
from the beginning.  
The proposed ban on nationwide coverage leading to the obligation for the 
national license holders to develop a joint cooperation with the potential local 
counterparts, became one of the hot issues. Around 70% of our informants, 
especially from cities outside Java, like West and North Sumatra, North and South 
Sulawesi, Papua, and Bali, felt it should be hailed as an important breakthrough. 
They believed: “Only by forcing the national stations to comply with that kind of 
regulation can we expect a significant decentralization to take place in Indonesia’s 
broadcasting scene.”  
The difference between discussants from Java and outside Java, however, did 
not seem significant when referring to public and community broadcasting in the 
Broadcasting Bill. This was displayed in comments such as: “We should reject the 
Broadcasting Law if it does not include those two broadcasting institutions.” In 
order to ensure that public and community broadcasting, including TVRI and RRI, 
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significantly recognize supervision and evaluation by the public, some academics 
and NGO activists in Java demanded that this condition be stipulated in detail in the 
Broadcasting Law. 
 
Theme 6: Transnational Capital and Public Sphere  
Given the significant amounts of time spent discussing the local versus 
national political economy and public sphere, one might expect that the 
transnational flows of capital and transnational public sphere would also receive 
much attention in the seminar series. In fact, there were only relatively few 
comments from the informants on how those issues should be addressed in the 
Broadcasting Bill. Among them were those from three business people from 
telecommunications companies in Bandung and Padang and two economic 
observers in Surabaya and Yogyakarta, who commented on the article allowing 
foreigners to own up to 49% of any broadcasting company in Indonesia. One of 
their arguments was: “Globalization is a reality we have to face. If a lot of 
international investors would like to invest their money here in broadcasting 
companies, it would be great for our provinces.”   
One student in South Sulawesi and another in West Java brought about the 
issue of relayed foreign broadcasting programs. “We have to set a limit on their 
amount,” said the Makassar’s student. His colleague in Bandung simply gave 
comments like: “If we don’t try to set a limit on the amount of relayed foreign 
broadcasting programs, it is exactly the same as allowing foreign broadcasting 
companies to build their station here!” In contrast, a cultural observer in Surabaya 
asked the participants not to spend a lot of time discussing transnational flows of 
capital or transnational public sphere. He said: “If we can develop some healthy 
public and community broadcasting in this province, I am sure we can survive any 
kind of potentially bad influence of international capital or international issues.” He 
then yelled out a proverb in a local language meaning that each area has its own 
unique traditions and cultures that are not easy to conquer.  
 
5. Conclusions  
The themes found in this research highlight the following important elements, 
as raised in the research questions: (1) local people argued that the shifting media 
system in Indonesia (due to Reform), including the new positioning of TVRI and 
RRI as public broadcasting, still did not solve the problems of scarcity of 
community access to the existing broadcasting stations; (2) local people were 
concerned with the needs to maintain their identities and cultures through the 
broadcasting programming and at the same time they worried about the impact of 
the libertarian interpretation of media-making; (3) Indonesia is a heterogeneous 
country, therefore the local people felt an urgent need to explore other forms of 
public communication, among others, community communication to be 
complementary with large-scale mass communication; (4) community and public 
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broadcasting were considered by the local people as more appropriate media to 
fulfill their specific needs, and to position the maintenance of their cultures and 
identities vis-à-vis other local, national and global cultures and identities; (5) the 
decentralization process, especially to guarantee community access to ownership, 
needed to be addressed in the making of the Broadcasting Law; (6) the Broadcasting 
Law should explicitly stipulate that public and community broadcasting must allow 
supervision and evaluation by the public and community. 
As the main aim of this study was to let people have a voice, the researcher 
did not try to persuade the informants to formulate their assessments according to 
any analysis model; yet, the prominence of the new triangular model, that 
community should be advanced as an active element (not just waiting for the state’s 
initiatives) to directly deal with, and continuously assess the developments taking 
place in, media and market, appeared strikingly in the research findings. It is partly 
parallel with Splichal’s (1993, 12) suggestions on socialization and the way in 
which communication should be organized as a public good, and managed and 
controlled neither by private (market) nor state interests, but rather by society as a 
whole. If communities can run those functions, such a public communication system 
could be seen as an alternative or a middle ground between the authoritarian and 
libertarian choices. 
To enhance these organizing, managing, and controlling functions, after the 
seminar series ended, the research team continued work with the local people. Up to 
December 2002, there have been 54 group discussions with the stakeholders of 
public and community broadcasting in the 10 cities. One of the predominant issues 
in these meetings was the dynamics of efforts to form Local Consultative Forums 
(LCF) as stakeholders forum on public and community broadcasting. All 
conversations in those meetings were also recorded as research data. Besides the 
meetings, the team also facilitated the production of television and radio programs 
involving local constituents, as recommended in the workshops. Of the 400 
programs aired on TVRI and RRI since November 2001 to December 2002, 30% 
was produced in ‘town hall meeting’ program format. The topics of these joint local 
programs of LCFs and local TVRI and RRI stations varied greatly to suit the unique 
needs of each area. For example, human rights issues in the Aceh conflict, the 
public health service system in Bandung, violence against children in Banjarmasin, 
the narcotics problem in Bali, an anthropological view of the HIV/AIDS problem in 
Papua, prejudice and discrimination on Chinese by the press in North Sumatra. 
Along with the joint production activities, some LCFs became more solid. Six 
of them became already official, namely, the Yogyakarta Society for Public 
Broadcasting (Yogyakarta), the East Java Forum for Public Broadcasting 
(Surabaya), the Media Forum for Brotherhood (Manado), the Makassar Local 
Consultative Forum (Makassar), the Bali Television Society (Denpasar), and 
“Balarea” in Bandung (“Balarea” also means brotherhood or togetherness). Outside 
of the ten original cities, there were cities that attempted to establish their own LCFs 
including Pontianak, Mataram, Banten, Palembang, and Banda Aceh. All these 
developments have gradually shown that the paradigm ‘work with the people’ used 
in this research works well and can encourage people to consider the implications of 
development of people’s capacity, equity, empowerment, and interdependence 
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(Byrant and White 1982, 15). This awareness also brought changes to the attitude of 
RRI and TVRI staff. In particular, RRI staff – from the central board of directors to 
local branches staff – have become more cooperative. They frequently stated that 
only through working together with LCF’s, they can be free from the former trap of 
the “paternalistic” vision (d’Haenens and Saeys 2001, 120; Williams 1976, 133). 
In order to have a sustainable, strategic, and comprehensive flow of 
endeavors, the research team together with the LCF members have also 
continuously discussed various developments in reference to McQuail’s 
Performance Model (1992). For example, in the macro environment (see Figure 5 
below), the still gloomy economy in Indonesia (which is now even worsened by the 
Bali blast) seemed to reduce the enthusiasm of foreign donors. They usually referred 
to the failure of public and community broadcasting in Eastern Europe because of 
similar problems leading to the unavailability of sufficient amounts of public 
funding. On the other hand, there had been some pressures from foreign 
ambassadors to Indonesia who even paid a visit to the Ministry of Information’s 
office to demand for further clarifications of an article in the Broadcasting Bill that 
limits relayed programs from foreign broadcasts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Media Organizational Performance Model (adapted 
from McQuail, 1992a, pp. 81-95) applied to negotiating 
public and community media in Indonesia 
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In the market environment, most of our sources in the Indonesian Advertising 
Agencies Association supported the existence of public and community 
broadcasting since in their opinion there will be enough potential market and 
advertising shares for them due to their specific characteristics. On the other hand, 
the position of commercial stations and surrounding corporate organizations was not 
clear yet. In some formal meetings they stated that they felt the need for alternative 
broadcasting too, as long as the broadcasting law provides crystal clear rules of the 
game. Yet, in other occasions, such as the one in East Java, the local branch of 
Indonesian Commercial Radio Stations Association (PRSSNI) whole-heartedly 
supported the raids launched by the so-called telecommunications police forces on 
the newly built local radio stations. These operations were based on ambiguous 
regulations in which it was uncertain whether the authority to allocate the license 
laid with the central Government (directorate general of post and 
telecommunications, according to the Telecommunications Law No. 36/1999) or 
with the local Government (as stipulated in the Regional Autonomy Law No. 
22/1999). Moreover, new media technologies and media convergence were always 
brought up as arguments for them to reject the article in the Broadcasting Bill 
proposing limits on vertical integration in the media industry. ATVSI (Indonesian 
Association for Television; its members are commercial stations only) allegedly 
masterminded a huge protest at the Parliament building to prevent the legislators 
from passing the Broadcasting Bill into Law on the scheduled plenary session. The 
first protest on November 25, 2002 was successful. But, in the following session on 
November 28, the parliament passed the Bill into Act, even though there was a 
rumor that the commercial television stations would boycott legislators’ activities 
should they approve the Bill. It is important to note here that the research team has 
always kept contacts with the members of the House Special Committee on the 
Broadcasting Law and the relevant Government officials as well. Reports on 
developments of this action-research were always submitted to them too. The team 
even developed a guidance book on the public and community broadcasting, 
submitted the draft to as many activists, legislators, Government officials, 
academics, and other relevant parties as possible, and launched and acknowledged it 
as a collaborative work of all parties (see Acknowledgements). 
Although the new Broadcasting Law No. 32/2002 with full recognition of 
public and community broadcasting never signed by the President, it went into 
effect on December 28, as endorsed by articles about legislation procedures in the 
Indonesian Constitution. The details of this new Law will be developed into lower-
level regulations and they certainly need to be analyzed again by the advocacy 
groups together with LCFs and local people. In the field, there have been at least 15 
local television stations joining two associations: Indonesian Public and Community 
Television Association launched in Balikpapan, April 28, 2002, and Indonesian 
Local Television Association formed in Bali, July 26, 2002. In the meantime, more 
than 400 community radios have been recorded and most joined the Indonesian 
Community Radio Network that was established on May 15, 2002.  
Finally, while working with the local people, the research team has kept 
sharing with them the fact that they themselves will determine whether their LCF 
can make further progress or not. Some key issues contributing to that progress are: 
(1) the creativity of the LCF members in that area; (2) the cooperativeness and 
Negotiating Public and Community Media in Post-Soeharto Indonesia 
110 
 
creativity of the managers and staff of TVRI and RRI; (3) strength of support from 
local Parliament members and local Government officials; (4) the support from 
external funding agencies to cover the joint production costs still necessary at this 
initial stage; (5) the initiatives to develop their own broadcasting stations outside 
TVRI and RRI. Shortly after the new Broadcasting Law was made effective, the 
research team and other activists also kicked off the follow-up sessions across the 
country to discuss those key issues in the new contexts provided by the (new) 
Broadcasting Law No. 32/2002.  
Concluding Remarks 
Findings on the Directions of Media Responsibility  
and Accountability via the Media Performance Model 
in Order to Comprehend the Field of Political Communication 
in Indonesia 
 
The findings put forward in this dissertation highlight the following important 
elements as a response to the research questions raised in the introduction:  (1) a 
model designed to explain political communication in the Indonesian context, 
embracing the two faces of political communication (i.e. the politics of 
communication and the communication of politics); (2) the Media Performance 
Model derived from the Model of Political Communication and designed to fit the 
specific context of mediated political communication comprising four factors (i.e. 
the Government, Market, Civil Society, and the Media); (3) the concepts of Media 
Responsibility and Media Accountability which help show clearly the directions of 
the interplay taking place in the Media Performance Model, especially putting 
emphasis on citizens as active information gatherers and processors; (4) a variety of 
directions of interplay among the Government, Market, Civil Society and the Media 
over the last 20 years in Indonesia, divided into three eras (i.e. the Soeharto Era, 
better known as the “New Order Era,” the May 1998 Revolution, and the Reform 
Era afterwards); (5) two alternatives are promoted and developed concerning the 
form, the institutional aspects and the concrete mechanisms of Indonesian Media 
Accountability (i.e. the LCF (Local Consultative Forum) and the Supervisory Body, 
that is endorsed in the Broadcasting Law No. 32/2002). ∗ 
 
1.   Model of the Political Communication Field 
For academic significance, the research in this dissertation has produced and 
provided details for what is intended to be a map of political communication 
studies, a “Political Communication Field Model.” In addition to serving as a 
structuring tool for this dissertation, this model is expected to have some heuristic 
                                                 
∗ Acknowledgements 
The Communication Department, University of Indonesia, thanks all the activists and institutions 
who made this action research possible (among others, ISKI, MPPI, KTVPI, Internews/IMLPC, 
KREASI, ISAI, etc.). Plans, reports, and other potential resources were exchanged with these 
organizations. A substantial portion of this research and joint local productions were made available 
by funds from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Indonesian 
Mission, disbursed through IFES (International Foundation for Election System), the Indonesian 
Office, and local NGOs involved in LCFs. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
112 
 
value for other scholars: as a subject for discussion, as a model for research in other 
countries, and as an object of comparison with other models, as scholars aim at 
clarifying the comprehensive and challenging future of the political communication 
field.  
This model demonstrates that this field has certainly made significant and 
rapid progress in recent years, especially for particular types of research: behavioral 
and media effects studies and campaign studies.  These areas may be regarded as 
icons of political communication. Since the Model is expected to be relatively 
comprehensive in describing the political communication field, it asserts the 
inclusion of behavioral studies, campaign studies and political/civic socialization 
studies on non-mediated messages or interactions. Most of them are (but are not 
limited to) interpersonal and group communication. In this way, this model enlarges 
the range of issues in the field of political communication. For instance, analysis 
may not only be confined to the study of popular opinion regarding political 
communication, but also to citizen action. Moreover, media forms not typically 
included in political communication research, such as movies, popular songs, 
television shows, radio programs, and even rumors, should be also seen as viable 
expressions of political communication. 
  
 
 
Figure 6:  A Political Communication Field Model 
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In the same spirit, this model embraces the twentieth-century political scientists’ 
approach, considering politics in terms of group competition for scarce resources. One 
such approach concludes that the essence of politics is action – not the action of 
individuals, because they are rarely effective in politics, but the action of groups. It 
defines groups by their interests.  Accordingly, this model visualises a specific arena to 
analyse various institutions and processes taking place around them, the so-called 
“interaction of interest groups.” That specific arena comprises governmental institutions, 
economics, culture, religion, etc. 
Political communication in this modern age consists primarily of mediated political 
communication. Accordingly, studies on media reality construction become interesting 
and important. These include analyses on agenda-setting and interaction in the 
newsroom. Three chapters in this dissertation describe the intense, dynamic interactions 
in the newsrooms of radio and TV stations as well as newspapers across Indonesia when 
approaching the peak of the May 1998 Revolution.  
All of the above-mentioned arenas address primarily (although not exclusively) 
parts of what Chaffee (2001) calls “communication of politics” (p. 243). Another 
inseparable part of political communication which, according to Chaffee, needs much 
more inventive efforts, has to do more with the “politics of communication.” For this 
part, the Model of the Political Communication Field, attributes a special place to citizens 
(both as individuals and groups) as active information gatherers and processors at all 
levels, such as the community, the family, peer groups, school, etc. The Model of the 
Political Communication Field reminds us that some areas need to be explored as much 
as the already popular domains, such as uses and gratifications studies with the emphasis 
on the active role of citizen in terms of selective exposure, media type and content 
choice, and citizens’ feedback to media contents. 
To ensure that citizens play the role of active information gatherers and processors, 
the Model of the Political Communication Field requires three necessary conditions 
(hence areas of studies): i.e. diversity of ownership, variety of media, and plurality of 
media content. Otherwise, in reality, citizens will be trapped into “the fallacy of the two-
model choice” (Bagdikian, 1997, p. 248), as if they only have a choice between two 
systems. The first system allows only very few media to operate under heavy government 
control; the Media thus become propaganda tools or ideological state apparatuses. The 
second system frees individuals and companies to found and develop as much media as 
possible under the “market principle”: the media here produce or buy programs for rating 
considerations only. Although extreme cases, both systems eventually fall into the trap of 
hegemony of tastes and goals. The policy of ensuring diversity of ownership, variety of 
media (such as commercial, public and community media), and plurality of contents will 
provide the (active) citizens not only with different levels of access to use media 
contents, but also with the chance to assess and develop media types/genres/output which 
will be well suited to their needs and contexts of life.  
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2.   The Media Performance Model 
The position of citizens as active information gatherers and processors as well as 
the institutions and processes which include interaction of interest groups in politics, 
economics, etc, will then relate the Model of the Political Communication Field to 
another model, which is designed to reduce that larger model to its essence, the so-called 
“Media Performance Model” (see Figure 1). This (relatively simple) model takes the 
form of a triangle, built up by four power entities, i.e. the Government, Market, Civil 
Society, and the Media positioned at the center of the triangle. Within each factor, there is 
a constant interplay between structure (e.g., defined as resources and regulations) and 
agency (in general referring to social actions carried out by social actors), which 
constrain as well as facilitate, impose limits on, as well as offer opportunities to, each 
other.   
The results of the interplay within each factor will inevitably have an impact upon 
the interplay or power relations among those four elements and vice versa. Researchers 
could take a certain period in history as an object to be examined using this Media 
Performance Model. They could then mark the resulting tendencies in a certain era and 
relate them to other research interests (as explored quite extensively in the first chapter on 
the three eras in Indonesia, i.e. the Soeharto Era, the May 1998 Revolution, and the 
Reform Era). One should keep in mind that even though any effort to analyse a certain 
era would seem to freeze those internal and external interplays for a while or seem to 
reduce them into a kind of a still-photo, the result should always be placed into an 
historical narrative. This means that the researcher needs to be highly alert when 
attempting to structure events into a meaningful and related order, and attempting to 
organize some well-connected concepts that enable him or her to assess the past, the 
present, and the future. 
 
3.   Media Responsibility and Accountability 
Regarding those interconnected concepts, it should be clear that although each 
chapter in this dissertation has its own theoretical framework and exploration of concepts, 
the Media Responsibility and Media Accountability concepts are nevertheless put 
forward together with the Model of the Political Communication Field and the Media 
Performance Model as unifying units in the overall theoretical framework of the 
dissertation. These concepts of Media Responsibility and Accountability are expected to 
enable any researcher to clearly see the directions of interplay among the factors in the 
Media Performance Model. Media Responsibility deals with the social needs the public 
should expect media and journalists to respond to. Therefore, it helps to investigate how 
the media and media professionals work to meet those expectations. Media 
Accountability describes how society might call on media and journalists to account for 
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the fulfillment of their responsibility. Hence, it helps to examine how the Government 
and most importantly Civil Society (elements) work to exercise their rights and duties. 
3.a.  During the Soeharto Era 
The first chapter, “Political Communication in Indonesia: Revisiting the Media 
Performance Model,” shows on the one hand that during the Soeharto Era (1966 to 1998, 
better known as the “New Order Era”) the regime in power put in place a systematic and 
comprehensive strategy to control the freedom of expression and academic exercise. The 
Government wanted to ensure that no media performance and research interest posed a 
threat to political stability. On the other hand, the media industry was shaped markedly 
by the dynamics of Soeharto’s market economy. The rapid economic growth during the 
Soeharto period created a new middle class with relatively higher education and income 
levels as large audiences with purchasing power. In addition, the expansion of the 
economy also led to the growth of the advertising industry and of advertising 
expenditures, which encouraged the massive arrivals of transnational advertising agencies 
during the 1970s. It then resulted in the transformation of the Indonesian press from the 
“political press” during Soekarno’s Guided Democracy (which defined the press as a 
“tool of the Revolution” responsible for energizing and mobilizing public opinion) into 
the “industrial press.” In this industrial context, a number of parties were tempted by 
business opportunities offered by the media sector. That the Soeharto Era was 
characterized by overlapping interests between the Government and the Market is 
depicted in the Media Performance Model. The Government issued media licenses 
(required at that time) on the basis of political criteria, mainly to its cronies or loyalists. 
In return, the Government received guarantees that the media owners would closely 
monitor their media performance to ensure that it followed the Government line. The 
situation was exacerbated by the bribery of government officials by the business 
community in order to smooth the process of “grabbing” the license. Consequently, the 
media owners who were granted licenses in general treated the media industry just like 
any other business commodity and viewed bribery as an inevitable part of their 
investment.  
In general, we can conclude that during the Soeharto Era the results of the interplay 
among elements in the Media Performance Model showed the dominance of the 
Government over other elements (see Figure 2 Part A). The overlapping of interests 
between the Government and the Market strengthened the control of the structure over 
the agency in the internal interplay within the media organization too. In a parallel way it 
weakened the potential establishment and performance of the Civil Society. The Media 
would never give significant space for any discourse (or news items) which inspired, or 
reported the establishment and performance of, voluntary associations that were 
independent of the state and commercial relations, working in the name of democracy 
and public interests.  
The above-mentioned conditions explain why during the Soeharto Era, the media 
performance never demonstrated real Media Responsibilities (McQuail, 2000). The 
assigned responsibilities, i.e. the obligations established by law, which the Media had to 
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meet, were kept at the highest level. Besides the printing license and the license for 
publishing print media, or the broadcasting license, journalists were required to join the 
one and only journalist organization allowed at the time. Chief editors had to attend 
courses on state ideology that were in fact part of an indoctrination process.  These 
obligations were clearly not in pursuance of the freedom of expression but of the 
government interests.  
The contracted responsibilities that should arise from self-regulated agreements 
between the press or broadcasters on the one hand and from society or politicians on the 
other hand with regard to the desired media conduct, were also forcefully exercised. For 
example, the so-called “telephone culture” meant that one call from a government official 
was enough to nip any potential revelation in the bud. The government also forbade press 
coverage of opposition leaders. These practices gradually damaged the self-assigned 
responsibilities indicating voluntary professional commitments to maintaining ethical 
standards and public goals. Together with the denied responsibilities (generally used to 
refute accusations of irresponsibility that are thought to be undeserved or inapplicable), 
Indonesian journalists tended more to “emphatetically” understand the state or power 
behaviors than to critically question them, as shown in research collected for the first 
chapter. Moreover, according to that research, Indonesian journalists were seen as 
spoiled, desperate, and too worried that the law would never side with the press. 
In the context of media accountability (which has to do with compelling the 
media’s proper conduct in relation to their responsibility), the weak Civil Society during 
the Soeharto Era could never equally respond to the domination of the Government in 
conjunction with the Market power. Even though political, market, and public 
accountability mechanisms seemed to ensure opportunities for citizens and voluntary 
associations to request the fulfillment of those accountabilities, in practice they never 
really materialized. As shown in the first chapter, audiences and researchers were keenly 
aware that the government and business interests exerted a huge influence over the 
Indonesian press. Such a constraining media structure produced a type of journalism that 
was very cautious, exercising self-censorship, avoiding direct criticism, and “similar to a 
snake, circling round and round without ever striking the target.”  
As to political accountability during the Soeharto era, questions arise about 
fiduciary practices (i.e., having to do with the media operating as a public trust). For 
instance, the public was aware of the monopoly in the television landscape  (as explored 
in the second chapter “In Search of Quality Measures for News Programming on 
Indonesian Television”), so that there would be no public trust reflected in the TV 
performance, but the public did not have a mechanism to compel proper conduct from the 
government. The public also knew that under the Soeharto regime journalism considered 
“harmful” for individuals, groups, organizations, and civil society was thoroughly 
disliked by the Government, as well as considered wrong for the essential needs of the 
political and judicial system. But there was no such mechanism to channel the public 
voice. 
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The main issues concerning market accountability during the Soeharto Era were 
relatively different between the print media and radio on the one hand and television on 
the other. In the television sector, until the first commercial station became operational, 
the public could never question the quality (in terms of value and pricing) of the service 
provided. Even after the launch of the first five commercial stations, the public still had 
to pay the license fee for TVRI (Television of the Republic of Indonesia), but it could 
never check TVRI’s management and technology aspects in terms of efficiency and 
innovation. As to the first five commercial TV stations, they started following the market 
system that appeared to work without conscious overall direction or control (reflecting 
the proverbial unseen hand) and without normative principles. The journalists described 
in the second chapter, both from the state-owned TVRI station and commercial stations, 
acknowledged the importance of viewing figures and program research. As a matter of 
fact the media market was as usual more likely to be influenced by politics and other 
ideological concerns than many other market sectors. The serious lack of professionalism 
at all levels of the news making process doubled the subordination of the Media to the 
Government and led, in most cases, to the overlapping of interests, whereas, in principle, 
the professional responsibility and accountability are supposed to complement or, better, 
compensate for the political or market dependency of media organizations.  
The third case study, “The Soeharto Regime and Its Fall through the Eyes of the 
Local Media,” showed that in Indonesia originally existed what is often referred to as 
“multi-level governance” as an indicator of the shared responsibility between the central 
and the provincial governments. Thus, political accountability included the legal 
framework for regulating the structure and functioning of broadcasting through national 
political and administrative institutions that were in turn shared by local institutions. 
What really happened in the field was that the local governmental institutions were only 
blindly loyal to the central government. They went even further by assigning one official 
to closely control one commercial radio station or newspaper. As a consequence, under 
this control, it was much more practical and safe for the local radio stations and print 
media to merely confine themselves to the boundaries (i.e., what was still allowed to be 
published or broadcast). These boundaries were mainly set out by the commercial TV 
stations from Jakarta. This meant that the local media and staff were in the same dark 
conditions when it came to media responsibility and accountability as Jakarta’s media 
and staff, both dominated by the overlapping interests of the government and the market. 
Moreover, since in Jakarta television appeared to be the last media agency to support the 
student and activist movements, the shift in the practice of responsibility and 
accountability in the local media usually came much later than in Jakarta.  
Regarding media accountability of the state-owned TV and radio station (TVRI & 
RRI), the local citizenry never had an equal position or enough power to assess how 
TVRI and RRI discriminated their programs from those of the commercial sector, or to 
assess TVRI and RRI’s internal pluralism as well as their contribution to a production 
climate that welcomed public participation. Lack of those accountabilities (as Marc 
Raboy explains in the CBC experience) would make the public interest poorly served in 
exchange for the interests of the state, the ruling government, or the media institution 
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itself; Raboy calls it  “administrative broadcasting,” while William as well as d’Haenens 
and Saeys use the term “paternalistic broadcasting.” 
 
3.b.  The May 1998 Revolution 
During the May 1998 Revolution, by means of the Media Performance Model, it 
can be shown how Civil Society and the (more open to the global) Market could fight 
back or corrode the Government control or legitimacy in astonishing ways. The latent 
performances of alternative media (the Internet) and underground media, together with 
rumors, helped enable Civil Society and Market to have a clear impact on the Soeharto 
Regime. In the end other media could not help but support the Revolution (see Figure 2 
Part B), which reached its peak with Soeharto’s downfall on May 21, 1998. It is 
interesting to note that the May 1998 Revolution was an “ideal” momentum for the 
Media to put into practice their Media Responsibility, and for the public to compel the 
Media to carry out their responsibility. Research in the first, second, and third chapter 
showed that there was a serious and intense interplay in all newsrooms throughout 
Indonesia between the structure (represented by the interest of the media owners) and the 
agency (materialized through social actions of TV journalists and editors). Some 
journalists could be included in the so-called “critical supporters” category, while others 
could be labeled as “spoilers” of the Soeharto Regime. Of course the degree of those 
interplays differed from one TV newsroom to the next. These actions were actually the 
manifestation of assigned, contracted, and self-assigned responsibilities. They did not 
only take place in Jakarta but also in other areas.  
Referred to as “interplay,” the social actions displayed by the journalists and editors 
constituted responses to the social actions by Civil Society, which increasingly compelled 
the Media to carry out their Media Responsibility. The emergence of mushrooming 
alternative media and underground media, that struggled for the public interest, were not 
only a breach in the formal regulations stipulating how broadcasting companies and 
newspapers should be structured and how they should function, but also constituted a 
serious threat to the Media that did not carry out their political responsibility. The Media 
were also compelled to conduct their market responsibility: to the surprise of the 
newsroom professionals TV news programs ratings increased significantly and could 
even compete with popular entertainment programs.  
The student action groups, which had frequently and temporarily occupied several 
local branches of the state-owned radio, RRI, in order to force it to air their demands, 
should be seen as an effort to compel the RRI to meet its public responsibility. The 
state-owned TV station, TVRI (which never reported the students demonstrations until 
millions of students and activists entered the Parliament compound in Jakarta and other 
cities across Indonesia) was forced by reality to finally start reporting the movement.  In 
this way, the students and activists reminded the Media about their assignment 
(especially for a station funded by public money) of maintaining a more direct 
relationship with the citizenry, in addition to their relationship with the Market and the 
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State. The endeavor to compel media professionals (not only those working in the state-
owned media) to carry out their professional accountability was reflected in the 
statements voiced by students and activists in their protests in that any media (especially 
a TV station) wanting to avoid at any price to broadcast the news on the movement 
deserved to be called a “coward.” 
Certainly we also have to mention that the collapse of the Soeharto Regime appears 
to be the product of internal contradictions within the political, economic, and mass 
media structures. On the one hand, Soeharto had to integrate the economy more deeply 
with the global capitalist system to strengthen the economy. This was strategically 
significant for the regime’s survival, since economic prosperity had been its main source 
of legitimacy. On the other hand, the economy’s proliferating links to global capital 
markets had made the regime more vulnerable to external pressures and changes, among 
others to capital mobility, as a direct consequence of the changes in risk perception by the 
parties involved. The “Press during the May Revolution” research (Hidayat et al., 2000) 
shows that under these circumstances the phenomenon of rumors indeed mattered. Again, 
it could be seen as another effort to indirectly compel the Media to carry out their 
responsibility; otherwise the Media would lose ground in their competition against the 
rumors that further proved to negatively affect Indonesia’s currency (the Rupiah) and 
forced people to queue and face empty supermarket shelves. It also clearly shows that in 
political communication as a research field, the media forms not typically included in 
political communication research (sometimes called “non-mediated communication”) 
certainly deserve more attention, especially in a country like Indonesia whose society is 
famous for its so-called “high-context” culture. By way of an example, under the 
domination of Javanese culture, it is taboo to make personal matters related to the first 
family public in the media.  As a result, rumor might be the only medium that fits this 
situation.   
 
3.c.  The Reform Era 
“Reformasi” (Reformation) continues to be the buzzword of the Post-Soeharto Era. 
The subsequent administrations -- under massive internal and external pressures for 
reform -- gradually freed the market, the society and the media from state intervention. 
The Market was increasingly liberalized through a series of  “jungle clearing operations” 
in order to end a web of politically well-connected business privileges and monopolies 
that surrounded Soeharto’s inner circle. The newly liberated civil society also expressed 
itself through the rise of non-governmental organizations, independent labor unions, a 
more independent press council, and some forty new journalist associations. As to the 
media sector, the process of liberalization has included a series of deregulations, and 
more importantly, the liquidation of the Information Ministry, which was one of the 
central features of Soeharto’s authoritarian corporatism, responsible for a long record of 
press bans. One year after the resignation of Soeharto, the Parliament passed a new, 
liberating Press Law (1999) that, among other things, eliminated licensing requirements, 
revoked the government’s ability to ban publications, guaranteed freedom of the press, 
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and even imposed a stiff two-year prison penalty on anyone acting against the law by 
deliberately taking actions which could obstruct the work of the press.  In short, from the 
interplay in the Media Performance Model it can be seen that the tendency that the 
Market, the Civil Society, and the Media would like to see less government interference 
in their arenas. Two questions still need to be addressed in this era: Firstly, whether the 
Market and Civil Society interact on an equal basis, and secondly, whether Civil Society 
interacts equally with the Media, meaning that the Media encourage the establishment 
and the development of Civil Society while at the same time the latter encourages citizens 
to be active information gatherers and processors, and ensures that the Media carry out 
their responsibility.  
Some initial studies in the first and fourth chapter show similarities with the 
development of broadcasting in the United States: the Indonesian, as well as the 
American, public was easily trapped into “the fallacy of the two-model choice.” The 
public is fed up with a system that is unashamedly filled with government propaganda 
and views the current libertarian program making as the only alternative. This has 
brought in programs such as bloody crime reporting, programs focusing on the 
supernatural or magic, celebrity gossip shows, imported and Indonesian versions of 
“telenovelas,” and other programs produced or bought for rating considerations only. 
Each element in the Media Performance Model seems to aim at a different level of Media 
Accountability. The Parliament, as a legislative counterpart to the government, tried to 
draft the formal regulation stipulating how broadcasting companies should be structured 
and how they should function (political accountability), among others by fully 
acknowledging public and community broadcasting in addition to commercial stations. 
This recognition became law on November 28, 2002. Most media owners and some 
significant parties among the media practitioners rejected this political accountability, 
and put forward full market accountability instead.  
Civil society, described in the action research of the fourth chapter, made every 
effort to compel political and public accountability: i.e., requesting the Media to 
maintain a more direct relationship with citizens, in addition to their relationship with the 
Market and the State. The action research in the fourth chapter also illustrates that the 
public tends to choose community broadcasting in the first place, followed by the public 
broadcasting as the appropriate media to be held responsible politically and publicly.  
The action research in the fourth chapter also strongly demonstrates that the 
paradigm of working with the people (introduced & suggested by Cohen & Uphoff, 
1980), especially by listening to the local voices and never trying to persuade the 
informants to formulate their assessments according to any analysis model, proved well-
suited to the local contexts in (so far) more than fifteen provinces across Indonesia.  
The six findings and the thematization of the data as well as the answers to the 
questions raised in the action research of the fourth chapter were in line with the four 
general themes of the theoretical perspectives for community media (advanced by 
Jankowski, 2002), i.e. democratic theory, cultural identity, the community, and the 
operational environment. In the fourth chapter, the operational environment is visualized 
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in a model based upon McQuail’s Performance Model adapted to the Indonesian case and 
applied to public and community broadcasting.  
The action research in the fourth chapter also shows an urgent need to address the 
forms, institutional aspects, and mechanisms for the public to exercise their rights and 
duties to compel the fulfillment of Media Responsibility. So far, there are two 
alternatives: First, the LCF (Local Consultative Forum) in which the locals could develop 
cooperation among multi stakeholders in planning and producing programs, as well as in 
evaluating media performance; Second, the Supervisory Body (Dewan Pengawas), 
already endorsed in the Broadcasting Law. 
One of the problems voiced by the local media practitioners in the  action research 
(described in the fourth chapter) was related to what Cees Hamelink calls “cultural 
synchronization,” which might become the central threat to cultural autonomy altogether. 
Cultural synchronization implies that the decisions regarding cultural development in a 
given country or community are made in accordance with the interests and needs of a 
powerful central nation and imposed with subtle albeit devastating effectiveness and 
without regard for the adaptive necessities of the dependent nation or community. Multi-
level cultural synchronization is going on in accordance with the national tastes and 
modes of program making (including news) throughout Indonesia; as well as in 
accordance with the global tastes and modes of program making, especially from 
America and other Western countries. 
Our continuous action-research efforts successfully promoted the establishment of 
Indonesia’s first Broadcasting Commission (KPI) on December 2003. This independent 
regulatory body’s mission is to monitor closely, on behalf of the public, the 
implementation of the responsibility of the media and compel the media to comply, 
where appropriate.  
On the one hand, as an illustration of the still intense interplays, recent history 
shows that the State Ministry of Information and Communication (a part of the 
government’s executive branch) has consistently tried to weaken the position and the 
authority of the KPI in such a way that it requires consultation with the State Ministry 
before making important decisions, especially when it comes to granting licenses. On the 
other hand, the KPI together with civil society elements have tried to block these State 
Ministry’s efforts. At the same time, the KPI has invited the media practitioners from 
commercial, public, and community stations to discuss jointly the assigned and 
contracted responsibilities as well as the political and public accountabilities of each 
media type that could be adopted as regulations by the KPI later on. Media owners and 
practitioners of commercial stations have also produced a guidance document on their 
self-assigned responsibilities, which received some objections from the KPI and civil 
society elements.  
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4. Community Media 
The community media practitioners are still attempting to formulate their vision of 
their responsibilities, their public and professional accountability. Their efforts have 
received support from academics and from civil society elements, as shown in the first 
National Conference on Community Broadcasting held by the Department of 
Communication, University of Indonesia, in January 2004.   
The National Conference was attended by 34 representatives of community radio 
stations throughout Indonesia. The academics who attended the conference came from 
the Indonesian Communication Association (ISKI) and five main communication 
departments in Indonesia. The elements of civil society attending the event represented, 
among others, the Press Council, the Indonesian Journalists Association, the Alliance of 
Independent Journalists, the Association of Local Television Stations, as well as the Press 
and Broadcasting Communities. Surprisingly some staff members from the Association 
of Private Television Stations and the Association of Commercial Radio Stations also 
participated in the conference. In general, it has always been widely believed that the 
commercial media sector does not support the community media since the latter could be 
seen as threats towards the commercial radio and TV stations, given the scarcity of 
frequencies as well as the fierce competition to generate advertising revenues. Their 
presence, although in very few numbers (only five people in total), showed that every 
institution has its own dynamic and that the attitudes of the individual members may 
differ from the general stance of the commercial media sector. From the government side, 
the State Ministry of Information and Communication failed to participate. Instead an 
official was sent to read the Minister’s keynote speech, which turned out – as usual - to 
be very normative and generally emphasized the limitations and obligations of the 
community media rather than their rights as reflections of the citizen’s media. 
Fortunately, another representative of the government side, i.e. the Director of Politics 
and Communication affairs of the Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) presented 
his office as a strong proponent of the community media for their merits in the new 
climate of democratization in Indonesia. The participation of five international speakers 
and observers also demonstrated the support from the international community concerned 
with the development of community media as the basis for decentralization and bottom-
up communication in Indonesia’s Reform Era. Two of them came from the 
Communication Department of Nijmegen University, one from the Dutch public 
broadcasting service, one represented the World Bank (the United States Agency for 
International Development), and another represented the TIFA Foundation. In short, the 
solidarity and support shown were decidedly promising for the future of community 
media in Indonesia.  
Nonetheless, the lack of concrete outcomes of this National Conference and 
following meetings show that it seemingly has been much more difficult for the 
community media pioneers and practitioners to define their media output, quality 
dimension, distinctiveness, and how to assure a truly community approach than their 
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painstaking struggle for acknowledgement by the government! The Program 
Commission, established to discuss the future output of community media, could not 
come to an agreement except stating that news, current affairs, and cultural programs 
should be central program genres. Some Commission members emphasized that 
instructional programs or practical tips can help community members deal with their real 
problems in daily life (ranging from problems faced in the rice fields to the red tape at the 
local government bureaucracies). A few members asserted that entertainment, even 
though only in the form of “karaoke,” can significantly help lighten the burdens of daily 
life.    
Regarding the quality dimension, the Program Commission unanimously agreed 
that the reliability of news and current affairs programs, the compatibility of cultural 
programs with authentic cultural values, as well as the contribution of the programs to the 
process of empowering the locals are paramount. This is in line with what they think of 
distinctiveness between the community media on the one hand and the commercial 
stations on the other, i.e. each community radio should install a so-called “Community 
Supervisory Board” that will monitor and assess the performance of the station in relation 
to the reliability of the news and current affairs, the compatibility of the cultural 
programs with the local cultural values, as well as the dynamic definition of 
empowerment of community members. Some Commission members strongly suggested 
that the community media become self-supporting in terms of program supply: depending 
on outsourcing would make the community station too similar to their commercial 
counterparts.  
The Managerial Commission expressed its concerns as to feasibility, specifically 
regarding steady financing and professional staffing. Most members did not agree with 
the suggestion to ask for some allocations of local government budgets since it might 
only lead to higher dependence on the local government. Instead they recommended 
further exploration of local advertising sources and other types of revenue. In short, this 
National Conference clearly illustrates the deductive approach of this dissertation: 
Departing from the general situation of recent political communication concerns, it flows 
into the specific case of Indonesian locals as active citizens who gather and process 
information, current affairs as well as culture through their own media. Notwithstanding 
the promising discourse and spirit, a serious question, inspired by Colle & Roman (2002) 
remains: “Can they make it happen?” 
The following is an example: it will be very likely that other factors in the Media 
Performance Model, i.e. the Government and the Market forces, (fully or partially) reject 
the draft declaration signed by the community media initiators (and supported by 
elements of Civil Society). Hence the community media practitioners might feel 
abandoned. Hamelink (1994) already anticipates this phenomenon and reminds us that 
empowerment cannot be passively enjoyed, but instead has to be actively achieved and 
safeguarded. According to him, even under international law (most macro contexts), the 
individual has duties towards the community. People cannot expect others (the state or 
the media) always to defend their rights and liberties. If people do not actively engage in 
the battle for their empowerment, they should not be surprised to find themselves one day 
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totally disempowered. Uniquely, if we put Colle & Roman’s question together with 
Hamelink’s reminder, the answer then will (again) depend on how empowered the people 
become after an action-research is accomplished, so that they are capable of fighting for 
themselves in the near future. 
 
5.  Closing paragraph 
Back to the political communication field, most of the conditions examined above 
(also described in full in the second, third, and fourth chapter) are more related to the 
politics of communication or to the issue “Who gets to say what to whom?” than to the 
communication of politics. Preferably both directions should be explored in parallel. In 
view of the most recent developments in Indonesia, i.e. the 2004 Elections, the field of 
political communication studies may wrongly be considered as merely concerned with 
the effectiveness of political campaigns. This dissertation aims to serve as a significant 
reference to show a comprehensive map of the political communication field, that 
includes (but is not limited to) the following 21 types of studies (as already mapped in 
Figure 6): 
1. Studies on citizens as active information gatherers and processors;  
2. Studies on institutions and processes taking place among them; 
3. Studies on political/civic socialization among and by citizens; 
4. Studies on political/civic socialization in institutions; 
5. Studies on media reality construction and input from institutions; 
6. Studies on press freedom; 
7. Studies on diversity in media ownerships; 
8. Studies on variety of media (types); 
9. Studies on interactions in the newsroom and agenda setting; 
10. Studies on plurality of contents; 
11. Behavioral studies (after media exposure); 
12. Media effect studies; 
13. Studies on campaign and elections (using media); 
14. Studies on political/civic socialization (through media);  
15. Studies on development;  
16. Studies on audience’s feedback (political/civic socialization, using media); 
17. Studies on media uses and gratifications or selective exposure on media choices and 
content choices; 
18. Behavioral studies (without using media); 
19. Studies on (non-mediated) campaigns and elections; 
20. Studies on (non-mediated) political/civic socialization; 
21. Studies on participatory development. 
Only with this in mind, the goal of enhancing political participation and fostering 
development studies, which empower the citizen and civil society, can be achieved. 
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Last but not least, McLeod (2001), Chaffee (2001), Mutz (2001) and Iyengar 
(2001) indicate a new challenge in this field: How to apply the rise of the Internet, which 
is quite different from the traditional media and requires a different research approach, to 
political communication research? With this in view, combined with the urgency to 
explore more political communication at community levels, Jankowski (2002) reminds us 
that an area of particular theoretical importance is the emergence of “virtual” 
communities in the form of digital cities and other network facilities, and the relation of 
these virtual arenas with geographically based “organic” communities. In this context, 
Indonesia might still be a far cry from other countries whose citizens are much more 
attached to the Internet, but it does not necessarily mean that this direction should receive 
little attention. 
 
Endnotes: 
1  For a full description see Bardoel & d’Haenens (2004) and McQuail (2003). 
2   Except for two mini-theses that were relevant for the discussion section, the data include primarily 
research conducted at the PhD and Master’s degree levels at various departments of faculties of social 
and political sciences throughout Indonesia. Obviously, this categorization process has its limitations 
since the decisions taken by the panel were somehow subjective. Nevertheless, the panel members 
brought their decisions in line with six articles that included directions for studies in political 
communication. Those six articles are: one article by Dahlan, 1990; four articles by McLeod, Chaffee, 
Iyengar, and Mutz presented at a symposium in honor of the research contributions of Steven Chaffee 
(all published in 2001); and one by Ryfe (2001).   
3 For instance, data show that from 1988 to 1997 alone, total advertising expenditures increased from 
Rupiah 314 billion to Rupiah 5,094 billion (PPPI, 1993; PPPI, 1998); of the ten largest agencies in the 
world, five established offices in Indonesia (Anderson, 1980: 1259). 
4 As Vatikiotis (1994: 108) mentions, “one way in which Soeharto appeared to curb the press by early 
1990 was by having members of his own family buy into the media.” Another observer wrote that the 
entry of Indonesia’s ruling elite to the media industry was a change of political strategy to control the 
mass media (Harsono, 1997).   
5  For a full description of the relationships between the Soeharto Regime and religions (see, among 
others, Dhakidae, 2003; Hefner, 2000). 
6  The internal contradiction within the media sector refers to the fact that, on the one hand, the 
imperatives of political responses dictate the media as instrument for the homogenization of views and 
opinions. But on the other hand, the logic of economic expansion and of capital accumulation demands 
diversification of news perspectives and dissenting opinions to be sold as commodities in the audience 
market. Accordingly, as Hill and Sen observe it, the media always maintain a profitable distance from 
both the palace and the market. At a time when dissenting against the Soeharto leadership was 
increasingly fashionable among the middle classes, an increasing distance from the palace was 
profitable (Hill & Sen, 2000). 
7  Studies about the impact of rumors on economic conditions can be traced back as early as the 1950s 
(see for example, Rose, 1951). 
Concluding Remarks 
127 
 
 
8  The Soeharto Regime, as a specific type of organization of state apparatus, has been defined in various 
ways, for instance “authoritarian corporatism” (see Hewison et al., 1993). 
9  The term “Civil Society” refers to the components of society that are based on voluntary association, 
and independent of the state and of commercial relations. 
10 Unless mentioned otherwise, all interviews were conducted by the first author. 
11 For more information, see the Asiapacific Space Report at http://www.asiaonline.net/spacerep. 
12 Updated in d’Haenens, Verelst & Gazali (2000); and d’Haenens, Gazali & Verelst (2000). 
13 “Keraton” means “palace”. 
14  In the Indonesian language the words “baru” (new) and “bau” (smell) almost sound alike.  
15  The field data were gathered by a team consisting of Effendi Gazali, Turnomo Rahardjo, Sunarto, 
Enny Maryani, M. Kh. Rachman R., and Hendra Harahap. All are associated with the Graduate School 
of Communication, University of Indonesia. 
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Samenvatting 
  
Het domein van de politieke communicatie vormt de voedingsbodem voor 
voorliggende oefening om de constructie van Indonesië’s democratie, te beginnen 
op het niveau van de symbolische samenleving zoals die wordt afgebeeld en 
gecommuniceerd door de media, te ondersteunen. Men zou er immers vanuit 
kunnen gaan dat het trage democratiseringsproces in Indonesië op enige wijze te 
maken heeft met de kwaliteit (of het gebrek daaraan) van de politieke 
communicatie.  Er is inderdaad altijd weinig aandacht geweest voor politieke 
communicatie in Indonesië. Zo werden overheidspraktijken, de politieke interactie 
tussen verschillende actoren zoals die binnen redacties, nooit eerder degelijk 
onderzocht vanuit het perspectief van de politieke communicatie, laat staan dat ze 
werden beschouwd als onderwerpen van publieke zorg. Indonesiërs in het algemeen 
en overheidsambtenaren in het bijzonder verwarren nog steeds analyses van 
communicatiegerelateerde aspecten van politieke handelingen afkomstig van de 
leek met diepgaande analyse van de politieke communicatie als een academische 
oefening. Deze problemen hebben elkaar versterkt rond het moment van de 
verkiezingen in 2004, waarin de Indonesiërs voor het eerst in de gelegenheid waren 
om de parlementsleden en hun president direct te verkiezen. Plots werd “politieke 
communicatie” het toverwoord, maar het denkkader waarbinnen naar dit begrip kon 
worden verwezen ontbrak.  
Politieke communicatiewetenschappers hebben sinds lang het domein van de 
communicatie van de politiek bestudeerd, hetgeen de ene zijde van de medaille zou 
kunnen genoemd worden. Toch is het interessant om vast te stellen dat in de 
geschiedenis van Indonesië het vooral de andere zijde van die medaille is, nl. de 
communicatiepolitiek, die de drijvende kracht achter de politiek van het land is 
gebleken. Al in de Nederlandse koloniale tijd werd de relatie tussen de autoriteiten 
en de media steevast gekenmerkt door conflicten en onderdrukking.  
Tegen deze achtergrond poogt het voorliggende onderzoek het theoretische 
gebrek in de ontwikkeling van het veld van de politieke communicatie in Indonesië 
te ondervangen aan de hand van de presentatie van een allesomvattend Model van 
het Politieke Communicatieveld dat beide kanten van de politieke communicatie 
bestrijkt. De voedingsbodem voor dit model is gevonden in een eenvoudiger model 
dat ook in essentie de mogelijkheid biedt om een bredere blik op politieke 
communicatie te werpen. Het “Media Performance Model” beschrijft de continue 
wisselwerking tussen vier krachten of (f)actoren, d.w.z. de overheid, de markt, de 
burgers en de media. De resultaten (op een geven moment in de tijd) worden dus 
gevisualiseerd door wat de media doen, d.w.z. de “media performance”: de externe 
wisselwerking tussen deze (f)actoren beïnvloedt en levert de input voor de 
onderlinge interactie van één van de (f)actoren binnen de mediaorganisatie, 
enzovoorts.   
Het is de bedoeling dat het voorgestelde Model van het Veld van de 
Politieke Communicatie het werk van anderen, zoals McQuail (1992), Hidayat & 
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Sendjaja (2002), en Bardoel & d’Haenens (2004) aanvult. Hoewel het vooral de 
hedendaagse gemedieerde politieke communicatie voor ogen heeft, biedt het model 
ook de mogelijkheid om niet-gemedieerde vormen van politieke communicatie te 
onderzoeken.  Als men de rol van de media wegdenkt, dan treden de andere drie 
(f)actoren immers eveneens in wisselwerking in een niet-gemedieerde omgeving.  
Het voorliggende onderzoek illustreert de noodzaak om mediahandelingen, 
gebundeld onder de noemer “media performance”, te verbinden met noties van 
mediaverantwoordelijkheid en -verantwoording. Mediaverantwoordelijkheid 
(opgelegd, toegekend, zelfbepaald of verworpen) zal de richtingen aangeven die de 
media zullen inslaan om de verwachtingen van het publiek in te lossen, dit terwijl 
de (politieke, markt-, publieksgerelateerde en professionele) verantwoording de 
richtingen zullen tonen die burgers kunnen volgen om actief de media ertoe aan te 
zetten om hun verwachtingen in te lossen, dit alles met als bedoeling om de 
communicatiepolitiek zo gunstig mogelijk te maken voor alle geledingen in de 
samenleving.  
Uitgerust met een inzichtelijke kaart van politieke communicatie, onderzoekt 
voorliggende studie concrete operationaliseringen van mediahandelingen, 
mediaverantwoordelijkheid en -verantwoording tijdens de laatste 20 jaar van 
politieke communicatie in Indonesië: eerst in het algemeen (in het eerste hoofdstuk), 
dan meer specifiek in de televisiesector (in het tweede hoofdstuk), in de lokale 
kranten en radiostations (derde hoofdstuk) en in de onderhandelingen tussen het 
publiek en lokale media (vierde hoofdstuk). De “media performance” was 
bestudeerd gedurende drie opeenvolgende periodes die het Indonesië van de laatste 
20 jaar hebben gekleurd: De Soeharto-periode (beter gekend als de Nieuwe Orde), 
de meirevolutie in 1998, en de Hervormingsperiode (na de val van Soeharto op 21 
mei, 1998).  
Het eerste hoofdstuk onderzoekt de media-industrie en kijkt naar de aard van 
het onderzoek op het terrein van de politieke communicatie in Indonesië gedurende 
en betreffende de drie onderzochte periodes. Daar waar het onderzoek tijdens het 
Soeharto-tijdperk ervan uitging dat de mediamakers louter ‘speelbal’ waren in de 
handen van de overheid en de marktwerking, is onderzoek rond de meirevolutie in 
1998 gestart met een nieuwe, multidisciplinaire aanpak, die de wisselwerking tussen 
structuur en een handelende factor in de media-industrie erkent. De periode van de 
hervorming bood de gelegenheid om aan te raken wat voorheen als taboe werd 
beschouwd in de politieke communicatie. Maar tot dusver blijken de onderzoekers 
zelf niet al te enthousiast om innovatieve projecten te ondernemen (bv. over de rol 
van het leger in de overgangsfase). Op dezelfde manier toonden de media tijdens de 
verkiezingen van 2004 duidelijk aan dat ze nog steeds op zoek zijn naar geschikte 
manieren om op een professionele en verantwoordelijke wijze op te treden naar de 
machtsgroepen toe en ook naar hun publiek, nadat ze zo aan banden waren gelegd 
gedurende al die jaren.  
Het tweede hoofdstuk schetst het snel veranderende Indonesische 
televisielandschap in de jaren ’90: tot zowat tien jaar geleden was het Indonesische 
publiek nog gewend om enkel naar de staatsomroep TVRI te kunnen kijken. 
Tegenwoordig kan men kiezen tussen vijf bijgekomen commerciële stations. 
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Diepte-interviews met lokale nieuwsmakers en beleidsmakers in zowel de 
staatsomroep als de commerciële televisiestations hebben de twee grootste 
problemen aangegeven die als obstakels golden voor nieuwsproductie tijdens het 
Soeharto-tijdperk (inclusief tot z’n laatste stuiptrekkingen): alomtegenwoordige 
politieke controle die de stations beperkte tot weinig risicovolle berichtgeving met 
doorgaans weinig nieuwswaarde (d.w.z. human interest en misdaadverhalen) en een 
gebrek aan ervaring met televisiejournalistiek.  
Het derde hoofdstuk gaat in op de inhoud en de dynamiek eigen aan de 
berichtgeving in lokale kranten en radiostations, teruggaand op de periode tot en 
onmiddellijk na de val van Soeharto. Er zijn diepte-interviews gehouden met 
uitgevers en beleidsmakers van de kranten en met de staf van verschillende 
radiostations in vier steden waar de mediaconsumptie en andere mediagerelateerde 
data voorheen zelden waren verzameld. De bevindingen toonden 
alomtegenwoordige politieke controle aan op twee niveaus – dat van de lokale en 
centrale overheid. Precies omwille van die controle erkenden de lokale 
mediamakers hun belemmeringen, maar was hun streven erop gericht om zoveel 
mogelijk vrijheid te verkrijgen binnen het systeem. Het onderzoek toont aan dat in 
het licht van deze contextveranderingen een genuanceerde visie op handelende 
(f)actoren binnen een structuur meer inzichten biedt dan de zuiver 
instrumentalistische en structuralistische orthodoxe visies.  
Aan het eind van het Soeharto-regime dat gekenmerkt werd door 
verandering en een hang naar een libertaire marktoriëntatie, hebben NGO’s, 
communicatiewetenschappers en politici gepoogd een platform te bieden waarop  de 
discussie rond en de juridische implementering van publieke en lokale omroep in 
Indonesië kunnen worden gevoerd. Het vierde hoofdstuk bespreekt de resultaten 
van focusgroepdiscussies die gehouden zijn juist met als doel om de 
decentralisering van de omroep in Indonesië te begeleiden. De gesprekspartners 
waren lokale mensen en vertegenwoordigers uit diverse geledingen in tien 
provincies verspreid over het hele land. De publieke hoorzittingen toonden aan hoe 
representatieve groepen in de samenleving kunnen en moeten betrokken worden in 
onderhandelingen rond mediabeleid die zich tot dusver enkel hebben afgespeeld op 
het nationale niveau. Transnationale stromen van mediaproducten versus 
deregulering van nationale omroepvergunningen en decentralisering van de 
publieke en lokale media zijn bediscussieerd vanuit een geïntegreerd perspectief.  
Al bij al hebben de bevindingen van het voorliggende onderzoek aangetoond 
dat, in het licht van de dominantie van de overheid over de andere (f)actoren, geen 
enkel mediatype op een afdoende wijze verantwoordelijkheid kon dragen of 
verantwoording kon afleggen onder het Soeharto-regime. Gedurende de 
meirevolutie in 1998 zijn de burgers en de markt (die opener was voor invloeden 
van buitenaf) er op verbluffende wijze in geslaagd om de overheidscontrole te 
bevechten of de overheidslegitimiteit aan te tasten. Het gevolg was dat de overheid 
opgelegde, afgesproken en zelfopgelegde verantwoording mogelijk maakte. Precies 
omdat de Indonesische democratie nog pril is en net was hersteld in 1998 na de val 
van Soeharto, moeten alle elementen in het Media Performance Model nog leren 
hoe ze hun verantwoordelijkheden moeten opnemen en hoe ze moeten omgaan met 
mechanismen om verantwoording te meten. Het parlement (de wetgevende tak van 
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de overheid) samen met de burgers zijn blijkbaar succesvol gebleken in het opzetten 
van mechanismen die de politieke en publieke verantwoording verhogen. De 
juridische erkenning van de publieke en lokale omroep evenals de oprichting van 
een onafhankelijke regulerende instantie, de KPI (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia of 
het Indonesische Commissariaat voor de Media) zou kunnen worden beschouwd als 
een vroegtijdig bewijs van deze paradigmawissel. De KPI, in naam van het publiek, 
heeft als taak om de implementering van mediaverantwoordelijkheid van dichtbij 
gade te slaan en, waar noodzakelijk, bij de media de naleving van hun 
verantwoordelijkheid af te dwingen. De KPI heeft ook de mediamakers van 
allerhande stations uitgenodigd om samen aan de tafel te gaan zitten om de 
opgelegde en aangegane verantwoordelijkheden evenals de politieke en publieke 
verantwoording voor elk mediatype met het oog op het behoud van een vergunning 
te bediscussiëren. Tegelijkertijd hebben de media-eigenaren en mediamakers van 
commerciële stations een document opgesteld ter oriëntering van hun zelf 
opgelegde verantwoordelijkheden. De publieke en lokale mediamakers zijn nog 
steeds aan het proberen om hun visies terzake te formuleren. Kortom, het proces is 
nog in volle gang. Daarom besteedt voorliggend onderzoek centrale aandacht aan 
“actieonderzoek” waarin de burgers samenwerken met gewone mensen, de lokale 
gemeenschap. Het concept van actie is parallel aan Hamelinks advies (1994), nl. dat 
mensen niet kunnen verwachten dat anderen (d.w.z. de overheid of de media) altijd 
hun rechten en vrijheden verdedigen. Daarenboven herinnert Colle (2002) ons eraan 
dat om het even welke inspanning ter ontwikkeling van de lokale gemeenschap, met 
inbegrip van de lancering van een lokaal radio- of televisiestation, de versterking 
van de lokale gemeenschap zelf zou bewerkstelligen en de leden van die 
gemeenschap een kans zou bieden op langdurige ondersteuning.   
De concepten van mediawerking, mediaverantwoordelijkheid en -verant-
woording geïntroduceerd bij het publiek in Indonesië zouden hen moeten helpen 
hun nog prille democratie te analyseren en hen in staat stellen om actie te 
ondernemen.  
 
 
 
Summary 
  
The field of political communication constituted the soil for the present 
exercise of revisiting the construction of Indonesia’s democracy – starting with the 
level of the symbolic society as portrayed and communicated through the media – 
since one could assume that the slow process of building democracy in Indonesia is 
somehow related to the quality (or lack thereof) of political communication. Indeed 
very little attention was paid so far to political communication in Indonesia. For 
instance, governmental practices, political interactions among interest groups, 
including those in the newsrooms, were never appropriately analyzed from a 
political communication angle, let alone considered a matter of public concern. 
Indonesians in general, and Government officials and politicians in particular, keep 
confusing layman’s analyses of communication-related aspects of political practices 
with the thorough analysis of political communication as an academic exercise. 
Certainly, these hindrances have cumulatively caused a more serious problem which 
reached a peak just recently, around the 2004 Elections, in which Indonesians for 
the first time got the opportunity to directly vote for the members of parliament and 
the president. Suddenly, “political communication” became a “buzzword,” but the 
specific framework within which to refer to it was lacking.  
Political communication scholars have long explored the communication of 
politics, what could be called “the first face of the coin.” It is interesting, however, 
to observe that in Indonesian history, the second face of political communication, 
i.e., the politics of communication, has been the predominant force driving the 
country’s politics. As early as the Dutch colonial time, conflicts and suppression 
continued to be the constants in the relationship between the authorities and the 
media.  
Against this background, the present research attempts to address the 
theoretical shortage in the development of the political communication field in 
Indonesia by providing a comprehensive Model of the Political Communication 
Field embracing the two faces of political communication. The breeding ground for 
this model was found in a simpler model that is still capable of representing the 
larger map of the political communication field in its essence. The Media 
Performance Model describes a continuous interplay among four power entities, 
also called (f)actors, i.e. Government, Market, Civil Society and the Media. The 
result of the internal interplay within each (f)actor will inevitably impact on the 
external interplay among these four (f)actors. Therefore, the outcomes (at a given 
period in time) are visualized in what the media do, referred to by the so-called 
“media performance.” In turn, the impact of the external interplay is then brought 
into the internal media environment as input for the internal interplay of each 
(f)actor in the media organization, and so forth.  
The presented Model of the Political Communication Field is expected to 
complement the efforts of others, as exemplified in the works by McQuail (1992), 
Hidayat & Sendjaja (2002), and Bardoel & d’Haenens (2004). Although it puts 
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emphasis on the mediated political communication usually taking place in this 
modern era, the design of the model uniquely provides opportunities to analyze non-
mediated political communication as well. Taking away the role of the Media (in 
the middle), the other three (f)actors could be seen interplaying in a non-mediated 
environment. 
The present research illustrates the necessity to connect Media Performance to 
the concepts of Media Responsibility and Accountability. Media Responsibility 
(whether assigned, contracted, self-designed, or denied) will show the directions the 
media are taking in meeting the public’s expectations, while media Accountability 
(political, market, public, and professional) will show the directions citizens can 
take to actively compel the media to meet their expectations, so as to render politics 
of communication beneficial to all elements in society.  
Equipped with a comprehensive map of political communication, the present 
research examines concrete operationalizations of media performance, 
responsibility and accountability taking place during the recent 20 years of political 
communication in Indonesia in general (in the first chapter), in the television sector 
(second chapter), in the local newspapers and radio stations (third chapter) and in 
the negotiations between the public and the community media (fourth chapter). The 
performance of the media was examined during the three subsequent eras that have 
colored Indonesia during the last 20 years – the Soeharto Era (better known as the 
New Order Era), the May 1998 Revolution, and the Reform Era (after the downfall 
of Soeharto on May 21, 1998). 
The first chapter examines the media industry and looks at the nature of 
political communication research in Indonesia during and concerning the three 
above-mentioned periods. While research during the Soeharto Era acknowledged 
Media makers as mere ‘toys’ in the hands of the Government and the Market forces, 
Research on the May 1998 Revolution and during the Reform Era started adopting a 
new, multi-disciplinary approach, recognizing the interplay between structure and 
agency in the media industry. The Reform Era indeed provided an opportunity to 
open up what was previously considered taboo in political communication. But so 
far the researchers themselves do not seem too enthusiastic to undertake innovative 
projects (e.g., on the role of the Armed Forces in the transition era). Likewise, the 
media during the 2004 election clearly proved to be still looking for appropriate 
ways to behave in a professional and responsible fashion with regard to the power 
groups and their audiences, after being held on a very short leash for so many years.     
The second chapter sketches the fast-changing Indonesian television 
landscape in the 1990s: until a decade ago Indonesian audiences were used to 
watching the state-owned TVR channel only. Nowadays they can choose among 
five additional commercial stations. In-depth interviews with local newsmakers and 
policy makers in both state television and commercial television stations highlighted 
two major problem areas for news-making characterizing the Soeharto regime (up 
until its last convulsions): omnipresent political control restricting stations to cover 
low-risk news items that usually also have less news value (i.e., human interest and 
crime stories) and lack of experience with television journalism.  
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The third chapter elaborates on the content and media management 
dynamics in local newspapers and radio stations going back to the period leading up 
to and immediately after the fall of Soeharto. In-depth interviews were conducted 
with editorial policy-makers of the newspapers and with various radio station staff 
members in four cities where media consumption and other data had rarely been 
documented. The findings revealed omnipresent political control at two levels – 
local and central Government. Because of this control, the local media personnel 
acknowledged their limitations, but strove for as much freedom as possible within 
the system. The research shows that in this context changes are taking place in both 
agency and structure and supports the thesis that there is an interplay between 
agency and structure as opposed to the instrumentalist and structuralist orthodoxies. 
At the end of the Soeharto regime characterized by the shift to a libertarian 
market orientation, a consortium of NGO’s, communication scholars academics and 
politicians have been trying to establish a ‘middle ground’ for discussions and legal 
implementation of public and community broadcasting in Indonesia. The fourth 
chapter discusses the outcomes of focus group discussions held in an effort to 
establish a platform for decentralization of broadcasting in Indonesia. These groups 
consisted of local people and spokespersons of constituent groups in ten provinces 
throughout Indonesia. The public hearings showed how constituent groups in 
society can and should be involved in media policy negotiations which so far 
predominantly took place at the national level only. Issues such as transnational 
flows of media products versus deregulation of national broadcasting licenses and 
decentralization of broadcasting as well as political economy of public and 
community media were looked upon from an integrated perspective.  
In all, the findings of the present research showed among other things that, 
given the dominance of the Government over the other elements, no type of Media 
Responsibilities and Accountabilities could be carried out properly during the 
Soeharto Era. During the May 1998 Revolution, Civil society and the Market (that 
was more open to global influences) managed to fight back or corrode the 
Government control or undermine its legitimacy in astonishing ways. As a result, 
the Government made the fulfillment of assigned, contracted, and self-assigned 
responsibilities, as well as public and professional accountabilities possible. The 
Indonesian democracy was just restored in 1998 after the fall of Soeharto. 
Meanwhile, all elements in the Media Performance Model are still learning how to 
carry out their responsibilities and deal with mechanisms for measuring 
accountability. The parliament (legislative branch of the Government) together with 
the civil society seem to be successful in establishing mechanisms which enhance 
political and public accountability. The legal acknowledgement of public and 
community broadcasting as well as the establishment of an independent regulatory 
body, KPI (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia or the Indonesian Broadcasting 
Commission) could be seen as some preliminary proof of this change in paradigms. 
KPI, on behalf of the public, is supposed to closely monitor the implementation of 
the responsibilities of the media, and, where appropriate, compel the media. KPI has 
also invited the media practitioners from all kinds of stations to jointly discuss the 
assigned and contracted responsibilities as well as the political and public 
accountabilities of each media type that will be given a license. At the same time, 
media owners and practitioners of commercial stations have launched a guidance 
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document on their self-assigned responsibilities. The public and community media 
practitioners are still trying to formulate their vision on their responsibilities, public 
and professional accountabilities. 
In short, the process is still underway. Therefore, the present research 
favours the direction of “action research” in which elements of civil society work 
together with the people at the grassroots level, the community. The notion of  
action is in line with Hamelink’s advice (1994) that people cannot expect others (i.e. 
the State or the Media) to always defend their rights and liberties. Furthermore, 
Colle (2002) reminds us that any effort in community development, including the 
set-up of a community radio or television station, should foster the empowerment of 
the community itself and provide the community members with a chance to achieve 
long-term sustainability.  
The concepts of Media Performance, Media Responsibility and 
Accountability introduced to the public in Indonesia should help them analyze their 
society which is still very much “under construction,” and enable them to take 
action accordingly.  
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LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
Number 32 of 2002 
Concerning 
BROADCASTING 
 
 
 
 
NATIONAL INFORMATION AGENCY 
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
 
 
 
 
BY THE GRACE OF GOD THE ALMIGHTY 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, 
 
Considering: a.  That freedom to express one’s opinion and to obtain information through 
broadcasting as the manifestation of human rights in society, nation, and State life, 
is carried out responsibly, harmoniously and on balance between freedom and 
equality in using the rights based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution; 
b. That radio frequency spectrum is a limited natural resource and a national asset that 
must be kept and protected by the State and be used for the most of people’s welfare 
in accordance to the objectives of the August 17,1945 Proclamation; 
c. That to maintain national integration, diversity of the people of Indonesia as well as the 
implementation of regional autonomy, a national broadcasting system needs to be set up that 
guarantees the attainment of national information system that is fair, even, and balanced in 
order to achieve social justice for all the people of Indonesia; 
d. That broadcasting institutions are mass communication media that have important 
roles in social, cultural, political, and economical life, have freedom and 
responsibilities in carrying out their functions as media of information, education, 
entertainment, as well as social control and bond; 
e. That a broadcast that is transmitted and received at the same time, simultaneously 
and free, has significant influence in making people’s opinion, attitude, and 
behavior, therefore broadcasting organizations are obliged to be responsible in 
maintaining moral values, ethics, culture, personality, and national unity based on the 
principals of The One and Only One God and Fair and Civilized Humanity; 
f. That based on the considerations as mentioned in letter a, b, c, d, and e, Law 
Number 24 Year 1997 regarding Broadcasting is viewed as no longer suitable, 
therefore needs to be retracted and changed with a new law. 
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In view of: 1. Article  20 clause (1), (2), and clause (4), Article 21 clause (1), Article    28F, Article 31 
clause (1), Article 32, Article 33 clause (3), and Article 36 of 1945 Constitution as changed 
with The Fourth Amendment To The 1945 Constitution; 
  2. Law Number 8/1992 regarding Film (State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 32/1992, 
Supplement to State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 3473); 
  3. Law Number 5/1999 concerning Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business 
Competition (State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 33/1999, Supplement to State 
Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 3817); 
  4. Law Number 8/1999 regarding Consumers Protection (State Gazette of Republic of 
Indonesia No. 42/1999, Supplement to State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 3821); 
  5. Law Number 22/1999 regarding Regional Government (State Gazette of Republic of 
Indonesia No. 60/1999, Supplement to State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 3839); 
  6. Law Number 36/1999 regarding Telecommunications (State Gazette of Republic of 
Indonesia No. 154/1999, Supplement to State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 3881); 
  7. Law Number 39/1999 regarding Human Rights (State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 
165/1999, Supplement to State Gazette No. 3886);  
   8. Law Number 40/1999 regarding Press (State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 
166/1999, Supplement to State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 3887); 
  9. Law Number 19/2002 regarding Copyrights (State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 
85/2002, Supplement to State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 4220); 
 
 
With the mutual consent of 
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
and 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
 
HAS DECIDED: 
 
To enact:  LAW CONCERNING BROADCASTING 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 1 
Meant in this Act by: 
1.   Broadcast is a message or series of messages in the form of audio, visual, or audio and visual or that in the 
form of graphics, characters, both interactive as well as non-interactive, that is receivable through broadcast 
receiver apparatus.  
2. Broadcasting is the activity of transmitting broadcast through transmission facilities and/or transmitter 
tools on land, at sea or in space by using radio frequency spectrum through the air, cable, and/or other 
media in order to be received at the same time and simultaneously by the public through broadcast receiver 
apparatus. 
3. Radio broadcasting is an audio mass communication media that channels ideas and information in the form 
of audio publicly and openly, as systematic and continuous programs. 
4. Television broadcasting is an audiovisual mass communication media that channels ideas and information 
in the form of audio and visual publicly, both openly as well as closed, as systematic and continuous 
programs. 
5. Advertising broadcast is broadcast of information that is commercial and social service on the availability 
of services, goods, and ideas that can be used by the public with or without recompense for the 
broadcasting institution concerned. 
6. Commercial broadcast is commercial advertising broadcast that is broadcasted through radio or television 
broadcasting with the aim to introduce, socialize, and/or promote goods or services to the targeted public to 
influence consumers to use the offered products.  
7. Public Service Announcement Broadcast is non-commercial advertising broadcast that is broadcasted 
through radio or television broadcasting with the aim to introduce, socialize, and/or promote ideas, ideals, 
advices, and/or other messages to the people to influence the public to do and/or behave in accordance to 
the message of the advertising. 
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8. Radio Frequency Spectrum is the electromagnetic waves that is used for broadcasting and moves in the air 
and space without modified conductor facilities, is a public domain and limited natural resource. 
9. Broadcasting Institutions are broadcasting organizers, either public broadcasting institutions, private broadcasting 
institutions, community broadcasting institutions as well as subscribed broadcasting institutions that in carrying out 
their tasks, functions, and responsibilities are to be guided by the prevailing statutory regulations. 
10. National Broadcasting System is the system of national broadcasting organizations based on the provisions 
of the prevailing statutory regulations that aims to attain the basis, objectives, functions, and direction of 
national broadcasting as the effort to achieve the national ideals as mentioned in Pancasila and 1945 
Constitution. 
11. National Information Systems that is fair, even, and balanced is the condition of information that is orderly, 
systematic, and harmonious especially concerning the flows of information or messages in the broadcasting 
between the central and the regions, inter-regions in Indonesia, and between Indonesia and the international 
world. 
12. Government is the Minister or other officials that are appointed by the President or Governor. 
13. Indonesia Broadcasting Commission is a state independent institution that is present in the central and in 
regions of which tasks and authorities is regulated in this Law as the manifestation of public participation 
in broadcasting sector.  
14.  Licence of Broadcasting Organization is the right granted by the State to broadcasting institutions to 
organize broadcasting. 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
PRINCIPALS, OBJECTIVES, FUNCTIONS, AND DIRECTION 
 
Article 2  
Broadcasting is organized based on Pancasila and 1945 Constitution of The Republic of Indonesia based on the 
principals of benefit, fair and even, legal assurance, security, diversity, partnership, ethics, independency, 
freedom and responsibility. 
 
Article 3  
Broadcasting is carried out aiming to strengthen national integrity, to foster personality and identity of a nation 
that is faithful to and devoted to God, to advance the intellectual life of the nation, to enhance public welfare, in 
the frame of developing independent, democratic, fair, and prosperous society, as well as developing Indonesian 
broadcasting industry. 
   
Article 4  
(1) Broadcasting as a mass communication activity has functions as the means of    
       information, education, healthy entertainment, social control and bond.  
(2) In carrying out the functions as mentioned in clause (1) broadcasting also has the aspects of economy and 
culture. 
Article 5  
Broadcasting is directed to: 
a. Highly abide by the implementation of Pancasila and 1945 Constitution; 
b. Maintain and enhance morality and religious values as well as national identity; 
c. Improve the quality of human resources; 
d. Maintain and strengthen national unity and integrity; 
e. Increase the awareness of legal obedience and national discipline; 
f. Channel public opinion and also encourage active role of society in national and regional development as 
well as in preserving the environment; 
g. Prevent ownership monopoly and support fair competition in broadcasting sector; 
h. Enhance the increase in the ability of people’s economy, achieve even distribution and strengthen 
national competitiveness in the era of globalisation; 
i. Provide information that is correct, balanced, and responsible; 
j. Enhance national culture. 
 
CHAPTER III 
BROADCASTING ORGANIZATION 
 
Part One 
General 
 
Article 6 
(1) Broadcasting is organized under one national broadcasting system. 
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(2) Under the national broadcasting system as mentioned in clause (1), the State controls radio frequency 
spectrum that is used for broadcasting organization for the most of people’s welfare. 
(3) Within the system of the national broadcasting there are broadcasting institutions and fair and integrated 
networking pattern that is developed by setting up network stations and local stations. 
(4). For broadcasting operation, a broadcasting commission is set up. 
 
Part Two 
Indonesian Broadcasting Commission 
 
Article 7 
(1) Broadcasting Commission as in Article 6 clause (4) is called Indonesian Broadcasting Commission 
(Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia), shortened as KPI. 
(2) KPI is a state independent institution, regulating matters on broadcasting. 
(3) KPI consists of Central KPI formed at the center level and Regional KPI formed at the provincial level. 
(4) In carrying out its functions, tasks, authority and duties, the House of Representatives of the Republic of 
Indonesia monitors the CENTRAL KPI, and Regional KPI is monitored by Provincial People’s 
Representative Council. 
 
Article 8  
(1) KPI as the manifestation of public participation functions to accommodate aspirations and represent public 
interests on broadcasting. 
(2) In carrying out its functions as mentioned in clause (1), KPI has authorities to: 
a. Set up broadcast program standards; 
b. Compose regulations and set up code of conducts on broadcasting; 
c. Monitor the implementation of regulations and code of conducts of broadcasting as well as the 
broadcast program standards; 
d. Impose sanctions towards violations of broadcasting regulations and code of conducts as well as 
broadcast program standards; and 
e. Perform coordination and/or cooperation with the Government, broadcasting institutions, and the 
public. 
(3) KPI has tasks and duties to:  
a. Ensure the public to get decent and correct information in accordance with human rights; 
b. Help managing the infrastructure in broadcasting sector; 
c. Help creating fair competition atmosphere among broadcasting institutions and related industries; 
d. Maintain fair, just and balanced system of information; 
e. Accommodate, investigate, and follow-up complaints, counter-statements, as well as criticisms and 
public appreciation toward broadcasting operation;  and 
f. Plan the development of human resources that guarantees professionalism in broadcasting sector. 
 
Article 9 
(1) The membership of Central KPI consists of 9 (nine) persons and the Regional KPI consists of 7 (seven) 
persons. 
(2)    Chairman and vice-chairman of KPI are elected from and by members. 
(3) Term of duty of chairman, vice-chairman and members of Central KPI and Regional KPI is 3 (three) years 
and they can be re-elected only for 1 (one) consecutive term of duty.  
(4) KPI is assisted by a Secretariat funded by the state. 
(5) In carrying out its tasks, KPI may be assisted by experts when necessary.  
(6) The Central KPI fund comes from the State Budget and the Regional KPI fund comes from the Regional 
Budget. 
 
Article 10  
(1) To become a member of KPI, one must meet the following requirements: 
a.  A citizen of the Republic of Indonesia that is devoted to the One and Only  One God; 
b.  Loyal to Pancasila and 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia; 
c. Holds a bachelor degree or possesses equal intellectual competence; 
d.  Physically and mentally healthy; 
e.  Dignified, honest, fair, and has immaculate manners; 
f.   Has concerns, knowledge and/or experience in broadcasting sector; 
g.  Not directly or indirectly involved in ownership of mass media; 
h.  Not a member of legislative and judicative bodies; 
i.   Not a government official; and 
j.  non-partisan. 
(2) Members of Central KPI are elected by the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia and 
Regional KPI are elected by Provincial People’s Representative Council upon the suggestions from public 
through an open fit and proper test. 
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(3) Members of Central KPI administratively are legalized by the President upon recommendations from the 
House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia and the Governor upon the recommendations of the 
Provincial People’s Representative Council administratively legalizes members of Regional KPI. 
(4)  A member of KPI quits because of: 
a. The end of official term; 
b. Death; 
c. Resignation; 
d. Being imprisoned following a permanent court decision; or 
e. No longer qualifies for the requirements as referred to in clause (1). 
 
 
Article 11  
(1) When a member of KPI quits from their term of office due to reasons mentioned in Article 10 clause (4) 
point’s b, c, d, and e, they shall be substituted by substitute members until the end of their term of office. 
(2) Substitution of members of Central KPI administratively is legalized by the President upon suggestion 
from the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia and members of Regional KPI are 
administratively legalized by Governor upon suggestion from Provincial People’s Representative Council. 
(3) Provisions regarding the procedures of substitution of members of KPI as mentioned in clause (1) shall be 
further regulated by KPI. 
 
Article 12 
Further provisions regarding diversification of authorities and tasks of KPI as referred to in Article 8, regulation 
of connection between Central KPI and Regional KPI, as well as substitution procedure of KPI members as 
referred to in Article 11 shall be decided by Central KPI Decree.  
 
 
Part Three  
Broadcasting Services 
 
 
Article 13 
(1) Broadcasting services consist of: 
a. Radio broadcasting services; and 
b. Television Broadcasting services. 
(2) Broadcasting services as mentioned in clause (1) are organized by: 
a. Public Broadcasting Institutions; 
b. Private Broadcasting Institutions; 
c. Community Broadcasting Institutions; and 
d. Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions. 
 
 
Part Four 
Public Broadcasting Institutions 
 
Article 14 
(1) Public Broadcasting Institutions as referred to in Article 13 clause (2) point a are in the form of state 
founded legal entities that are independent, neutral and non-commercial, and provides services for the 
interest of the public. 
(2) Public Broadcasting Institutions as referred to in clause (1) consist of Radio of Republic of Indonesia and 
Television of Republic of Indonesia, which broadcasting central station is located in the capitol of the state 
of Indonesian Republic. 
(3) Local Public Broadcasting Institutions can be established in provincial, municipality or city levels. 
(4) The supervisory board and managing directors of Public Broadcasting Institutions are established based on 
the provisions of the prevailing laws. 
(5) The supervisory boards for Radio of Republic of Indonesia and Television of Republic of Indonesia are 
determined by the President upon the recommendation of the House of Representatives of the Republic of 
Indonesia; or by Governor or Mayor upon the recommendation of Provincial People’s Representative 
Council for the provincial public broadcasting institutions after they undergo an open fit and proper test 
upon the inputs from the government and/or public. 
(6)  The number of supervisory board for Radio of Republic of Indonesia and Television of Republic of 
Indonesia is 5 (five) persons and supervisory board for Local Public Broadcasting Institution is 3 (three) 
person. 
(7)  The managing director is appointed and determined by the supervisory board. 
(8) The members of managing director and supervisory board serve for one term of 5 (five) years and can be 
re-elected only for 1 (one) consecutive term of duty. 
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(9) The central Public Broadcasting Institutions shall be supervised by the House of Representatives and the 
provincial Public Broadcasting Institutions shall be supervised by the Provincial People’s Representative 
Council. 
(10) Further provisions regarding Public Broadcasting Institutions is regulated by KPI together with the 
Government. 
 
Article 15 
(1) The Public Broadcasting Institutions are funded by: 
a. Broadcasting dues; 
b. The national or provincial Budget; 
c. Public donation; 
d. Commercials broadcast; and 
e. Other legal activities related to broadcasting operation; 
(2) In the end of every fiscal year, the Public Broadcasting Institutions are obliged to submit financial reports 
audited by public accountants and announced them on the mass media. 
 
 
Part Five  
Private Broadcasting Institutions 
 
Article 16 
(1) Private broadcasting institutions as referred to in Article 13 clause (2) point b are broadcasting institutions 
in the form of commercial Indonesia legal entities with the sole activities of providing radio or television 
broadcasting services. 
(2) Foreign citizens are not allowed to become the managers of Private Broadcasting Institutions, except in the 
financial and technical fields.    
 
Article 17 
(1) Private broadcasting institutions as referred to in Article 16 clause (1) shall be established with the initial 
capital wholly owned by the citizens and/or legal entity of Indonesia. 
(2) Private broadcasting institutions can make reinvestment and development using foreign capital with the 
amount of not more than 20% (twenty percent) of the total capital and shall be owned at least by 2 (two) 
shareholders. 
(3) Private broadcasting institutions must provide opportunities to their employees to own the company shares 
and earn the dividends.  
 
Article 18 
(1) Concentration of ownership and domination of Private Broadcasting Institution by one person or legal 
entity in one broadcasting area or several broadcasting areas is limited. 
(2) Cross ownership between Private Broadcasting Institution that operates radio broadcasting services and 
Private Broadcasting Institution that operates TV broadcasting services, between Private Broadcasting 
Institution and printed media company, between Private Broadcasting Institution and another Private 
Broadcasting Institution of different type of media, directly or indirectly, is limited.  
(3) Regulation on the numbers and the scopes of local, regional and national broadcast area both for radio and 
television broadcasting services will be arranged by KPI together with the Government. 
(4) Further provisions concerning limitation on ownership and domination as referred to in clause (1) and 
limitation on cross ownership as referred to in clause (2) will be arranged by the KPI together with the 
Government. 
 
Article 19 
Private Broadcasting Institutions are funded by: 
(1).  Commercials broadcast; and/or 
(2).  Other legal activities related to broadcasting operation. 
 
Article 20 
A Private Radio Broadcasting Services and a Private TV Broadcasting Services can only operate 1 (one) 
program through 1 (one) channel in 1 (one) scope of broadcast area.    
 
Part Six 
Community Broadcasting Institutions 
 
Article 21 
(1) Community Broadcasting Institutions as referred to in Article 13 clause (2) point c, are broadcasting 
institutions in the form of Indonesia legal entities, founded by certain communities, independent, non-
commercial, has low transmission power, has limited area scope, and intended to serve their community 
interest.  
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(2) The Community Broadcasting Institutions as referred to in clause (1) operate on the following bases:   
a. Non profit oriented and not a part of a profit oriented company; and 
b. To educate and teach the community to increase welfare by promoting programs in the field of culture, 
education and information that reflects national identity. 
(3) The Community Broadcasting Institution is a non partisan community organization that: 
a. is neither a representative of a foreign organization or institution nor a member of international 
community;   
b. is not related to illegal organizations; and 
c. is not a tool for the propaganda of certain groups or factions.   
 
Article 22 
(1) A Community Broadcasting Institution is founded by the fund contributed by a certain community and 
belongs to the community. 
(2) A Community Broadcasting Institution receives funding from donation, grants, sponsors and other legal 
sources with no strings attached. 
 
Article 23 
(1) Community Broadcasting Institutions are not allowed to receive initial fund to establish the stations and 
operational fund from foreign party. 
(2) Community Broadcasting Institutions are not allowed to run advertisings and/or other commercials 
broadcast except the PSA's. 
 
Article 24 
(1) A Community Broadcasting Institution is obliged to develop codes of ethics and regulations that must be 
known widely by the community and other members of the society. 
(2) In the case of the existence of grievance from the community or other members of the society on the 
violation of code of ethics and/or regulations, the Community Broadcasting Institution is obliged to take 
actions in accordance to guidelines and prevailing provisions. 
 
 
Part Seven 
Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions 
 
Article 25 
(1)  Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions as referred to in Article 13 clause (2) point d are broadcasting 
institutions in the form of Indonesia legal entities that only provide   subscribed broadcasting services and 
should first obtain license for subscribed broadcasting operation. 
(2) Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions as referred to in clause (1) are transmitting or distributing its broadcast 
material to its subscribers I particular through radio, television,   multimedia, or other media of 
information. 
 
Article 26  
(1) Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions as referred to in Article 25 consist of: 
a. Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions through satellites; 
b. Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions through cable; and 
c. Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions through terrestrial. 
(2) In operating their programs, Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions shall: 
a. Conduct internal censorship toward the entire content of the program to be broadcasted and/or 
distributed;   
b. Provide at least 10% (ten percent) of the channel capacity for programs from Public Broadcasting 
Institutions and Private Broadcasting Institutions; and 
c. Provide at least 1 (one) channel of domestic production program for every 10 (ten) foreign production 
programs being channeled.   
(3) Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions are funded by: 
a. Subscription fee; and 
b. Other legal activities related to broadcasting operation. 
 
Article 27 
Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions through satellites as referred to in Article 26 clause (1) point a must meet 
the following requirements: 
1) It has broadcasting scope that covers within the area of the Republic of Indonesia;  
2) It has broadcast control stations located in Indonesia; 
3) It has a satellite transmitting station located in Indonesia; 
4) It uses a satellite that has a landing right in Indonesia; and 
5) It guarantees that the program is only accessible to the subscribers. 
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Article 28 
Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions through cable and through terrestrial as referred to in Article 26 clause (1) 
point b and point c must meet the following requirements: 
a. It has broadcasting scope that covers one service area specified in the operation license issued for the 
institution; and 
b. It guarantees that the program is only accessible to the subscribers. 
 
Article 29 
(1)  Provisions as stated in Article 16 clause (2), Article 17, Article 18, Article 33 clause (1) and clause (7), 
Article 34 clause (4) and clause (5) also apply for Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions. 
(2)  Further provisions concerning procedures and requirements in obtaining license as referred to in Article 25 
clause (1) shall be arranged by the KPI together with the Government. 
 
 
 
Part Eight 
Foreign Broadcasting Institutions 
 
Article 30 
(1)  Foreign Broadcasting institutions are not allowed to be established in Indonesia. 
(2) Foreign Broadcasting institutions and foreign broadcasting office that will perform journalistic activities in 
Indonesia, either broadcasted live or recorded, must fulfill all the provisions stated in the prevailing laws.   
(3) Further provisions concerning the guidelines for coverage activities of foreign broadcasting institutions 
shall be arranged by the KPI together with the Government. 
 
 
Part Nine 
Broadcasting Stations and Coverage Areas 
 
Article 31 
(1) Broadcasting Stations that operate radio or television broadcasting services consist of network broadcasting 
station and/or local broadcasting station.   
(2) Public Broadcasting Stations can operate programs based on networking station system that covers the 
whole area of the Republic of Indonesia.     
(3) Private Broadcasting Stations can operate programs through networking station system with limited 
coverage area.  
(4) Further provisions concerning the operation of networking station system shall be arranged by the KPI 
together with the Government. 
(5) Local broadcasting station can be established in certain locations within the area of the Republic of 
Indonesia with limited coverage in the location concerned.   
(6) The majority ownership of initial capital and operation of the local broadcasting stations are primarily 
allocated to the local community where the stations are located.    
 
 
Part Ten 
Basic Plan of Broadcasting Technique and 
Technical Requirements of Broadcasting Instruments 
 
 
Article 32 
(1) Every establishment and operation of broadcasting must meet the requirements of the basic plan of 
broadcasting technique and the technical requirements of broadcasting instruments. 
(2)  Further provisions concerning the basic plan of broadcasting technique and the technical requirements of 
broadcasting instruments as referred to in clause (1) shall be arranged by KPI together with the 
Government based on the prevailing laws. 
 
Part Eleven 
Licensing 
 
Article 33 
(1) Broadcasting institutions are obliged to obtain broadcasting operation licenses before starting with 
broadcasting activities. 
(2)  The applicants must provide their name, vision, mission, and program format and fulfill the requirements 
stated in this Law. 
(3) The issuance of license as stated in clause (1) is based on the public need, interest and convenience. 
(4)  License and license extension shall be issued by the state after obtaining: 
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a. Input and evaluation result of the hearing between the applicants and KPI; 
b. Recommendation of fit and properness for broadcasting operation issued by KPI; 
c. The agreement in the joint meeting forum held particularly for licensing issue between KPI and the Government; 
and 
d. Allocation License and radio frequency spectrum utilization by the Government upon the 
recommendation of KPI. 
 (5) Based on the result of agreement as referred to in clause (4) point c, administratively the license for 
broadcasting operation is granted by the state through KPI. 
 (6) The broadcasting operation license and the extension license of broadcasting operation are obliged to be 
issued within 30 (thirty) work days at the latest after reaching the agreement from joint meeting forum as 
referred to in clause (4) point c. 
 (7) Broadcasting institutions are obliged to pay the fee for broadcasting operation licenses through the State 
Treasurer’s Office.   
 (8) Further provisions concerning the procedures and requirements for obtaining broadcasting operation 
licenses shall be arranged by the KPI together with the Government. 
 
 
Article 34 
(1) Broadcasting operation licenses that are issued shall be as follows:    
a. Radio broadcasting operation licenses are granted for 5 (five) years period of time.   
b. Television broadcasting operation licenses are granted for 10 (ten) years period of time. 
(2) The licenses as referred to in clause (1) point a and point b are extendable.   
(3) Before obtaining a fixed license for broadcasting operation, radio broadcasting institutions must undergo 
broadcast try-out period for 6 (six) months at the longest and 1 (one) year try-out period for television 
broadcasting institutions at the longest.   
(4) Broadcasting operation licenses are prohibited to be transferred to other parties.   
(5) Broadcasting operation licenses can be revoked due to: 
a. Failure to pass the prescribed broadcasting try-out period; 
b. Violation on the utilization of the allocated radio frequency spectrum and/or broadcast coverage; 
c. Failure to perform broadcast activity more than 3 (three) months without notifying the KPI; 
d. Being transferred to other parties; 
e. Violation on the basic plan of broadcasting techniques and the technical requirements of broadcasting 
instruments; or  
f. Violation on the provisions concerning the broadcast program standards after a permanent court 
verdict.   
 (6) Broadcasting operation licenses become overdue because they have expired and not to be prolonged. 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
BROADCAST OPERATION 
 
Part One 
Broadcast Content 
 
Article 35 
Broadcast content must be in line with the principles, objectives, functions and directions of broadcast as 
referred to in Article 2, Article 3, Article 4, and Article 5. 
 
Article 36 
(1) Broadcast content must contain information, education, and entertainment and be beneficial in the shaping 
of intellectual, personality, morality, advancement, national endurance, maintaining unity and integrity as 
well as implementing religious values and the Indonesian cultural values.   
(2) Broadcast content of television broadcasting services provided by Private Broadcasting Institutions and 
Public Broadcasting Institutions must carry at least 60% (sixty percent) domestic programs.   
 
(3) Broadcast content must provide protection and empowerment to the particular public, who are children and 
youths, by broadcasting programs in a proper time, and broadcasting institutions must include and/or 
mention public classification in accordance with the broadcast content.   
(4) Broadcast content must maintain the neutrality of the program and not to favor the interest of certain 
groups.   
(5) Broadcast content must not include: 
a.  Slander, instigation, misleads, and/or lies;  
b.  Exhibiting violence, indecency, gambling, narcotics and illegal drug abuse; or 
c.   Provoking ethnic, religious, racial and inter-groups conflicts.   
(6) Broadcast content must not ridicule, underestimate, molest and/or neglect religious values, the dignity of 
Indonesian people and violate international relationship.   
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Part Two 
Broadcast Language 
 
Article 37 
The primary language media in broadcast program operation must be the right and proper Indonesian language.   
 
Article 38 
(1) Local languages can be used as introductory language in the operation of local-content broadcast program 
and to support certain programs when necessary.    
(2) Foreign languages can be used only as introductory language in accordance to the necessity of a broadcast 
program.   
 
Article 39 
(1) Programs in foreign language can be broadcasted using the original language and for TV broadcasting services in 
particular, must be equipped with the Indonesian subtitles or selectively dubbed into Bahasa Indonesia in accordance 
to the necessity of certain programs.    
(2) Dubbing of foreign language into Bahasa Indonesia is limited to a maximum of 30% (thirty percent) from 
all foreign programs being broadcast.   
(3) Sign language can be used in certain programs for the deaf.    
 
Part Three 
Relay and Joint Broadcast 
 
Article 40 
(1) Broadcasting institutions may relay programs from other broadcasting stations; either domestic broadcasting stations as well as 
foreign broadcasting stations. 
(2) Broadcast relay used as regular programs, originated both from domestic or foreign, are limited. 
(3) Relay of regular programs originated from foreign broadcasting institutions in particular, the number, 
duration, types and numbers of program are limited.    
(4) Broadcasting institutions may perform relay from other broadcasting institutions irregularly upon certain 
national or international programs and/or favorite programs.    
 
Article 41 
Among broadcasting institutions, cooperation may be performed in making a joint broadcast as long as it is not 
intended to information and opinion-shaping monopoly. 
 
 
Part Four 
Journalistic Activity 
 
Article 42 
In conducting journalistic activity, electronic media journalists must comply with Journalistic Code of Ethics 
and the prevailing laws.   
  
Part Five 
Broadcast Right 
 
Article 43 
(1) Each broadcasted program must have a broadcast right. 
(2) In broadcasting a program, broadcasting institutes are obliged to mention the broadcast right.   
(3) The ownership of broadcast right as referred to in clause (2) must be mentioned clearly in the program. 
(4) Broadcast rights of every broadcast program is protected by the prevailing laws.   
 
Part Six 
Broadcast Rectification 
 
Article 44 
(1)  Broadcasting institutions are obliged to make rectification when it is come to their attention that there is a 
mistake and/or error in their broadcast and/or news content, or when there is protest against the content of 
the program and/or news.    
(2) Rectification or correction must be done in less than the next 24 (twenty-four) hours and when unable to do 
so, the correction can be done in the first opportunity and must be treated as a priority.   
(3). Rectification or correction as referred to in clause (2) does not make the broadcasting institutions immune 
from the responsibility or legal proceeding by the injured parties. 
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Part Seven 
Broadcast Archive 
 
Article 45 
(1) Broadcasting institutions are obliged to store broadcast materials including audio records, video records, 
photos, and documents for at least 1 (one) year after being broadcasted.   
(2) Broadcasting materials with high values of history, information or broadcasting must be submitted to the 
appointed institutions to preserve them in line with prevailing laws.   
 
Part Eight 
Advertising Broadcast 
 
Article 46 
(1) Advertising broadcast consists of commercial and public service advertisement.   
(2) Advertising broadcast must comply with fundamentals, objectives, functions and directions of 
broadcasting as referred to in Article 2, Article 3, Article 4, and Article 5. 
(3) Commercials are not allowed to: 
a. promote something related to the teaching of religions, ideologies, individuals or groups that hurt 
the feelings or abase other religions, ideologies, individuals or groups; 
b. promote liquor or its equivalent and addictive substance or material;    
c. Promote cigarettes by exposing the shape of the cigar; 
d. Promote things that are against the public morality and religious values; and/or  
e. Exploit children under the age of 18 years. 
(4) The advertising broadcast material to be broadcast through broadcasting institutions must meet the 
requirements issued by the KPI. 
(5) Commercials that are broadcasted shall become the responsibility of the relevant broadcasting 
institution.   
(6)  Commercials being broadcasted during the program targeted for children must meet the broadcasting 
standard for children.  . 
(7)  Broadcasting institutions must set aside air time for broadcasting public service advertisements.   
(8) The portion of broadcasting time for commercials in private broadcasting institutions is maximum 20% 
(twenty percent), whilst the portion of broadcasting time for commercials in public broadcasting 
institutions is maximum 15% (fifteen percent) from the entire broadcasting time. 
(9) The portion of broadcasting time for public service advertisements in private broadcasting institutions is 
maximum 10% (ten percent) of the commercial broadcasting time, whilst for public broadcasting 
institutions at least 30% (thirty percent) of the advertising time. 
(10) The airtime of broadcasting institutions cannot be bought by any parties for any reasons other than for 
advertising programs.   
(11) Advertising materials must utilize domestic resources.   
 
 
Part Nine 
Censor of Broadcast Content 
 
Article 47 
Broadcast contents in the form of films and/or advertisements must pass the censorship by the appointed 
institution.   
 
CHAPTER V 
CODE OF CONDUCTS OF BROADCASTING 
 
 
Article 48 
(1)  Code of broadcasting conducts for broadcast operation is determined by the KPI.   
(2) Code of broadcasting conducts as referred to in clause (1) shall be based on: 
a. Religious and moral values and the prevailing laws; and 
b.  Other norms that are valid and acceptable among the general public and broadcasting institutions. 
(3) The KPI must issue and socialize the code of broadcasting conducts to broadcasting institutions and the 
general public.   
(4) The code of broadcasting conducts shall determine the standards of broadcast contents that at least related 
to the:   
a. Respect of religious points of view;   
b. Respect of privacy;  
c. Manner and morality;  
d. Limitation on the exposure of sexuality, violence and sadism; 
e. Protection towards children, youths and women;   
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f. Program classification that is based on group’s age; 
g. Program broadcasting in foreign languages; 
h. Punctuality and neutrality of the news program; 
i. Live broadcasts, and 
j. Advertising broadcasts. 
(5) The KPI will facilitate the establishment of Broadcasting Code of Ethics. 
 
Article 49 
The KPI shall regularly observe the code of broadcasting conducts as referred to in Article 48 clause (3) in line 
with the amendments of the laws and the development of norms prevailed in the society.   
 
Article 50 
 
(1) KPI is obliged to monitor the implementation of code of broadcasting conducts. 
(2) KPI is obliged to accommodate complaints from every individual or group who finds out violations 
towards code of broadcasting conducts. 
(3)  KPI must proceed official complaints on fundamental issues as referred to in Article 8 clause (3) point e. 
(4)  KPI must submit the complaints to the relevant broadcasting institutions and give them a chance to 
respond.  
(5)  KPI must submit a written report on evaluation and examination result to the complainant parties and 
related broadcasting institutions.   
 
Article 51 
(1) The KPI can oblige the broadcasting institutes to broadcast and/or publish the statement related to the 
complaint as referred to in Article 50 clause (2) when it is proven to be true.   
(2) All Broadcasting Institutes must comply with the decisions issued by the KPI that based on the code of 
broadcasting conducts. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
 
Article 52 
 
(1) Every citizen of the Republic of Indonesia has the right, obligation and responsibility to participate in the 
development of national broadcasting operation.   
(2) Non-profit organizations, NGOs, universities, and education circle society can develop literate activities 
and/or the monitoring of Broadcasting Institutions.   
(3) The citizens as mentioned in clause (1) have the right to submit objections against the program and/or 
broadcast content that considered harmful.   
 
 
 
CHAPTER VII 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Article 53 
(1) In exercising its functions, authorities, tasks and obligation, the Central KPI shall be responsible to the 
President and submit reports to the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia.   
(2) In exercising its functions, authorities, tasks and obligation, the Regional KPI shall be responsible to 
Governor and submit reports to the Provincial People’s Representative Council of the Republic of 
Indonesia.   
 
Article 54 
The president of the legal entity of the broadcasting institution shall be responsible in general upon broadcasting 
operation and must appoint the responsible party for each executed program. 
 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS 
 
Article 55 
 (1). Any person whosoever violates provisions as stated in Article 15 clause (2), Article 20, Article 23, Article 
24, Article 26 clause (2), Article 27, Article 28, Article 33 clause (7), Article 34 clause (5) point a, point c, 
point d, and point f, Article 36 clause (2), clause (3), and clause (4), Article 39 clause (1), Article 43 clause 
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(2), Article 44 clause (1), Article 45 clause (1), Article 46 clause (6), clause (7), clause (8), clause (9), and 
clause (11) shall be imposed with administrative sanctions. 
(2) Administrative sanctions as referred to in clause (1) can be in the form: 
a.    Written warning; 
b. Temporary suspension of the problematic program after a certain stage; 
c. Limitation of broadcasting duration and time; 
d. Administrative fine; 
e. Suspension of broadcasting activities for a certain period of time; 
f. Not granting broadcasting operation license extension;  
g. Revocation of broadcasting operation license. 
(3) Further provisions on the procedures and issuance of administrative sanctions as referred to in clause (1) 
and clause (2) shall be arranged by the KPI together with the Government.   
 
 
CHAPTER IX 
INVESTIGATION 
 
Article 56 
(1)  Investigation toward criminal acts regulated by this Law shall be done in accordance with the Penal Codes. 
(2)  For criminal acts related to violations of provisions as referred to in Article 34 clause (5) point b and e, the 
investigation shall be executed by Civilian State Officials in line with prevailing laws. 
 
 
CHAPTER X 
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 
 
Article 57 
The sanction of maximum imprisonment of 5 (five) years and/or a fine of maximum Rp1.000.000.000,00 (one 
billion Rupiah) for radio broadcasting and the sanction of maximum imprisonment of 5 (five) years and/or a fine 
of maximum Rp10.000.000.000,00 (ten billion Rupiah) for television broadcasting, for every person who: 
a. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 17 clause (3);   
b. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 18 clause (2); 
c. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 30 clause (1); 
d. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 36 clause (5); 
e.  Violates the provision as referred to in Article 36 clause (6). 
 
Article 58 
The sanction of maximum imprisonment of 2 (two) years and/or a fine of maximum Rp500.000.000,00 (five 
hundred million Rupiah) for radio broadcasting and the sanction of maximum imprisonment of 2 (two) years 
and/or a fine of maximum Rp5.000.000.000,00 (five billion Rupiah) for television broadcasting, for every 
person who: 
a. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 18 clause (1); 
b. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 33 clause (1); 
c. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 34 clause (4); 
d. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 46 clause (3). 
 
Article 59 
Any person who violates provisions as referred to in Article 46 clause (10) shall be sanctioned with a fine of 
maximum Rp200.000.000,00 (two hundred million Rupiah) for radio broadcasting and the sanction of 
maximum Rp2.000.000.000,00 (two billion rupiahs) for television broadcasting. 
 
 
CHAPTER XI 
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS 
 
Article 60 
(1) With the enactment of this Law, all the existing implementing regulations in the broadcasting field remain 
valid as long as they are not contradictory or replaced with new ones.    
(2) The existing Broadcasting Institutions before the enactment of this Law may continue to perform their 
functions and must adjust themselves with the provisions of this Law within 2 (two) years the longest for 
radio broadcasting services and 3 (three) years the longest for television broadcasting services after the 
enactment of this Law.   
(3)  Broadcasting Institutions that already have relay station before the enactment of this Law and after the end 
of adjustment period can still operate its broadcasting through the relay station until the establishment of 
local station, networking with the concerned Broadcasting Institution within 2 (two) years at the longest, 
unless there is a special reason decided by KPI together with the Government. 
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CHAPTER XII 
CLOSING PROVISIONS 
 
Article 61 
(1) The KPI must have been established within 1 (one) year at the latest after the enactment of this Law. 
 
(2) For the first time the nomination of KPI members is submitted by the government upon public suggestion 
to the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia.   
 
Article 62 
(1) The provisions arranged by KPI together with the Government as referred to in Article 14 clause (10), 
Article 18 clause (3) and clause (4), Article 29 clause (2), Article 30 clause (3), Article 31 clause (4), 
Article 32 clause (2), Article 33 clause (8), Article 55 clause (3), and Article 60 clause (3) shall be 
determined by Governmental Regulation. 
(2) The Governmental Regulation as referred to in clause (1) must be decided within 60 (sixty) days after 
finished being arranged by KPI together with the Government at the latest. 
 
Article 63 
With the enactment of this Law, therefore Law Number 24 Year 1997 concerning Broadcasting (State Gazette 
of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1997 Number 72, Supplement to State Gazette Number 3701) is declared null 
and void. 
 
Article 64 
This Act shall be declared effective on the day of its enactment.   
For public cognizant, it is ordered to publish this Law by placing it in State Gazette of the Republic of 
Indonesia.  
 
Endorsed in Jakarta,  
 On December 28th 2002 
Enacted in Jakarta 
On December 28th 2002 
 
The Minister of State Secretary of the Republic of Indonesia,  
 
(Not signed) 
 
 
BAMBANG KESOWO 
 
STATE GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA YEAR 2002 NUMBER 139 
 
Copied as original 
 
 
The Deputy of Cabinet Secretary 
Law and Legislation Bureau 
 
(Signed) 
 
Lambock V. Nahattands 
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LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
Number 40 of 1999 
Concerning 
THE  PRESS 
 
 
 
 
 
NATIONAL INFORMATION AGENCY 
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
Number 40 of 1999 
concerning 
THE PRESS 
 
WITH THE BLESSING OF GOD ALMIGHTY, 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
 
Considering :  a.  that the freedom of the press is one of  the manifestations of the people’s sovereignty  and 
constitutes an important  element to promote a democratic life  of the society, nation and 
state,  thereby securing the freedom to express  thoughts and opinions as meant  in Article 
28 of the 1945 Constitution;  
  b.  that in a democratic life of the society,  nation and state, the freedom to express  thoughts 
and opinions in accordance  with one’s conscience and the  right to get information are 
fundamental  human rights, which are necessary  to uphold justice and truth, to promote  
public welfare, and to advance the intellectual  life of the nation;  
c.  that the national press as a vehicle of  mass communication, information dissemination,  
and public opinion building,  should be allowed to execute its  principles, functions, 
duties, and roles  as well as possible based on professional  freedom of the press, thus 
necessitating  that it be given legal guarantee  and protection, and also be  made free from 
interference and coercion  from any quarters.  
  d.  that the national press shall take part  in promoting world order based on  freedom, lasting 
peace, and social justice.   
e.  that Act No. 11 of 1966 concerning  Basic Provisions on the Press, as  amended by Act 
No.4 of 1967 and  later amended by Act No. 21 of 1982,  is no longer suitable to the 
demand of  temporal change;  
f.  that based on considerations as  meant by letters a, b, c, d, and e, it is  deemed necessary 
to enact a law on  the Press.  
PROVISIONAL TRANSLATION
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In view of :  1.  Article 5 clause (1), Article 20 clause  (1), Article 27, and Article 28 of the  1945 
Constitution.  
  2. Decree of the People’s Consultative Assembly No. XVII/MPR/1988 on Human  Rights;   
 
With the consent  of the House of Representatives  of the Republic of Indonesia   
 
HAS RESOLVED 
 
To enact :  LAW ON THE PRESS:  
CHAPTER I 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
 
Article 1 
As meant in this law:  
 
(1) “The Press” is a social institution and a vehicle of  mass communication that performs journalistic 
activities  covering the seeking, obtaining, storing, processing,  and disseminating of information, either 
in the  forms of manuscript, audio, visual, audio-visual, and  data and graphs, as well as in other forms of 
the  printed media, the electronic media and any other  forms of media.  
(2) A Press Corporation is an Indonesian corporate  body that operates press undertakings, which cover  
the printed media, electronics media, news agencies,  and other media corporations with specialization in  
managing, disseminating and distributing information.   
(3) A News Agency is a press corporation that serves  the printed media, electronics media or other media, 
as well as the community in obtaining information.  
(4) A Journalist is a person doing journalistic works on  a regular basis.  
(5) A Press Organization is an organization of journalists  and that of press corporations.  
(6) A National Press is the press operated by an Indonesian  press corporation.  
(7) A Foreign Press is the press operated by a foreign  press corporation.  
(8) Censorship is the forced removing of some or all parts  of information materials to be published or 
broadcast,  or warnings or reprimands with threats from any quarter,  and/or obligation to report to, and 
apply for permit  from the authority to carry out journalistic activities.  
(9) Bridling or broadcasting prohibition is the terminating  of publication and distribution of the printed  
media, or coerced and illegal broadcasting.  
(10) Right of Refusal is the right of a journalist, in the line  of his/her profession, to refuse to disclose the 
name(s)  or other identities of the source person(s), which the  journalist must keep in secret.  
(11) Right of Reply is the right of a person or a group of  persons to make responses and denials to 
publication  contents that harm his/her or their good name.  
(12) Right of Correction is the right of everybody to correct  or rectify mistaken information, either on 
his/her- self or concerning other persons, which is published  by the press.  
(13) Obligation of Correction is the obligation to correct  or rectify false information, data, fact, opinion, or 
picture, which have been published by the press concerned.  
(14) Journalistic Code of Ethics is a compilation of professional  ethics for journalists.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
PRINCIPLES, FUNCTIONS, RIGHTS, DUTIES, 
AND ROLES OF THE PRESS 
 
Article 2 
Freedom of the Press is one of the manifestations of  the people’s sovereignty, which is based on the principles  
of democracy, justice, and legal supremacy.  
 
Article 3 
(1)  The national press functions as a medium for information  dissemination, education, entertainment, and 
social  control.  
(2)  In addition to the functions referred to under clause  (1), the national press also functions as an economic  
institution.  
 
Article 4 
(1)  The freedom of the press is guaranteed as the basic  right of the citizens.  
(2)  Towards the national press, there shall be no censorship,  bridling, or broadcasting prohibition.  
(3)  By the freedom of the press, the national press has  every right to seek, get, and disseminate ideas and 
information.  
(4)  In bearing legal responsibility for a publication, a journalist  has the Right of Refusal.  
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Article 5 
(1)  In reporting events and opinions, the press is obliged  to pay respect to the religious norms, social morality  
and the principle of presumption of innocence.  
(2)  The press is obliged to honor the Right of Reply.  
(3)  The press has an obligation to abide by the Right of  Correction.  
 
Article 6 
The national press holds the roles to:  
a.  fulfill the right of the people to know;  
b.  uphold the basic values of democracy, encourage the  observance of legal supremacy and human rights, 
and  pay respect to diversity.  
c.  develop public opinion based on correct, accurate and  true information.  
d.  launch supervision, criticism, and correction, and offer  suggested solutions to matters pertaining to public  
interests.  
e.  fight for justice and truth.  
 
CHAPTER III 
JOURNALISTS 
 
Article 7 
(1)  A journalist is free to join any journalist organization of  his or her choice.  
(2)  Journalists should sanction a Journalistic Code of Ethics and abide by it.  
 
Article 8 
In executing his/her duties, a journalist is provided with the necessary legal protection.  
 
CHAPTER IV 
PRESS CORPORATIONS 
 
Article 9 
(1)  Every Indonesian citizen has the right to establish a  Press Corporation.  
(2)  Every press corporation must be in the form of Indonesian  corporate body.  
 
Article 10 
A Press Corporation should always step up the welfare  of its journalists and other press workers by offering  
shares in the ownership of the venture and/or net profit  sharing and other forms of incentives.  
 
Article 11 
Infusion of foreign capital to a press corporation should  be made through the stock exchange.  
Article 12 
A press corporation is obliged to openly announce its  name, address and administrator-in-charge through said  
media; specific to press publication, name and address of  the printer corporation should also be included.  
 
Article 13 
A press corporation is prohibited from carrying advertisements  that:  
a.  dishonor the dignity of a religion and/or disturb the  harmonious life among religious followers, and 
contradict  public morality;  
b.  feature liquor, narcotics, psychotropic, and other addictive  substances in line with provisions of operative  
statutory regulations.  
c.  show the form of cigarette and/or cigarette usage.  
 
Article 14 
To disseminate news at home and to abroad, every Indonesian citizen and the state are allowed to establish a 
news agency.  
 
CHAPTER V 
PRESS COUNCIL 
 
Article 15 
(1)  Within the frame of helping uphold the freedom of the  press and improving the national press life, an 
independent  Press Council shall be founded.  
(2)  The Press Council shall execute its functions as follows:  
a.  to protect the freedom of the press from interferences  by other parties;  
b.  to carry out studies to enhance the development of  the press life;  
c.  to sanction a Journalistic Code of Ethics and to  supervise its implementation;  
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d.  to give considerations and to help settle public complaints  over press publication-related cases;  
e.  to facilitate communications among the press, the people, and the government;  
f.  to help press organizations in formulating regulations in the field of the press and to improve the 
quality of journalistic profession;  
g.  to set up a data bank on press corporations.  
 
(3)  The Press Council membership shall consist of:  
a.  Journalists chosen by journalist organizations;  
b.  Executives of press corporations chosen by press corporation organizations;  
c.  Public figures, experts in the field of the press and or communications and other fields, chosen by 
journalist organizations and press corporation organizations;  
(4)  The chairperson and vice chairperson of the Press Council are elected from among and by the members of 
the Council;  
(5)  The membership of the Press Council as meant by clause (3) of this Article shall be determined by a 
Presidential Decree;  
(6)  The membership of the Press Council shall be effective for a period of 3 (three) years and afterward is 
eligible for reelection for one more term only;  
(7)  Financial sources of the Press Council shall derive from:  
a.  press organizations;  
b.  press corporations;  
c.  unconditional contributions from the state and other donors.  
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
FOREIGN PRESS 
 
Article 16 
Foreign press circulation and the establishment of foreign press representative offices in Indonesia shall be done 
according to the provisions of the operative statutory regulations.  
 
 
CHAPTER VII 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
 
Article 17 
(1)  The public may hold activities to facilitate the exercise of the freedom of the press and guarantee the right 
to obtain required information.  
(2)  The activities as meant in clause (1) can be in the forms of:  
a.  monitoring and writing analyses on legal violations, ethics and on technical errors of the presentation 
of new reports committed by the press;  
b.  conveying suggestions and recommendations to the Press Council with a view to maintaining and 
improving the quality of the national press.  
 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
PENAL PROVISIONS 
 
Article 18 
(1)  Whosoever illegally and deliberately takes actions that result in the impediment and obstruction to the 
implementation of the provisions of Article 4 clause (2) and clause (3) of this law shall be liable to a 
maximum prison sentence of 2 (two) years and/or a maximum fine amounting to Rp500,000,000.00 (five 
hundred million rupiahs).  
(2)  Any press corporation that violates the provisions of Article 5 clause (1) and clause (2) and Article 13 of 
this law shall be liable to a maximum fine of Rp500,000,000.00 (five hundred million rupiahs).  
(3)  Any press corporation that violates the provisions of Article 9 clause (2) and Article 12 of this law shall be 
liable to a maximum fine of Rp100,000,000.00 (one hundred million rupiahs).  
 
 
CHAPTER IX 
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS 
 
Article 19 
(1)  After the sanctioning of this law, all operative regulations in the field of the press as well as all existing 
agencies and institutions remain effective and continue to function so long as they are not in contradiction 
to or not yet replaced by new ones based on this law.  
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(2)  Press corporations already in existence before this Law comes into force, shall adjust themselves with the 
provisions of this Law within 1 (one) year after this Law is promulgated.  
 
 
CHAPTER X 
CLOSING PROVISIONS 
 
Article 20 
At the time this Law comes into force:  
(1)  Act No. 11/1966 concerning Basic Provisions on the Press (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia 
No.40, Supplementary State Gazette No.2815) that was amended the last by Act No.21 of 1982 on 
Amendments to Act No. 11 of 1966 on Basic Provisions on the Press as it was amended by Act No.4 of 
1967 (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 1982 No. 52, Supplementary State Gazette No.3235);  
(2)  Act No. 4/PNPS of 1963 on Control of Printed Matters, the Content of which may Disturb Public Order 
(State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 1963 No 23, Supplementary State Gazette of the Republic of 
Indonesia No.2533), Article 2 clause (3) as applied to provisions on bulletins, daily newspapers, and 
periodical publications; are hereby declared invalid.  
 
Article 21 
This law shall come into effect at the date of its sanctioning. In order that everyone may take cognizance of it, it 
is hereby ordered to place this Law in the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Sanctioned in: Jakarta   
On: 23rd September 1999  
 
PRESIDENT  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA  
 
sgd  
BACHARUDDIN JUSUF HABIBIE  
Promulgated in Jakarta  
On 23rd September 1999  
 
MINISTER/STATE SECRETARY  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA  
 
sgd  
MULADI  
 
STATE GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA OF 1999 NUMBER 166  
 
 
ELUCIDATION  
on LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
Number 40 of 1999 
concerning 
THE PRESS 
 
GENERAL 
Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution guarantees the  freedom to associate and assemble, to express thoughts  
in writing and orally. The press, which includes the printed  media, electronic media and other media, 
constitutes a  means to express the thoughts in writing and orally. In order  that the press may function 
maximally as mandated in  
Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution, it is deemed necessary to produce a Law concerning the Press. The 
maximum function of the Press will be needed because the freedom of the press is a materialization of the 
people’s sovereignty and constitutes an important element in a democratic life of the society, nation, and state.  
In the democratic life, the accountability to the people is secured, the transparency of the state 
administration functions, and justice and truth is established.  
The press, which enjoys the freedom to seek and impart information, will also be indispensable in 
observing Human Rights that is guaranteed by Decree No. XVII/MPR/1988 of the People’s Consultative 
Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia on Human Rights. The decree among other things states that everyone 
has the right to communicate and to get information, in conformity with the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19, which reads: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”  
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The press, which also conducts social control, is very important to prevent power abuse, be it in the form 
of corruption, collusion, nepotism, or other deviation and misconduct.  
In implementing its functions, rights, duties, responsibilities and roles, the press shall pay respect to 
everybody’s basic rights, thus raising the expectation of the Press to be professional and to be open to control by 
the public. Control by the public shall include the observance of the Right of Reply and the Right of Correction 
by everybody, by social institutions such as Media Watch, and by the Press Council in various forms and means. 
To prevent overlapping arrangements, this Law does not stipulate provisions that have been regulated by other 
statutory regulations.  
 
 
Article by Article 
 
Article 1 
 Sufficiently clear  
 
Article 2 
 Sufficiently clear  
 
Article 3 
 Clause (1) 
  Sufficiently clear  
 Clause (2) 
Press corporations shall be managed on the  basis of economic principles in order that the quality  
of the press and the welfare of journalists and other press workers may continuously be improved, 
without neglecting its social responsibility.  
Article 4 
 Clause (1) 
What is meant by “the freedom of the press is guaranteed as the basic right of citizens” is that the 
press is free from any kind of actions of restraint, prohibition, and/or coercion, thus securing the 
people’s right to get information. Freedom of the press is the freedom imbued with awareness on 
the need to uphold legal supremacy that is enforced by the court, and professional accountability as 
elaborated by the Journalistic Code of Ethics and in line with the conscience of the journalists.  
 Clause (2) 
No censorship, bridling, or broadcasting prohibition shall be applied to the printed and electronic 
media. Transmission of information which makes no part of the implementation of the journalistic 
activities shall be regulated in the provisions of other operative regulations.  
 Clause (3) 
  Sufficiently clear  
 Clause (4) 
The main aim of the Right of Refusal is to enable a journalist to protect the source of information, 
by refusing to mention the identity of the source of information concerned. Said right is applicable 
in case of the journalist is asked to give information by investigative officers or to be a witness 
before the court. The Right of Refusal can be revoked for the sake of the state interests and security 
or public order, as ruled by the court.  
 
Article 5 
 Clause (1) 
The national press, in broadcasting information, shall not pass judgment or make a conclusion on 
someone being guilty or otherwise, particularly, moreover on cases being processed in the court of 
justice. And the national press should also accommodate the interests of all parties’ related with the 
report.  
 Clause (2) 
  Sufficiently clear  
 Clause (3) 
  Sufficiently clear  
 
Article 6 
The national press has an important role in fulfilling the people’s right to know and to develop public 
opinion, by conveying correct, accurate, and true information. This will encourage the upholding of justice 
and truth, and the realization of legal supremacy towards the creation of an orderly society.  
 
Article 7 
 Clause (1) 
  Sufficiently clear  
 Clause (2) 
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What is meant by “The Journalistic Code of Ethics” is a code of ethics which is agreed upon by 
journalists’ organizations and is stipulated by the Press Council.  
 
Article 8 
What is meant by “legal protection” is protection by the government and or society to journalists in 
carrying out their functions, rights, duties, and roles in conformity with the provisions of operative 
statutory regulations.  
 
Article 9 
 Clause (1) 
All Indonesian citizens are given an equal right or opportunity to work in conformity with Human 
Rights, including to establish a press corporation in accordance with the operative statutory 
regulations. The national press has important and strategic functions and roles in the life of the 
society, nation, and state. As such, the state is entitled to establish a press corporation by founding 
an institution or a corporation to operate a press undertaking.  
 Clause (2) 
  Sufficiently clear.  
 
Article 10 
What is meant by “other forms of incentives” is a raise in salary, bonus, insurance policy, and so forth. The 
provision of welfare shall be implemented on the basis of an agreement between the corporation 
management and the press workers.  
 
Article 11 
Infusion of foreign capital to a press corporation shall be limited to below the majority stake and shall be 
carried out in conformity with the operative statutory regulations.  
 
Article 12 
Open announcement of the name, address and administrators-in-charge shall be done through:  
a.  for the printed media, the column of the name, address, and administrators of the publication 
concerned and the name and address of the printing company;  
b.  for the electronic media, the name, address and administrators of the corporation, the introduction or 
conclusion of every journalistic broadcasting works;  
c.  for other media, means adjusted to the form, nature, and characteristic of the media concerned. This 
announcement is meant as manifestation of accountability on those journalistic works which have 
been published or broadcast. What is meant by “administrators” are persons in charge of the press 
corporation, covering the business and editorial departments.  
 Matters regarding penal accountability shall abide by the provisions of the operative statutory 
regulations.  
 
Article 13 
 Sufficiently clear  
 
Article 14 
 Sufficiently clear  
 
Article 15 
 Clause (1) 
The aim of forming the Press Council is to promote freedom of the press and to step up the quality 
and quantity of the national press.  
 Clause (2) 
Considerations to the public complaints as meant in clause (2) letter d are in relation with the Right 
of Reply, Right of Correction, and assumption of violations to the Journalistic Code of Ethics.  
 Clause (3) 
  Sufficiently clear  
 Clause (4) 
  Sufficiently clear  
 Clause (5) 
  Sufficiently clear  
 Clause (6) 
  Sufficiently clear  
 Clause (7) 
  Sufficiently clear  
 
Article 16 
 Sufficiently clear  
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Article 17 
 Clause (1) 
  Sufficiently clear  
 Clause (2) 
To materialize public participation as meant in this clause, it is allowable to set up a media watch 
institution or organization.  
 
Article 18 
 Clause (1) 
  Sufficiently clear  
 Clause (2) 
In a case of criminal violation done by a press corporation, the administrator shall act on behalf of 
said corporation, as meant by Article 12.  
 Clause (3) 
  Sufficiently clear  
 
Article 19 
 Sufficiently clear 
 
Article 20 
 Sufficiently clear 
 
Article 21 
 Sufficiently clear  
 
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY STATE GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA NUMBER 3887.  
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Laws and Government Regulations 
concerning the Right to Information 
 
 
Indonesia has several laws and government regulations that have articles or provisions touching on  
the right to information. The following is a select listing of these**: 
 
The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia states: “ Freedom of association and assembly, of expressing thoughts and issuing writing and the 
like, shall be prescribed by statute.” (Quoted from the translation of the Confederation in Abdul Razak (1985), 
Press Laws and Systems in ASEAN States, Confederations of ASEAN Journalists Publication, Jakarta, p. 258). 
 
In August 2000, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), Indonesia’s highest body empowered to draw and 
change the Constitution, expanded Article 28 to include human rights. It covers 10 basic rights. The right to 
communicate and obtain information to develop his or her personal self and social environment, and the right to 
seek, obtain, own, store, process and deliver information by using all kinds of channels available.” 
 
The Human Rights Charter in MPR Stipulation XVII/1998 on Human Rights. Every person has the right to 
seek, obtain, own, store, process, and transfer information using all kinds of channels available (Article 20, 
Section VI on the right to freedom of information). 
 
Act no. 40/1999 on the Press. Article 4, paragraph 1, states: Press freedom is guaranteed as a citizen’s human 
right. Article 4, paragraph 3, states: to guarantee press freedom, the national press reserves the right to seek, 
obtain and disseminate  ideas and information. 
 
Act no. 28/1999 on State Administrators Clean and Free from Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism 
(Good Governance Act). – Every State Administrator is obliged to report and announce his or her assests 
before and after taking office (Article 5, point 3). 
• Participation in the administration of the State is a public right and responsibility to create clean State 
administrators (Article 8, paragraph 1). 
• Public participation meant in Article 8 takes the from of: a. the right to seek, obtain and provide 
information on State administration (Article 9, paragraph 1). 
• Provisions on the how to implement public participation in State administration shall be elaborated in 
a government regulation (Article 9, paragraph 3) 
 
Government Regulation no. 68/1999 on Implementing Procedures of Public Participation in State 
Administration (issued July 14, 1999 and effective since November 20, 1999). This regulation provides the 
implementing procedures for Act no. 28/1999. 
• In matters where the public intends to seek and obtain information on State administration, the party 
concerned has the right to inquire or obtain from the office or agency in question. (Article 3, 
paragraph 1). 
• The right for equal and fair service from a State administrator can be obtained by compliance of 
conditions and observance of the procedures of obtaining service in line with operating laws and 
regulation (Article 7). 
• Every State administrator who receives a public request to obtain information on State administration 
is required to provide an answer or explanation in line with his or her duty and function and at the 
same time paying attention to existing laws and regulations (Article 10). 
 
Act no. 39/1999 on Human Rights. Every person has the right to communicate and obtain information (Article 
14). 
 
Act no. 31/1999 on the Eradication of Corruption as a Criminal Act. The public can participate in helping 
efforts to prevent and eradicate corruption. Public participation can take the from of: 
• the right to seek, obtain, and provide information regarding the suspected existence of a criminal act 
of corruption; 
Appendix  3
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• the right to obtain service in seeking, obtaining and providing information regarding the suspected 
existence of criminal act of corruption from law enforcement authorities that handle cases of criminal 
acts of corruption (Article 41). 
 
Act no. 23/1999 on Bank Indonesia. The Central Bank is required to provide the public through the mass 
media at the start of every fiscal year information containing an evaluation on the implementation of monetary 
policy the previous year and monetary policy plans and goals for the coming year (Article 58). The governor of 
the Central Bank and officers down the rank can face up to three years imprisonment and a fine of up to three 
billion rupiah for illegal disclosure of confidential information. The confidentiality of information is established 
by a regulation of the board of governors (Article 71). 
 
Act no. 12/1997 on Copyright. The Justice Department draws up a list of copyright for public preview at no 
charge (Article 29). 
 
Act no. 13/1997 on Patents. The Patents Office provides a special place where interested members of the public 
can have the opportunity to look at documents for patent applications that have been announced (Article 50). 
 
Act no. 14/1997 on Trademarks. The Trademarks Office will, within 14 days at the latest since receiving  an 
application for trademark registration, announce those applications that have complied with the conditions 
(Article 19). 
 
Government Regulation no. 18/1999 on the Management of Hazardous and Toxic Waste.  Every person 
has the right of information on hazardous – and toxic – waste management. The responsible authority is required 
to provide information to every person  publicly (Article 54). 
 
Act no. 25/1999 on the Financial Balance between the Center and the Regions. The central government 
implements a regional financial information system. The information in this regional financial information 
system is public data that can be made available to the public. (Article 27). 
 
Act no. 41/1999 on Forestry. The government together with the business community and public publish 
research and information systems development results and information on forestry research and research result 
services (Article 54). 
 
Act no. 23/1997 on Environmental Management. Every person has the right to environmental information 
linked to a role in environmental management (Article 5).  Every person  who undertake a business and/or an 
activity has the obligation to provide true and accurate information on environmental management (Article 6). 
 
Act no. 24/1992 on Spatial Use Management. Every person has the right to know os spatial use plans (Article 
4, paragraph 2, letter  a). 
 
Act no 8/1999 on Consumer Protection.  Consumer protection has the aim to create a consumer protection 
system that contains the element of legal certainty and information openness and access to the information 
(Article 3, letter  d). 
• The right of the consumer is the right to true, clear and honest information on the condition and 
guarantee of goods and/or services (Article 4, letter e). 
• The obligation of the business practitioner is to provide true, clear and honest information on the 
condition  and guarantee of goods and/or services and provide directions on use, improvements and 
maintenance (Article 7, letter f). 
 
Government regulation no 27/1999 on Environment  Impact Analysis. 
• Every enterprise and/or activity as determined in Article 3, paragraph 2, must be announced to the 
public in advance before the party that initiates the enterprise or activity can formulate the 
environmental impact analysis (Article 33, paragraph 1). 
• All documents concering environmental impact analysis, suggestions, opinions and responses of 
citizens concerned, the conclusions of the evaluating committee, and the decision concerning the 
environmental worthiness of the enterprise and/or activity is for public disclosure (Article 35, 
paragraph 2). 
 
Government regulation no. 69/1996 on the Implementation of the Rights and Obligation, and the Form 
and Methods of Public Participation in Spatial Use Management. 
• In activities on spatial use, the public has the right to be publicly informed on spatial-use plans 
(Article 2, letter  b). 
• To realize the public’s right to be informed on spatial-use plans as determined in Article 2, spatial-use 
plans are enacted and published  in: 
a. The State Gazette for national-level spatial-use plans. 
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b. The Provincial gazette for provincial-level  spatial-use plans. 
c. The district/city gazette for district/municipal spatial-use plans (Article 3, paragraph 1). 
• To meet the pubic’s right as determined in paragraph 1, the government has the obligation to 
announce/disseminate spatial-use plans that have been stipulated at places that would enable the 
public to be informed of them easily (Article 3, paragraph 1). 
 
 
Act no. 10/1998 on Changes to Act no 7/1992 on Banking. 
• Banks  have the obligation to treat information of depositors and their deposits as confidential with 
certain exemptions (Article 40, letter  a). 
• For the interest of taxation, the management of Bank Indonesia at the request of the Minister of 
Finance has the authority to issue a written order addressed to a bank to provide information and 
present  written evidence and documents on the financial situation of certain depositors to the tax 
authorities (Article 41, letter  c). 
• For criminal cases before a court of law, the management of Bank Indonesia can provide permission 
to the place, prosecutors or to judges to obtain information from a bank accounts of a suspect or 
defendant (Article 42, paragraph 2). 
 
Act no. 36/1999 on Telecommunications. Whenever a customer requires the records for the 
telecommunications service used, the telecommunications service provider has the obligation to make them 
available. (Article 18, paragraph 2). 
• A telecommunications service provider has the obligation to treat as confidential information that is 
sent and/or received by customers of the telecommunications service through the telecommunications 
network provided (Article 42, paragraph 3). 
 
The Criminal Code (KUHP). Whosoever purposely discloses confidential information that requires that person 
to keep it by virtue of his or  her position, in the present of in the past, can be convicted with a maximum prison 
sentence of nine months or a fine of up to six hundred rupiah (Article 322). 
 
Act no. 7/1971 on Archives. Archieves are papers produced and received by state agencies and government 
bodies in whatever form, either singly or in clusters, for use in implementations of government business (Article 
1,  letter  a). 
• Whoseever purposefully and illegally owns archieves as defined in Article 1, letter a of this law can be 
prosecuted and liable to a maximum 10 years in prison (Article 11, paragraph 1). 
• Whoseever stores an archive as defined in Article 1 letter a of this law, who purposely discloses its 
contents to an unauthorized third party can be prosecuted and liable to life imprisonment or face a 
maximum 20-year prison sentence (Article 11, paragraph 2). 
 
________________________ 
** Quoted from Basorie (2001). 
 
 
